

CANADIAN FORCES, MODERNIZATION and REORGANIZATION

A Critical Look at the
Canadian Forces Transformation Project

Applied Project

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TRANSFORMATION
CANADIAN FORCES, MODERNIZATION and REORGANIZATION

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 SITUATION

1.1.1 The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) have entered into a period of extensive change. This process did not appear from the exceptional vision of an individual or miracle team, but is the result of many years of study and the continuous change of virtually every possible influencing factor, home and abroad. Everything from the availability of military recruits and civil service applicants to the balance of power in our volatile world, have combined to produce a constantly developing national and international security environment.

1.1.2 The intention of this project is to provide a good picture of the circumstances from which the department and the forces embarked on this journey and the long process involved. It will then examine the steps taken and progress achieved to date. It is important that all understand that this project is not studying a simple exercise in applied logic. The many authorities involved did not just identify the need for department wide alteration and immediately proceed with finding and applying solutions.

1.2 BACKGROUND

1.2.1 In any political system, a nation's military institutions are subject to the whims and perceived realities of those in power. Politicians make the primary decisions and set the governing policies that determine the health level of importance the government affords to its military forces. There are many factors that are considered by elected ministers or those in "absolute" power when increasing or decreasing the fiscal resources available to their forces.

1.2.2 For the dictator, totalitarian regime or other holders of various forms of absolute power, the military is most frequently essential to their survival and are treated accordingly. In a democracy, the formula becomes much more complicated. Bureaucrats or at least civil servants will complete studies, compile reports and provide advice on the condition of military forces and how they should develop in the future. The incumbent military leaders will provide their technical input to the puzzle and it is the responsibility of the members of the "house of representatives", whatever their name and format, to determine what military posture, size and sophistication is best for all those who have a vested interest at any level.

1.2.3 The factors to be considered are quite considerable and extensive. They include everything from the world situation to the ability to recover from natural disasters and political turmoil at home. The rapid escalation of technology development and availability and multiplying costs against shrinking funds available must be weighed with the political guess as to the population's

willingness to pay for military capability over other areas in the constantly expanding list of public funding priorities. Though many people tend to look with disdain on this factor, all must expect, and respect, the reality that the elected official will have to gauge how various decisions will affect their personal and party future. If they are not in power they can not exercise their power or influence on policy or proceedings.

1.2.4 It is not a perfect process in any political system and is most probably more difficult in a democracy. The dictators need only satisfy those who support their power while the periodically elected must win the support of their party, constituents and financial contributors. Then it is time to consider the situation and what is the best course of action for all concerned.

1.2.5 If there is going to be a discussion of the most recent restructuring of the Canadian Military, there is a need to present a fresh understanding of the start state and where it originated. The Canadian Armed Forces (Canadian Forces is also an official identifier (CF)) emerged from the “integration” of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force starting with the White Paper on Defence (WPD64) presented in March, 1964¹.

1.2.6 The integration process was, officially, a ten year program, however, from personal observation and experience, throughout that process, all visible changes were completed with the issue of new hat badges and other insignia in the spring of 1972. This was followed by thirty years of continuous cycles of change and strength reductions. Integration and unification are not new concepts, as the control advantages of a single military commander had been a central factor of the military-civil, power split, debate from confederation².

1.2.7 The Navy, Army and Air Force comprised a total of eleven separate service commands and approximately 115,000 personnel in 1964 when the groundwork legislation was passed. They were each commanded by a “Chief of Staff” and several subordinate commanders. This was replaced by six integrated functional commands, three operational and three for support. The three operational commands were Maritime, Mobile and Air while the three support commands were Materiel, Training and Air Transport with all concentrated into a system of 39 “Canadian Forces Bases”(CFB) and several "Canadian Forces Stations"(CFS) operating the North America Air Defence (NORAD), radar chains³.

1.2.8 Though there were several strength reductions, base closures, unit removals and the resulting restructuring over the interim period, the CF kept this basic structure up to the implementation of the various modernisation initiatives in

¹ Encyclopedia Canadiana, Vol. 3, (228)

² Report, by Doctor R. Mackay Hitsman, Director Directorate of History. Published after Dr. Hitsman's death in (1967) by S.F. Wise, Director Directorate of History and is annotated by W.O. P.R. Marshall, who had assisted in the preparation of the report.

³ Encyclopedia Canadiana, Vol. 3, (229)

2000. Personnel strength was listed as 62,000 regular and 25,000 reserves/rangers, however, those numbers do include members who have signed recruiting papers but have not started training, personnel on medical holding lists for treatment or release, persons who have been released and are on terminal/severance leave and many members who work in areas widely separated from operations or operational training.⁴

1.2.9 Through this period, the CF deployed United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Missions (PkM) around the world and conducted several series of "division level" exercises in Canadian training areas and with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. However, the UN missions were either individual personnel tasks or new units formed in the mission location. The exercise divisions were very small and were built by stripping the infrastructure and training establishments. This severely restricted any accumulation of experience and resulting personnel and economic gains.

1.2.10 Somalia was the first deployment of a significant, integral, armed fighting unit by the Canadian Military since Korea. It did not go very well for many reasons. The Somalia Inquiry Report⁵ (SIR) opens with; *"On July 2, 1997, the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, released the Somalia Inquiry Report."* The report then opens with some very broad references to the many failings of various government departments and officials throughout the severely shortened period of study and decision on CF participation in the mission. However, as they are never investigated, they were not considered pertinent to the purpose of this study and the best analysis, of CF problems in the mission, are summarized in the Conclusion⁶.

1.2.11 The conclusion to the report opens with; *"It is inappropriate, at this point, to speak in terms of a conclusion to the Somalia debacle. Our investigation has been curtailed, and important questions remain unanswered. Somalia, unfortunately, will continue to be a painful and sensitive topic for Canada's military for years to come. There can be no closure to this subject until the myriad problems that beset the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence are addressed comprehensively and effectively."*, and continues with; *"The stigma of failure must be attached to the Somalia deployment because the mission failed in so many important ways. While it makes for dispiriting reading, a review of our findings on fundamental matters shows the extent of the morass into which our military has fallen"*. These are very strong and unpleasant terms, but extremely difficult to refute and the itemized findings cover the full spectrum of factors that determine military success. They are:

⁴ About DND/CF – Who We Are, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about/index_e.asp

⁵ Somalia Inquiry Report, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/somalia/index_e.asp

⁶ Somalia Inquiry Report, Executive Summary, Conclusion, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/somalia/vol0/V0S27_e.asp

1. *LEADERSHIP* was central to our Inquiry, because at issue was the extent to which the mission failed because of leadership shortcomings. Throughout this report, we ask repeatedly whether what ought to have been done was in fact done. Too often, our answer is "no".
2. *ACCOUNTABILITY* was ever before us, since the whole purpose of an investigative inquiry is to provide a full accounting of what has transpired. What the Government of the day and the Canadian people were seeking from our Inquiry were our findings on the accountability of senior CF officers and DND officials for the failures of the Somalia mission. We provide principles of accountability to be used as the yardsticks by which we assess the actions and decisions of senior leaders. Again, too often, we find that those actions and decisions were scandalously deficient.
3. *CHAIN OF COMMAND*, if not effective, consigns the military enterprise to failure. In our Inquiry, where the task is to examine and analyze the sufficiency of the actions and decisions taken by leaders and the effectiveness of the operation as a whole, the importance of an effective chain of command is very clear. Regrettably, our conclusion is that the chain of command, whether in theatre or in Ottawa at NDHQ, failed utterly at crucial points throughout the mission and its aftermath.
4. *DISCIPLINE*, whose chief purpose is to harness of the capacity of the individual to the needs of the group, is initially imposed through the rigours of training. The ultimate goal of military discipline is to lead individual soldiers to the stage where they control their own conduct and actions. The probability of success for a particular mission will vary in proportion to the extent to which there is good discipline among soldiers. In the lead-up to the deployment, as well as in Somalia itself, that state of discipline among the troops was alarmingly substandard - a condition that persisted without correction.
5. *MISSION PLANNING* entails proper planning and preparation. Where inadequacies occur in these areas, the conditions for mission failure are created. Substantial planning failures and inadequacies were manifest in such things as last-minute changes to the mission, its location, the tasks involved, the rules governing the use of force, the organization, composition and structure of the force, as well as in shortfalls in logistical support, weapons and materiel, and force training.
6. *SUITABILITY* focuses on the qualities of the unit selected for service in Somalia. With the selection of the CAR to serve in Somalia came the need for us to evaluate the adequacy of that choice by senior leadership, given such realities as recognized deficiencies in the organization and leadership of the Regiment, the restructuring and downsizing of the Regiment, the failure to remedy known disciplinary problems, and the

- substantial turnover in personnel just prior to deployment. Our examination of this question leads us to conclude that the CAR was clearly unsuited, in the mission-specific sense, to serve in Somalia.*
- 7. TRAINING is the bedrock of discipline and the foundation for the professional image of the armed forces. Fundamental to the operational readiness of a unit is the question of whether troops are well trained to perform all aspects of the specific mission for which the unit is being deployed. In this report, we have striven to answer the question of whether the soldiers who were deployed to Somalia were properly trained for their mission. This involved an assessment of the nature and adequacy of the actual training received and the policies underlying that training, together with an examination of whether the performance of our soldiers could have been improved or enhanced if they had been exposed to additional, more focused and sophisticated training. Our conclusion regarding mission-specific training is that on almost every count the Somalia mission must rate as a significant failure.*
 - 8. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT refer to the operational directions that guide the application of armed force by soldiers within a theatre of operations and define the degree, manner, circumstances, and limitations surrounding the application of that force. Our task was to evaluate the extent to which the rules of engagement were effectively interpreted, understood and applied at all levels of the Canadian Forces' chain of command. We find that the ROE were poorly drafted, slow to be transmitted, never the subject of proper training, and inconsistently interpreted and applied. Moreover, we found serious deficiencies in the Canadian policy and procedures for the development, formulation, and transmission of ROE.*
 - 9. OPERATIONAL READINESS entails a rigorous and comprehensive assessment of whether an assigned unit is ready to mount its mission in an operational theatre. In some sense, the concept embraces all the matters described to this point. If a unit is led by competent and accountable leaders who respect and adhere to the imperatives of the chain of command system; if the soldiers serving under these leaders are properly recruited and screened, cohesive, well trained and disciplined; if they have a clear understanding of adequately conceived and transmitted rules of engagement, then one can have confidence that this is a unit that is operationally ready to deploy and to be employed. To our deep regret, we came to negative conclusions about each of these elements and found that the Canadian Airborne Regiment, in a fundamental sense, was not operationally ready to deploy and be employed for its mission.*
 - 10. COVER-UP has been used in this report to describe a deliberate course of conduct that aims to frustrate broader moral, legal, or public claims to*

information and involves a purposeful attempt at concealment. In the military, laws and regulations impose specific duties in relation to reporting, retaining, or divulging information. In our inquiry, the reporting of significant incidents in theatre and the adequacy of the investigations prompted by such reports revealed the existence of one kind of cover-up, while the alteration and falsification of documents and the manipulation of access to information processes led to another. Also, a third variety emerged, as many of the documents to which we were entitled and that were pledged publicly to us by leaders, both governmental and military, reached us with deliberate tardiness, or in incomplete form, or not at all. We found deep moral and legal failings in this area when we unearthed the origins of cover-up in both the incident of March 4, 1993, and in our examination of the public affairs directorate of DND.

1.2.12 It is apparent that there is an urgent need for some criteria against which to measure efforts and results. As they were developed after the Somalia mission it is logical to believe that the "lessons learned" in Somalia and the Balkans were strong influences on the "Defence Strategy 2020" as outlined in "Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020, June 1999"⁷. This document states: *"At its core, the strategy is to position the force structure of the CF to provide Canada with modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations. The force structure must be viable, achievable and affordable. A summary of critical attributes of this strategy together with strategic directions is outlined in the table below."*(Table 1)

1.2.13 So, this is the uniquely Canadian Military establishment of the mid 1990s, organised in six commands, three operational and three support / infrastructure that must be evaluated to identify improvement potential and processes of change. These commands had grown through thirty years of ad hoc reactionary evolution to include several subdivisions each with only passing attention to operational efficiency or success. The situation faced by the government and their appointed military and civil service leaders and commanders was one of, exponentially, increasing costs and shrinking budgets. The National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) of 2003 organization chart is at Figure 1.

2. RESEARCH

2.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

2.1.1 The primary question is: Have the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces complied with the attributes and the objectives (table 1 and table 2) of Strategy 2020 and have they met criteria set in the "CDS Intent" and "CF Mission" statements? Secondary to this is: Do the projects executed for

⁷ Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020, June 1999
http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/docs/2020_e.doc

modernization, upgrading and reorganization (transformation) of the CF, serve the best interests of Canada and its military establishment with sufficient flexibility for today's requirements and our swiftly changing and unpredictable world?

2.2 RESEARCH METHOD

2.2.1 The research approach will centre on "exploratory research" as this attempting to determine the general conduct and progress surrounding the modernization, updating and restructure of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. As this is seen as the beginning study of the overall transformation process from initiation to now and the plans for the future, the pertinent issues and possible problems have not yet been identified. Other approaches are applied in isolated cases, such as the Somalia Mission, where descriptive research was employed to show the relevance and effect of that event on evolving results.

2.2.2 This is a relatively new subject and though the CF and the Department seem to be making a lot of planning and execution information and data quite openly available, some significantly important data is not well presented. As more information is found, more questions tend to arise with the result that as the present situation emerges from the available information, more detailed study will, certainly, be indicated in several areas.

2.2.3 As research progresses and the information chains develop, the full extent of the transformation becomes clearer, and the need to set limits to the scope of study is more evident. Research must concentrate, first, on the evaluation of the process as it applies to the bringing together of the many "modernization" and "reequipping" activities in progress across the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. The second concern will be restricted to the plan developed by the present CDS and his team of military and civilian experts and the execution of that plan. Any other area of study that may seem appropriate will have to be dealt with through recommendations for future study.

2.3 RESEARCH LIMITS

2.3.1 The primary source of research material has been the DND and CF public access web sites with some sources in NATO, Great Britain and the United States. Several other sources such as Canadian Forces College papers and The Canadian Military Journal have influenced overall approach to the subject and resulting conclusions, though there are not a lot of direct quotes or concepts taken from them. Generally, as long as one is experienced with the quirks and idiosyncrasies of data gathering and reporting in government departments and their subordinate entities, the material is very accurate and generally complete. As the programme is relatively new as a single umbrella and very new for the government data collection, collation and publication processes, there is not a lot

of hard copy material available. However, the search will continue and all that is not security classified will certainly be utilized.

2.4 RESEARCH APPROACH

2.4.1 It is preferred that information sources remain set in the realm of "public domain" as this would better facilitate an open report that might give a wider audience an insight to the CF, its issues, expertise and procedures. Though they can not be quoted directly, several personal conversations on the subject with old friends who still serve, have been used as additional enlightenment to "light the road", and help situate the final conclusions. The call is also out for any other CF/DND information access that can be authorized without restricting public availability of the final document.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. THE START - Government

3.1.1 The Government's White Paper on Defence, 1994(WPD94)⁸ is the base document that started the process for the renewal and modernization of the Canadian Forces, though it has been 13 years since it was tabled in the House. There has been almost continuous research and study, numerous review boards and implementation teams throughout the intervening years. However, the primary precepts and assumptions listed in the white paper are still valid and contribute significantly to the development process. Several of the primary assumptions have been widely altered by subsequent developments, but, the last sentence of the conclusion is most pertinent. That is: *"Whatever the future brings, the new defence policy will enable Canada to respond and adjust as necessary to deal with the range of challenges to our security that could arise, now and into the next century."*

3.1.2 The most significant value of this document today is that it identifies and acknowledges the greater majority of factors that must be considered if the Canadian Military and its supporting agencies are going to be effective and affordable in the future. As this project paper unfolds, the significance of the WPD94 as a measure of where the CF has gone since, and criteria and mitigating factors for evaluating the planning and execution of the Transformation process will become clearer. For those who feel they must view WPD94, it is available at the Government web site provided in the reference.

⁸ White Paper on Defence, 1994,
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/reports/94wpaper/white_paper_94_e.asp

3.2. THE START – Canadian Forces

3.2.1 In the document; Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020, June 1999, the leadership of the Canadian Forces apply the parameters (attributes) set in WPD94 and considerable study and discussion of interim events to present a set of templates for the development of plans, policies and doctrine for the future of the forces.

3.2.2 There are several areas of interest in the Strategy 2020 document, and some notable comparisons to consider between it and the White Paper. The first factor that will have a significant affect on future planning, particularly in reaction to government direction and all of the volatile conditions around the world and the changing domestic demographic, is the list of eleven critical Attributes and their Strategic Direction (Table 1) formalized in this strategy. They are the base lines of why there must be constant change and what must be guarded and enhanced throughout the process.

Table 1 The critical attributes and enabling strategic directions of Strategy 2020,

Attribute	Strategic Direction
1. Modernization	Focus defence R&D efforts to target leading-edge technologies, while capitalizing on Canadian technological know-how to build and extend CF distinctive competencies (particularly in the areas of space, telecommunications, information and sensing).
2. Deployability	Focus on global deployability with allies and rapid response while accepting that sustainment for long deployments will require support from the Reserves, host-nation support and contractors.
3. Inter-operability	Strengthen our military relationship with the US military to ensure Canadian and US forces are inter-operable and capable of combined operations in key selected areas.
4. Force Structure	Move towards an adaptable, multi-purpose, combat-capable force structure that makes the best mix of capital to produce desired tactical and operational level capabilities.
5. Domestic capability	Ensure a capability to respond to domestic crises.
6. Jointness	Identify and strengthen those specific capabilities that enable the CF to fulfil Canadian security priorities, deliver a joint capability to deal with weapons of mass destruction, information operations and other asymmetric threats, and form counter-threat partnerships with domestic and international partners.
7. Capital Program	Increase investment in the Capital Program to not less than 23% of the Defence Services Program to maintain and sustain a modern force structure.
8. Command and Control	Foster jointness in command and control as well as logistics and intelligence, including the development of deployable joint headquarters capable of exercising national command and logistics support of Main Contingency Forces.
9. Engage Canadians	Actively engage other government departments and Canadians in security and defence issues at national, regional and community levels, taking into account their expectations in

Attribute	Strategic Direction
	defence planning and decision making.
10. Human Resources	Position Defence as an employer of choice for Canadians by expanding the knowledge and skills base of our personnel and by providing them with progressive opportunities for development, career mobility and recognition for service.
11. Proactivity	Think and act on the basis of forward-looking analysis and active scenario-based planning.

Together with the eight long term strategic objectives below (Table 2) and their five year targets, the eleven attributes identify and define parameters and baseline standards that set the stage for, continually evolving, proactive defence leadership to keep CF development abreast of world realities. They are the core considerations of any modern, adaptable organization in a splintered environment.

Table 2. Defence, long-term strategic objectives, and 5-year targets.

<p>Objective 1: Innovative Path</p> <p>“Create an adaptive, innovative and relevant path into the future.”</p>	<p>Five-Year Targets</p> <p>Enhance the collective strategic decision-making ability of the senior leadership team Complete the force-planning scenarios and use them to provide coherent and focused advice to government Provide value-added reporting to government, parliament and the public on our progress towards 2020 through the adoption of a results-oriented performance-measurement system Define the long term strategy in five year increments and review and update periodically Support stakeholders’ awareness of our strategic progress-through a focused information program.</p>
<p>Objective 2: Decisive Leaders</p> <p>“Develop and sustain a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness and trust while improving our leaders’ abilities to lead and manage effectively.”</p>	<p>Five-Year Targets</p> <p>Define and apply high standards for the selection, development and assessment of military and civilian leaders at all levels Introduce a focused program to impart the skills and knowledge required by senior personnel to conduct strategic level planning and decision making as well as providing advice to the Government Strengthen professionalism and accountability by integrating a values framework for the Defence institution.</p>
<p>Objective 3: Modernize</p> <p>“Field a viable and affordable force structure trained and equipped to generate advanced combat capabilities that</p>	<p>Five-Year Targets</p> <p>Design a viable and affordable force structure Conduct a focused, paced and innovative modernization program with a minimum of 23% of the Defence Services Program in Capital Develop new task tailored capabilities to deal with asymmetric threats and weapons of mass destruction</p>

<p>target leading edge doctrine and technologies relevant to the battlespace of the 21st century.”</p>	<p>Re-focus defence R&D on the operational needs of the department capitalizing on leading edge technologies, while exploiting Canadian technical expertise, especially in the areas of space, remote sensing, telecommunications and information management Complete introduction of a program of joint experimentation maximizing the effectiveness of new doctrines and systems.</p>
<p>Objective 4: Globally Deployable</p> <p>“Enhance the combat preparedness, global deployability and sustainability of our maritime, land and air forces.”</p>	<p>Five-Year Targets</p> <p>Design land forces such that the vanguard and main contingency forces are fully deployable to an offshore theatre of operations within 21 and 90 days respectively Enhance our strategic airlift and sealift capability Complete the conversion of the Joint Force Headquarters to a deployable C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) organization capable of national command and logistic support at the operational level of war.</p>
<p>Objective 5: Interoperable</p> <p>“Strengthen our military to military relationships with our principal allies ensuring interoperable forces, doctrine and C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence).”</p>	<p>Five-Year Targets</p> <p>Manage our interoperability relationship with the US and other allies to permit seamless operational integration at short notice Develop a comprehensive program to adopt new doctrine and equipment compatible with our principal allies Expand the joint and combined exercise program to include all environments and exchanges with the US.</p>
<p>Objective 6: Career of Choice</p> <p>“Position Defence as a rewarding, flexible and progressive workplace that builds professional teams of innovative and highly skilled men and women dedicated to accomplishing the mission.”</p>	<p>Five-Year Targets</p> <p>Reduce the number of military support occupations and refocus on broader career fields Develop flexible career policies to meet changing requirements Examine and adapt new training strategies to provide all CF members with the common knowledge and skills required to operate in the battlespace of the 21st century Develop and implement a recruitment and retention program that better meets future Defence Team requirements Implement the Parliamentary Quality of Life recommendations.</p>
<p>Objective 7: Strategic Partnerships</p> <p>“Establish clear strategic,</p>	<p>Five-Year Targets</p> <p>Undertake joint planning with Other Government</p>

external partnerships to better position Defence to achieve national objectives.”	<p>Departments, where appropriate, to achieve synergies and efficiency</p> <p>Undertake a program to foster greater understanding and co-operation with the unions representing many members of the Defence Team</p> <p>Support a coordinated approach to national security strategy</p> <p>Reformulate key domestic, public and private sector partnerships to lever defence capabilities</p> <p>In cooperation with Canadian industry, field technology demonstrators that provide capability to respond to asymmetric threats.</p>
<p>Objective 8: Resource Stewardship</p> <p>“Adopt a comprehensive approach to planning, management and comptrollership, focused on operational requirements, that prepares us to respond rapidly and effectively to change.”</p>	<p>Five-Year Targets</p> <p>Design and implement an integrated defence management system linking strategy to outputs</p> <p>Revitalize the departmental acquisition process with the aim of reducing acquisition time for departmentally approved projects by 30%</p> <p>Establish a joint mechanism to prioritize and sustain our capital program on an annual basis</p> <p>Develop a realty asset management system to facilitate investment and disposal decisions</p> <p>Reduce departmental holdings of infrastructure, for example, buildings, structures and jetties, by 10%</p> <p>Start the integration of departmental level enterprise management information systems.</p>

3.2.3 The traditional sequence in Canada has been for the politicians to make economic or political decisions and have the military management react to make the Forces fit the circumstances with little regard for what they will insist the forces do for them. This worked, reasonably well, when forces were involved in NATO exercises and UN missions of various scenarios. With two "super powers" keeping the majority of the world's military strife within manageable bounds, all was easy with slow change and controlled weapons distribution. With one power removed from the military support balance, and loosing control of extensive weapons stocks, changes are very rapid and unpredictable.

3.2.4 Strategy 2020 provides a logical, orderly, and easy to follow system for the evaluation of world events and the application of basic proven criteria for the process of drawing conclusions and setting appropriate new policies. This makes it possible for the Department and its agencies to keep in tune with probable mission requirements and to react quickly modify strategy, tactics and structure to maintain a proactive response, on a continuous basis.

3.2.5 After many years of not having a clear vision of what the government and people of Canada wanted from their military establishment, all stakeholders are showing a deeper understanding and concern for the employment and support of

the Canadian Forces. This is a direct result of the perceived change in the world. The CF is being handed and is handling some very important and dangerous roles in the nation's international and domestic future. It is most important for those in "military command and control" of the forces and their resources to work overtime to ensure all receive the best return on their respective investments.

3.2.6 Though the term "transformation" was not as yet applied it is still most important to realize the significance of the statement: *"Following detailed analysis, Strategy 2020 incorporates lessons learned from a wide range of initiatives and studies. In developing the strategy, we built on the strategic assessment embodied in the 1994 Defence White Paper (DWP94), considered the needs and expectations of our major stakeholders, assessed the institution's strengths and weaknesses and analyzed emerging defence issues such as those associated with the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)".*⁹

3.2.7 *"Essentially, this revolution is the military equivalent of what most civilians know as the "information age" or "new economy". In a military context, today's new technologies radically increase the precision and lethality of modern weapons systems, the costs, and the volume and speed of information available to decision-makers and their troops. The combination of these developments in a military context is a radical transformation of the operational concepts, doctrine, organizational structures, and tactics of modern warfare."*¹⁰

3.2.8 Like any large economic entity, the Canadian Forces are dependent on providing its stakeholders with a viable return on their investment. As that return can not be tied to a monetary measurable, those responsible for "the company" must measure their performance and that of their responsible command by other yardsticks. For the CF, the basis of the measuring system is the Defence Mission.

3.2.9 As the main concern, at this stage, is with the initiation of transformation, as a process, within the department in general and the CF in particular it is appropriate to inject the mission statement from the 2003-2004 Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP03-04), which states: *"The mission of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, and the broader defence portfolio (collectively referred to as Defence) is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values, while contributing to international peace and security. In fulfilling this mission, Defence maintains a range of capabilities and delivers a variety of Defence services that are designed to contribute to:*

1. *the physical security of Canadians;*
2. *the defence of our sovereignty;*

⁹ General J.M.G. Baril, Chief of the Defence Staff and J. Judd, Deputy Minister National Defence in the forward to a departmental briefing, June 1999. http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/fword_e.asp

¹⁰ The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence, Minister's Message, Department of National Defence: 2003-2004 Report on Plans and Priorities.

3. *continental security;*
4. *international stability; and*
5. *the promotion of basic human rights and freedoms abroad."*

3.2.10 These are, of course, extremely broad statements and they are appropriately expanded and itemized in thousands of pages of studies, policies and directives. They will also change continually throughout the period of study as the world creating their validity is not stable.

3.2.11 The first impression of the term and activity of "transformation" from CF documents published in the 2003 to 2005 timeframe was that it is the overall combining and coordinating vehicle for the rebirth of the CF. It still arrears that this is the most prevalent intent and situation within the CF, however, some government reports and evaluations lead me to consider that things may not be quite so clear and coordinated throughout the Department and other government agencies.

3.2.12 This is a good time to make note of, further, pertinent agreements and differences between the Government White Paper and the Department of national Defence, Canadian Forces Strategy 2020. In doing this, it is important to remember that there are five years of extensive development in world situations and, as a result, considerable change in Canada and our political and military commitments. With the difficulties experienced by the forces in reacting to the Ontario – Quebec ice storm while supporting a "combat capable" deployment to the Balkans, several UN missions and the close of Canadian Forces Europe the development of Strategy 2020 was somewhat long.

3.2.13 Some of the most influential assumptions of the White Paper required drastic alteration and in some cases lost their validity due to the rapid shift in world pressures. Looking at the end product, one must consider that the situation served all concerned rather well. Between these two documents, DND and the CF have the mandate they required to restructure, modernize and re-doctrine the Canadian Military. This is the start of a CF with the flexibility, training and resources to task-tailor, deploy and operate combined joint forces around the world.

3.2.14 However, there was some significant concern through the next few years that there was no clear vision or Canadian imperative to these plans as articulated by Colonel C.M. Fletcher (now Director of Reserves) in his paper for the Canadian Forces College in 2004¹¹, when he wrote: *"To date, CF strategic level documents contain mostly generalities on transformation. They tend to parrot the concepts articulated in US Forces documents, and do not appear to accommodate uniquely Canadian requirements to successfully effect*

¹¹ Colonel C.M. Fletcher, Canadian Forces transformation Bucking the Trend – Interoperability Trumps 'Jointness', Canadian Forces College <http://wps.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/amsc/amsc6/fletcher.doc>

transformation. For example, the vision statement from Strategy 2020 states in part: "We will exploit leading-edge doctrine and technologies to accomplish our domestic and international roles in the battlespace of the 21st century and be recognized, both at home and abroad, as an innovative, relevant knowledge-based institution. With transformational leadership and coherent management, we will build upon our proud heritage in the pursuit of clear strategic objectives".

3.2.15 Given the close ties and like interests, considerable parity with basic concepts, concerns and doctrine would have to be expected in many areas of policy in Canada and the United States. There are, however, some significant differences in culture, beliefs and accepted military procedures. Most notable is the fact that the US did not sign the Hague Conventions nor do they support the eradication of land mines. These are highly important differences in the conduct of war.

3.3 PROGRESS

3.3.1 So far, "transform" and "transformation", have been used only as synonyms for change in reference to various activities and procedures that require alteration across the CF and DND. Now, it is all brought together with the development of transformation as a DND/CF Programme. The seeds were sown by Department of National Defence: 2003–2004 Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP 03-04) and reinforced by the Minister of National Defence (MND), John McCallum, in his included Ministers Message. He refers to: *"the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes, failed states, and terrorist networks such as al-Qaida that have global reach"*; and finishes with, *"Despite differences of opinion on how best to grapple with this threat, western democracies continue to share a mutual and united interest on the need to transform their armed forces and national security establishments to deal with it. September 11, 2001, was a deliberate, conscious and organized attack on western values and interests. Under the principles of collective defence and collective security—the founding principles of NATO and the United Nations respectively—the al-Qaeda attack on the United States of America was an attack on all of us.*

3.3.2 The Minister went on to state: *"Like our major allies, Canada must adapt its defence and security establishment to these new realities. Armed forces around the world have no choice but to transform themselves in the face of these enormous changes. In response to September 11, the United States is currently undertaking the largest restructure of its government since the beginning of the Cold War. Britain recently completed a post-September 11 update to its Strategic Defence Review. The Czechs, Australians, Germans and Dutch are all launching major transformation initiatives. For Canada, the question is how best to achieve the required transformation of the Canadian Forces."*

3.3.3 So, here is the documented imperative to "transform" the CF and DND to facilitate an ability to better plan and execute suitable actions to counter attempts to violate the security of Canada and Canadians. Domestic or international, civil or military, the collective changes in our world technology and socio-political forces will require constantly evolving doctrine and policies throughout our military and security agencies. RPP 03 – 04 constitutes formal direction to DND and the CF to execute a transformation to overhaul all aspects of organization, equipment, policy, procedures and training and provides the "planning context" and "corporate priorities" governing the process.

3.3.4 Strategy 2020 identified the process of; *"Shaping our Future – Implementing the Strategy."* It carries on to explain; *"Strategy 2020 is an achievable and pragmatic roadmap for the future of Canadian defence, based on a thorough strategic assessment of the challenges and opportunities in the emerging defence environment of the 21st century. Strategy 2020 flows from current defence policy and serves as a long-term guide for defence planning and investment. It will be updated periodically to respond to new policy direction and to ongoing changes in our strategic environment. Implementation of this strategy will be conducted through the Defence Management System. Its ultimate success rests upon the four key success factors of Unity, Continuity, Resolve and Partnership."* These factors are expanded in the following paragraphs, but for this situation, it is sufficient to note that the terms are applied to, CF and DND, internal relationships.

3.3.5 The organization established to satisfy this requirement is "Defence Planning and Management (DP&M)"¹². Headed by a Major General, as the Chief of Program, it is;

DP&M Definition & Purpose

The Defence Planning & Management framework is the overarching structure that DND/CF uses to:

- Plan - its long, mid and short term strategic direction;*
- Manage - the Sustaining and Change Agendas;*
- Monitor - performance and risk management; and,*
- Report - to government through the Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) and the Departmental Performance Report (DPR)*

3.3.6 This framework organization is established with distinct areas of responsibility; *"DP&M Core Processes: The DP&M includes six interdependent components or processes; each with its own set of requirements and steps, and each involving aspects of Risk Management. The six processes are:*

1. *Strategic Visioning - provides a roadmap (i.e. Strategy 2020), consisting of the overall strategic vision and long term strategic objectives, to steer*

¹² Defence Planning and Management website, http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp_m/intro_e.asp

- planning and decision-making to deal with defence challenges that may emerge in the future.*
2. *Capability-Based Planning - produces the "capability targets and gaps" of the DND/CF consistent with the department's white paper and strategic vision.*
 3. *Resource Prioritization - involves analyzing corporate priorities and establishing resource priorities over multiple planning horizons, including the immediate planning cycle.*
 4. *Business Planning - establishes annual plans and priorities and balances the investment in sustaining ongoing operations and activities with the investment required to modernize the Forces.*
 5. *In-Year Management - involves monitoring the progress against the Defence Plan, managing the impact of significant issues and new requirements and adjusting resources in response to new pressure.*
 6. *Performance Management - outlines the structure and focal areas (i.e. Strategy Map) for measuring performance in the DND/CF through which senior management monitors the achievement of results and reports on performance.*

3.3.7 The establishment of this high level organization to oversee all areas of management, planning and reporting across the department is most encouraging. Two particularly impressive points of this initiative are its close links with the CDA and other institutions to gather and spread knowledge and its mandated policy to maintain three interdependent levels or "planning horizons" of planning, monitoring, managing and reporting. It is explained as; *"There are three planning 'horizons' or views which assist in the planning process. Each looks at the different future term, and carries a different focus. The horizons are:*

1. *Horizon 1 - a short-term view of 1 to 4 years, focusing on maintaining and enhancing current capabilities;*
2. *Horizon 2 - a medium-term view of 5 to 10 years, focusing on replacing or enhancing current capabilities; and,*
3. *Horizon 3 - a long-term view of 10 to 30 years, dependant on the nature of capability and the degree of technological change involved. It focuses on acquiring new capabilities.*

Within the DP&M framework, Strategic Visioning focuses on horizon 3, while Capability-Based Planning focuses on horizon 2, and Resource Prioritization and Business Planning each focus on horizon 1.

3.3.8 This is a very positive development for several reasons. First; this organization is structured and mandated to "oversee" the planning and to evolve

the planning criteria and attributes identified in Strategy 2020. So it will not stop at the continuous development and adjusting of present and future plans and reporting templates., DP & M will also apply the accumulated, process and results, information to keep all considerations and procedures of the complete "situation identification to solution execution and results evaluation" chain up to date. It will draw on the expertise of all government, academia and business sources at home and around the world.

3.3.9 Strategy 2020 identified an extensive list of CF policies, procedures and equipment that required modernization, reorganizing, realignment (all of the above) or even replacement. RPP 00-01¹³ states that: *"in many regions of the world we have witnessed an increase in small wars, intrastate conflicts, ethnic violence and other humanitarian tragedies. As a result, the Canadian Forces have been asked to sustain an extremely high tempo of operations for much of the past decade. To this end, the plans and priorities of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces for the next three years are:*

- Modernizing Canada's force structure;*
 - Nurturing Defence's human resources;*
 - Strengthening the capital equipment program;*
 - Reviewing Defence's national infrastructure;*
 - Supporting Canada-United States relations;*
 - Entrenching institutional reform and cultural change;*
 - Further enhancing communications, openness and transparency; and*
 - Modernizing management practices.*
- Achievable and affordable targets have been set to align each of these priorities with Strategy 2020."*

3.3.10 PRR 01-02¹⁴ expanded on and showed a commitment to this policy with: *To modernize its leadership development and human resource management practices and to begin the process of transforming itself into a full learning organization, Defence will: Begin implementation of Professional Development 2020, the Canadian Forces' new blueprint for building on and institutionalizing reforms to enhance leadership and professional development of both the Regular and Reserve Force officer corps; continue to move towards competency based management of Defence's civilian human resources by systematizing job competencies, performing capacity checks identifying skill gaps, and linking recruiting, learning, and professional development strategies to identified needs, and by developing performance agreements for senior military and civilian officials; continue with the Terms of Service Review and Reserve Force Employment Policy Projects to identify ways to enhance the flexibility of military careers and align related policies as required; and complete development of the*

¹³Department of National Defence: 2000-2001 Report on Plans and Priorities, http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/j-RPP00-01_e.asp

¹⁴Department of National Defence: 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/j-RPP01-02_e.asp

Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development strategy (NCM PD 2020) to guide future NCM training, education and professional development".

3.3.11 This requirement has been carried forward with the establishment of The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)¹⁵, is a military formation created 1 April 2002 to promote, facilitate and harmonize common professional development for all members of the Canadian Forces, regardless of their branch of the service or occupation. Excluding students, the CDA comprises approximately 270 military members and 740 civilians, and is based in Kingston, ON, on the grounds of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). The leadership of this new formation is, I believe, an excellent indicator of the level of importance the CF is placing on the regeneration and development of real military leadership combined with good sound and effective civilian (or as soldiers will say "real world") leader, manager expertise. I know two of these professional gentlemen personally, and am most impressed by their selection. They are;

1. CDA Commander, Major General (MGen.), P.R. Hussey, OMM, CD
2. Chief of Staff, Captain (Navy) (Capt.(N)), J.E. Jollymore, OMM, CD
3. Director of Learning Management, Dr. Allan James Barrett
4. Director of Professional Development, Colonel (Col.), M.D. Hodgson
5. Director Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Col. Bernd Horn, OMM, CD, PhD
6. Formation Chief Warrant Officer (CWO), R.D. Lamothe, MMM, CD

3.3.12 The mission and vision statements are short, clear and easy to remember.
MISSION. To champion Canadian Forces professional development and lifelong learning to enable operational success. (This mission statement is clear. However the meaning of the verb, "Champion" merits some explanation. Champion should be understood to be synonymous with such words as promote, negotiate, coordinate, focus, collaborate, integrate, encourage, support, facilitate and foster. "Champion" does not imply ownership, governance or control.)
VISION. A world leader in military professionalism, leadership and professional development, critical to the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.

3.3.13 All indications from thirty five years of service and several conversations with serving officers and non commissioned members, the CDA constitutes a quantum leap in training and leadership development, not only in the CF but across the department. Military and civilian tradespersons and supervisors will be able to train together, gain better understanding of each other and develop mutual respect and support. This will, most importantly, standardize leadership, training, career and progression criteria and policy across the environments, (Maritime, Land and Air) the branches, (ie. Logistics, Signals and Land Maintenance) and through all levels of the department.

3.3.14 RPP 03-04 reported that; "*Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) – The LFRR PMO stood up in 2000 with a mission to develop an effective and credible*

¹⁵ Canadian Defence Academy information, http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/Index/engraph/about/about_e.asp

Army Reserve complementary and supplementary to the Regular Force and relevant to the needs of the nation. The desired outcome of LFRR is to produce an Army Reserve, which is essential, relevant, viable and sustainable. Land Force Reserve restructure is a two-phase process. While LFRR Phase 1 was focussed on stabilizing and testing new capabilities, Phase 2 will focus on change and growth. LFRR is about enhancing the Army's strategic capacity and capability while supporting Army Transformation." The paragraph concludes with; " The project has been actively conducting a Unit Consultative Process in order to validate and asses potential impact of the Roles, Missions, and Tasks proposal published in February 2002. The LFRR PMO considers this process key to achieving the mission." These are thought provoking statements, however, there does not seem to be significant cause, effect or solution substance on the subject.

3.3.15 "Land Force Reserve Restructure" was first introduced in 1994. I was personally involved while on the Logistics Staff (G4) in Land Force Western Area Headquarters (LFWA HQ). We, as regular force, staff officers identified three serious problems with, not only the Land Force Reserve, but with the reserve forces in general. First, they have too many units with too few tradespersons. Most reserve units are in the 100 to 150 personnel strength category, yet they are named "battalions" and have the command structure to match. The result is a Lieutenant Colonel (LCol.) commands a small company and the platoon, or smaller, sized companies are commanded by Majors (Maj.). This severe over ranking is standard throughout the, reserve forces, commissioned and non-commissioned chains of command. Second, there are no acts of Parliament that would require a reserve soldier to answer a call to service. Third, regular force units are not funded to employ reserve members on short contracts when required.

3.3.16 I completed my last two years of service as the Regular Support Staff Officer (RSSO) of a reserve Service Battalion (Svc Bn). At 177 all ranks, it was, then (it is now averaging 100 personnel), the second largest in Canada, however, on 16 occasions the unit staff tried to "call-up" personnel for exercises or support emergency service augmentation of regular force units, the best response was 38 and the highest physical turn-out was 27 soldiers. Those factors would tend to make the reserve soldier quite expensive and would seem to draw funds away from training. There can be no doubt that tradition and the part time soldier still have an important role to play in Canada's military services, however, it is certainly time for some hard decisions and firm follow through. With the addition of severance and superannuation packages, the costs are increasing and there is considerable potential for a project study the resulting "restructure" progress.


3.4 TRANSITION

3.4.1 As restructure, modernize and update efforts are brought together to create a focused and coordinated package for interdependent projects to be prioritized and tailored for economy of effort and collective advantage, it is helpful to remember a

primary decree of WPD94. It stated; *"Management, Command and Control. In the Government's view, the structural foundations of the Department and the Canadian Forces are meeting the challenge and there are no compelling reasons to reverse them, but they can be streamlined. We will, by 1999, reduce headquarters staffs by at least one-third. A new command and control structure will be put into place by mid-1997 with no change in the successful civilian-military integration of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), and one layer of headquarters will be eliminated. The Chief of the Defence Staff will continue to exercise command of military operations. Our civilian employees will continue to play critical roles, although their overall numbers will be reduced to approximately 20,000 by 1999. The Total Force approach is right for Canada, but changes are needed to reflect our requirement for ready forces. New strategic environments require that traditional approaches to mobilization planning be revised to reflect post-Cold War situations. By 1999, the Regular Force and the Primary Reserve will be reduced to approximately 60,000 and 23,000, respectively while approximately 3,000 soldiers will be added to the army's field force through reductions in headquarters, restructuring of the three environments and a reduction in the size of the Reserves as recommended by the Special Joint Committee."*

3.4.2 Table 3¹⁶, provides a good picture of the time, space and activity relationships for events, operations and developments in the Forces through this era of CF/DND change evolution. It is a slide from a presentation to management professionals.

Table 3



¹⁶ The Defence Management Journey, from a presentation to the Canadian Centre for Management Development, MGen D. Dempster 3 Oct 02.

http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/dp_m/dpm3oct2002_e.ppt

The most striking point of this table is that WPD94 was produced during a period of considerable calm while Strategy 2020 was studied, analyzed and published congruent with much more active CF participation in highly intense deployments in which the polar change in danger and operational focus became evident. This is a good time to set a sensitive point in perspective. Canadians dying in "peace" and other foreign deployments is not a new thing. Starting with, Acting Brigadier, H. Angle with the United Nations Military Observer Group, India Pakistan, on 17 July 1950, and before Afghanistan, 120 Canadians have died, including 25 in the Balkans operations. Hundreds more have been injured; some very seriously.

3.4.3 Canada is not in isolation in defence and security, but is a partner in a multitude of varied agreements and treaties with many nations and collective groups of nations. RPP 03 – 04 acknowledges that: *"Like our major allies, Canada must adapt its defence and security establishment to these new realities. Armed forces around the world have no choice but to transform themselves in the face of these enormous changes. In response to September 11, the United States¹⁷ is currently undertaking the largest restructure of its government since the beginning of the Cold War. Britain recently completed a post-September 11 update to its Strategic Defence Review. The Czechs, Australians, Germans and Dutch are all launching major transformation initiatives. For Canada, the question is how best to achieve the required transformation of the Canadian Forces."* NATO¹⁸ is also deep into a transformation programme.

4 A SUMMARY OF PROGRESS - STRATEGY 2020

4.1 Before moving on to the latest happenings in CF/DND development, it is important to provide a quick snap shot of how the various reorganization, modernization and upgrading initiatives have been executed and what has been accomplished up to the start of 2005. Most of the initiatives have been accomplished quite slowly over the six years since adoption of Strategy 2020 and with considerable influence from interim events and studies.

4.2 THE SETTING

4.2.1 Fiscal year 2003 - 2004 is a typical period that provides a good idea of DND/CF activity and operations through these interim years. In his Minister's Message, for 2003–2004, Departmental Performance Report, March 31, 2004 the Minister of National Defence¹⁹, Bill Graham, stated that; *"While ensuring that Defence continues to meet its commitments at home and abroad, we have also made significant progress in preparing the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces for the challenges of the future."*

¹⁷ Transformation, United States Department of Defence, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transformation/>

¹⁸ NATO, Transformation Net, Allied Command Transformation, <http://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/concept>

¹⁹ Department of National Defence: 2003–2004, Departmental Performance Report, for the period ending March 31, 2004. www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/dpr_e.asp

4.2.2 Under the section on Command and Control the report acknowledges *(my paraphrase)*; *In mid 2003, the Army staffed most of the key appointments at NATO's International Security Assistance Force Headquarters (ISAF HQ) in Kabul, and also provided the Deputy Commander ISAF, Major-General Andrew Leslie (with Rotation 0 of Operation ATHENA). In February 2004, Canadian Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier assumed command of the overall ISAF international mission (during Rotation 1). Though several Canadian officers held command positions in the Balkans (UN and NATO) ISAF is the most significant command held by a member of the Canadian Forces since the Suez crisis in 1956.*

4.2.3 The establishment of the CDA and all of its sub facilities and bodies is, without doubt, the most significant organizational change and progressive accomplishment. However there has been considerable advancement across the full spectrum of criteria shown in Tables 1 and 2 with continuous growth of the multi-departmental, Modern Management project within DND and the CF. This project constitutes an extensive adoption of the latest general business practices and terminology in all levels of departmental and forces activity.

4.2.4 As stated in DRP 2003-2004; "Modern Management in Defence (MMD) Defence was one of the five departments involved in the Modern Management pilot, and is now a key contributor to the advancement of the Modern Comptrollership initiative of the Treasury Board Secretariat. the three-year pilot phase that began in 1998–1999 and the three-year implementation phase that ended on March 31, 2004. MMD laid the groundwork for continuing the pursuit of management excellence using the new Management Accountability Framework (MAF) developed by the Treasury Board Secretariat. DND and the CF have established advanced practices for three of the MAF elements:

- **Public Service and CF Values** (example: the Defence Ethics Program);
- **People** (examples: alternate dispute resolution mechanisms and the CF Quality of Life initiative); and
- **Learning, Innovation and Change Management** (examples: the Defence Learning Network and the Continuous Improvement Working Group).

Good management practices are firmly established in the following MAF elements:

- **Governance and Strategic Direction** (example: capability-based planning);
- **Results and Performance** (example: implementation of a trial "strategy map" and a "balanced scorecard" for strategic performance management);
- **Policy and Programs** (example: development of Strategy 2025, an updated long-term defence strategy that includes a strategic operating concept);
- **Risk Management** (example: risk management programs for nuclear safety, flight safety and air-worthiness, environmental protection, military operational planning, legal risk management, and capital project planning);
- **Stewardship** (examples: annual audit and evaluation work plans, monthly financial reports, an integrated long-term capital plan, and a strategy for the

renewal of grants and contributions); and

- **Accountability** (example: the publication in April 2004 of *Strengthening Accountability and Comptrollership in National Defence*).

Across the spectrum of Defence management, significant progress is being made in harmonizing performance management with other core Defence management processes, such as business planning and integrated risk management. Aligning performance management with all these processes will ensure that Defence Planning and Management is progressive and accountable in the future."

4.2.5 The report also shows that operational activity did not wane as; *"Through its international engagements, the CF made a valuable contribution to Canadian diplomacy and interests. During fiscal 2003–2004, the CF deployed almost 13,000 personnel on domestic and international operations, with more than 10,000 personnel deployed outside Canada. The CF participated in a total of 20 international operations, and deployed about 3,700 personnel on international peace-support and coalition operations in locations such as Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Arabian Gulf region and Haiti. These deployment figures meant that the CF had 6.07 percent of its total personnel deployed on multinational operations, the second-highest percentage in NATO after the United States at 8.03 percent. Deployed CF personnel distinguished themselves by their professionalism and dedication, and demonstrated that they are among the best-trained and most effective military personnel in the world."*

4.2.6 In keeping with the Canadian Forces Mission, and all documents directing change in DND and the CF, support to the people of Canada was not reduced and actually proved to be a period of increased requirement for force deployments, as confirmed by DRP 2003-2004; *"At home, the CF continued to fulfil its defence objective of satisfying a wide range of requests for support from other government departments and agencies; for example, the CF assisted Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada by supporting RCMP counter-drug. The CF also provided aid to civil authorities in four national crises: the public health emergency and widespread power failure in Ontario, the forest fires in British Columbia, and Hurricane Juan in Nova Scotia. In calendar year 2003, the three Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centres reported 7,499 search-and-rescue incidents, and the CF responded to 1,121 aeronautical, maritime and humanitarian search and rescue incidents."*

4.2.7 The situation, as 2005 approaches is that eleven years after the Defence White Paper, 1994 and six years since the approval of "Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020" there has been some very positive change moving DND and the CF toward a more modern, up to date and operable organization with cutting edge training and state of the art equipment. However, this is being accomplished through isolated projects under WPD94 as the last

legal direction from parliament. The key phrases that effect modernization, upgrading and restructuring are; *"Further reductions of defence infrastructure and support are both possible and necessary and the rationalization process is underway to identify savings beyond the measures mandated in the 1994 federal budget. By 1999, the Regular Force and the Primary Reserve will be reduced to approximately 60,000 and 23,000, respectively while approximately 3,000 soldiers will be added to the army's field force through reductions in headquarters, restructuring of the three environments and a reduction in the size of the Reserves as recommended by the Special Joint Committee. National Defence is radically restructuring planned acquisitions and they will be cut by at least 15 billion dollars over the next 15 years."*

4.2.8 This situation is an indicator that the WPD94 was not being followed. As world events in general and 11 September 2001 in particular produced a completely different situation than that envisioned by the WPD94 decision makers. Canada's most immediate, planned, response was the deployment of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI) Battle Group (BG) (about 900 men and women from CFB Edmonton and 2PPCLI, CFB Winnipeg). This presented a situation that did not fit the main assumptions on which the WPD94 was based and many decisions were made completely outside of policy, as an necessary expedient, strictly to support the missions in progress. It is time for a new defence policy paper.

5 DEFENCE POLICY STATEMENT 2005 (DPS 2005)²⁰

5.1 CONTENTS

5.1.1 It would seem that a significant "restructure" and "rededication" of the Canadian Military establishment and its governmental support and control structures has been ongoing, under several project names for several years. "Transformation" is a term that first surfaces in an address by General Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), 2001 to 2005, in an address to The Canadian Club luncheon in Ottawa on 24 September, 2003²¹.

5.1.2 In the DPR 2003-2004 the Minister of National Defence stated that the department would conduct the required study and would produce a government, defence policy paper. Though it was not yet tabled in the house in February 2005 it was available to the CDS and senior members of the defence command team. DPS 2005, as can be expected, starts with an updated assessment of world and national conditions and realities. It reinforces the basic tenets of Strategy 2020 and provides additional clarification of Canadian Government interpretations of the varied scenarios of strife and disaster around the globe. It is not important, in the context of

²⁰ Canada's International Policy Statement 2005, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Defence, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/pdf/dps_e.pdf

²¹ General Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), 2001 to 2005, in an address to The Canadian Club luncheon in Ottawa on 24 September, 2003 http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/speeches/24-Sep-03_e.asp

this paper, to list and discuss those many involved reasons for the issue of direction, toward extensive change. For those who wish to review the document, the link to the Government of Canada web site is provided with the reference.

5.1.3 However, a good view of the conclusions and directives provided by this document is required to effectively and credibly measure success rates, particularly for the CF. Many areas of concern are identified, and broad term corrective actions are mandated. This provides the CF commanders with the authority and resources to look at all facets of structure, strategy, tactics and the equipment and personnel required to accomplish changes that will best support government wishes in the service of Canadians.

5.1.4 DPS 2005 is very clear on what the Government of Canada requires of the DND and the CF. These requirements are aptly focused on the expected requirement to operate domestically and internationally under several varied situations, often, simultaneously. Simply stated, DPCS 2005 directs that; *"The Canadian Forces will further improve their ability to operate effectively with the armed forces of our allies. Maintaining this high level of interoperability will strengthen the confidence that other countries have in us as a reliable partner, and enhance our credibility on the world stage. The Forces will also enhance their ability to work with government and non-governmental organizations at all levels, at home and abroad."*

5.1.5 There are three basic success factors stated in DPS and it is clearly stated, that "transformation" is the route to those ends; *"Our military will become more effective, relevant and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased."*

- *The Forces will become more effective by better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces. The overall goal will be "focused effects": the ability to deploy the right mix of forces to the right place, at the right time, producing the right result.*
- *The Forces will become more relevant, both at home and abroad. They will adapt their capabilities and force structure to deal, in particular, with threats that arise from the kind of instability that we have seen abroad, especially in failed states.*
- *The Forces will become more responsive by enhancing their ability to act quickly in the event of crises, whether in Canada or around the world. They will arrive on the scene faster, make a rapid transition to operations once there, move more effectively within theatre, and sustain deployments, in some cases, for extended periods.*

The key to this more effective, relevant and responsive force is the transformation process on which the Canadian Forces are now embarked.'

5.2 IMPLEMENTING THE VISION: CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION

5.2.1 Under this most appropriate heading, the policy statement provides some explanation of the various steps required to achieve "transformation";

"Transformation will require the Canadian Forces to:

- *adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations, by:*
 - *transforming their command structure, which will include changing how they organize themselves for operations, thereby enhancing their ability to deploy at home and abroad. Modifications to domestic command and control will be especially significant. As the Forces begin to treat Canada as an integrated theatre of operations, they will establish Canada Command, a single operational command headquarters that will enable them to more effectively meet their fundamental responsibility to protect Canadians at home; and*
 - *establishing fully integrated units capable of a timely, focused and effective response to foreign or domestic threats to Canadian security. Maritime, land, air and special operations forces will emphasize cooperation and teamwork at all levels to achieve a total effect greater than the sum of the individual parts;*
- *evaluate their force structure on an ongoing basis to ensure that capabilities remain relevant. The status quo is not an option. The Forces will maintain or modernize those capabilities that remain valid, acquire new ones and eliminate those no longer needed. This process will require clear priorities and the reallocation of budgets;*
- *improve coordination with other government departments and interoperability with allied forces, particularly the United States, through smart investments in evolving technology and doctrinal concepts, training opportunities, and exchange and liaison programs. The Forces will also build on strong relationships with their counterparts in other agencies and countries, their professional reputation and accumulated experience in multinational operations;*
- *update their command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (C4ISR). The rapid acquisition and sharing of information will be critical to future operations. Commanders and subordinates at every level need to know what is happening before they can respond to incidents. The Forces will increase the quality and quantity of*

information and intelligence so that they can make the timely decisions essential for success;

- *place greater emphasis on experimentation to develop doctrine and concepts to identify which capabilities are most suitable to implement the vision. The Forces will use this process, for example, to refine the development of their unmanned aerial vehicle capability; and*
- *continue to invest in people. For transformation to be successful, our military personnel must possess the skills and knowledge to function in complex environments where operations and technologies are changing at breakneck speed. Professional and highly competent people, available when required and in sufficient numbers, are the Forces' most valued resource. To this end, recruitment and retention will remain one of the Forces' top priorities."*

5.3 TRANSFORMING THE CANADIAN FORCES: A FOCUS ON INTEGRATED OPERATIONS

5.3.1 With the increased reliance on combined (Maritime, Land and Air elements), joint (with other Departments or Nations) operations in both domestic and international operations, the CF and the Department must develop the policy and doctrine to succeed in these situations. Therefore, the DPS 2005 directs that;

"These goals demand that the Canadian Forces move beyond traditional thinking. Consequently, the operational transformation of the Canadian Forces will focus on the establishment of new joint organizations and combat structures that can meet the Government's expectations for effectiveness, relevance and responsiveness.

Specifically, the Canadian Forces will have the ability to deploy three kinds of joint formations.

- *A Special Operations Group will be established to respond to terrorism and threats to Canadians and Canadian interests around the world. This group will include Joint Task Force 2, our special operations and counterterrorism unit; a special operations aviation capability centred on helicopters; and supporting land and maritime forces. The Special Operations Group will be capable of operating as an independent unit or contributing to other joint force structures. Integrating our special operations forces in this manner will increase their impact in operations, as well as the range of options available to government in the deployment of the Canadian Forces.*
- *A Standing Contingency Task Force will be established to respond rapidly to emerging crises. This high-readiness task force will be made up of existing, designated maritime, land, air and special operations elements, organized under a single integrated combat command structure. It will be ready to deploy with 10*

days' notice, and provide an initial Canadian Forces presence to work with security partners to stabilize the situation or facilitate the deployment of larger, follow-on forces should circumstances warrant.

Other Mission-Specific Task Forces will be deployed as required. These task forces, which will be drawn from forces maintained at different states of readiness and structured for longer deployments, will carry out combat and peace support operations. They will be made up of maritime, land, air and special operations elements, and could be deployed as follow-on forces to the Special Operations Group, the Standing Contingency Task Force, or as stand-alone contributions to other operations."

5.4 The DPS 2005 expands considerably on what activities and missions parliament requires the CF to develop and maintain the ability to complete. As a result, the CDS and his Environment Commanders (Maritime, Land and Air) are presented with a very strong and clear mandate and guidance to transform the CF to better operate in today's world, and to develop the flexibility and constant evaluations necessary to stay ahead of developments.

6 CHIEF of the DEFENCE STAFF

6.1 CDS ACTION TEAMS

6.1.1 The present CDS, General Hillier, responding to the focus of the DPS, seems to have embraced "transformation" as the term to be the single word reference for the overall rebirth of the Canadian Military. During his 2005 tour of CF units and formations he repeatedly stated; *"Make no mistake about this; we are moving through this transformation process at a phased, but aggressive pace."*²² This is most evident in his extremely aggressive approach. Appointed CDS on 4 February 2005, he issued his first direction²³ for the planning and execution of force renewal on 10 March 2005. Issued to the most senior

6.1.2 CF command response to the Defence Policy Statement was very rapid and decisive. The CDS directed the formation of four CDS Action Teams (CAT), each with a very specific focus and the mandate to determine how best to comply with government policy. Only the executive summaries of the team reports are available, however, they provide a good understanding of the "guidance" given and resulting processes and findings.

6.1.3 Each action team was required to fulfil the action team mandate while addressing the very specific questions tasked to them through their directives. There can be no doubt that the CDS is serious about getting viable courses of

²² General Hillier, CDS Address to the Troops, Tour of Bases and Units, 2005.
http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/intro_e.asp

²³ CDS Planning Guidance – CDS Action Teams, 10 March 2005

action on all areas of concern identified in the policy statement. The general mandate is stated as;

"Action Team Mandate. In order to initiate rapidly the CF transformation planning process, the CDS formed Action Teams to develop key concepts encompassed in the DPS (reference B). These Action Teams, which were composed of representatives from each of the environments (including special forces and reserve advisors) and led by a general or flag officer, were tasked with investigating C2, force development and force generation, operational capability, and institutional alignment, in order to initiate implementation of the new CF vision. In addition to investigating these areas, the Action Teams were tasked to recommend near-term actions, as well as actions to be taken over the mid-to-longer term, necessary to realize the CF transformation vision. The Action Teams were to achieve their mandate by delivering recommendations to the CDS and by handing over their work to a CF transformation planning and implementation staff."

6.1.4 The primary direction given to all team members, their support groups and those who addressed or provided reference material to any of the teams was in the form of the "CDS Principles", stated as;

"CDS Principles. Finding a means to deal effectively with domestic routine and contingency operations, while selectively committing forces to international operations in such a way as to ensure a strong Canadian voice is heard on the international stage, will be challenging and will involve the fundamental transformation of the CF based on the six principles articulated by the CDS:

- a. *Change initiatives must build a CF culture vice functional or environmental cultures;*
- b. *The C2 structure must shift from a staff-centric to a command-centric construct;*
- c. *The chain of command must shift from a risk-averse approach to an empowered mission command approach;*
- d. *The C2 structure must transform from a staff matrix to a chain of command empowered with authority, responsibility and accountable to a higher commander;*
- e. *The CF must focus primarily on operational effectiveness; and*

CF transformation must consider the Regular and Reserve components and DND civilians as a part of a single solution."

6.2. CAT 1 RECOMENDATIONS²⁴

6.2.1 The CAT Reports contain extensive explanation of the findings, however, at this stage of study, only the recommended changes to CF structure are of concern as they are documented force behind actual command and staff reorientation. CAT 1 was tasked to analyse and recommend appropriate changes to the command and control structure across all environments, branches and levels of the forces and the department. Their results are extensive, but the following list forms the framework of restructure and consequential realignments. They are: "CAT 1, KEY RECOMMENDATIONS"

"Canada Command. The DPS directs that Canada be viewed as a single operational theatre, and this, in turn, explains the rationale behind the establishment of Canada Command (CANCOM), which will focus on the defence of Canada (a detailed analysis of the CANCOM construct can be found in part III of this report)."

"Operational Commands. Beginning with where CANCOM would fit in the strategic and operational command and control (C2) structure, three options were developed to determine the C2 of international operations in relation to the responsibility of CANCOM for domestic operations. The CDS quickly selected the option in which both CANCOM and Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) reported directly to the CDS."

"CF C2 Structure. An operational level command be created for the C2 of international missions/operations. CAT 1 proposal for the name of this command is Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). Under CEFCOM would be the Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF), Mission Specific Task Force(s) (MSTF), and the DART."

"The Force Generation Issue. From an initial spectrum of ten possible models, six options that explored the interaction between force employment, force generation, and force development were prepared for Armed Forces Council (AFC) on 18 April 2005."

6.2.2 Cat 1 also identified and reported a long list of enabling shifts of authorities and responsibilities held by NDHQ and Environmental Command Staffs (ECS). Those considered to be success or failure factors are listed here as; "CAT1 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS IMPACT ON STRATEGIC STAFF (NDHQ)"

"Separation of Strategic and Operational functions. A clear separation of operational level from strategic level functions currently residing in NDHQ will be required as commanders at the operational level (CANCOM, CEFCOM, (Special

²⁴ CDS Action Team 1 Report, Part I – Executive Summary. <http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-ftc/00native/CAT%201%20Exec%20Sum%20Eng.pdf>

Operations Groups (SOG), and Support Command (SPCOM) will require appropriate joint staffs to carry out their mission."

"Realignment of CF and DND functions. A structure focused on operations with the primary mandate to strategically support the CF, both domestically and internationally, needs to be developed."

"Separation of Staff and Command functions. Staff and Command functions should be separated. The strategic general staff must be focused on policies, processes and assisting the CDS in decision making."

"Ensuring Checks and Balances. The creation of CANCOM requires that the functions currently carried out in the various staffs at all levels be reviewed and re-distributed adequately with the aim of eliminating overlaps or duplication where it currently exists."

"CF C2 Structure. The strategic and operational levels need to be separated by creating a strategic level J-Staff to support the CDS and by the creation of four new Commands based on CANCOM, CEFCOM, the SOG and Support Command. Further the creation of CANCOM and Canada as a single operational theatre will drive the requirement to form six Regional HQs to command and control routine and contingency domestic operations."

"Regional Construct. CANCOM should be established with a six-region construct. The recommended regional commands are:

- a. Pacific Command (British Columbia);*
- b. Prairie Command (Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba);*
- c. Central Command (Ontario);*
- d. Eastern Command (Quebec);*
- e. Atlantic Command (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland & Labrador); and*
- f. Northern Command (Yukon Territories, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut)."*

6.3 CAT 2 RECOMENDATIONS²⁵

6.3.1 CAT 2 was tasked with the same general CDS Principles and a specific team mandate. Their mandate is stated as; *"CDS Planning Guidance directed that CAT 2 propose a coherent, optimally-integrated Force Development (FD) and managed readiness Force Generation (FG) approach to meet the operational needs of the new defence policy and CF vision. Specifically, CAT 2 was to develop: an Integrated Force Development System, including a Concept Development, Experimentation and Doctrine unit; an Integrated Managed Readiness System (IMRS); an integrated exercise and training framework to support the IMRS system; and a Coalition Advocacy concept."*

6.3.2 The team also took the following statement as primary guidance for their deliberations, discussions and recommendations, due to their direction to enable successful collaboration between DND/CF agencies and other national and international organizations; *"According to **Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy**, Canada's International Policy Statement and the CDS vision for transformation of the Canadian Forces, the CF must become fully integrated not only across all traditional Services and with our traditional military allies, but with a variety of Federal, Provincial and local Government Departments and Agencies, non-Government organizations, and international organizations."*

6.3.3 Cat 2 has identified two critical success or failure factors on which all of their recommendations will depend and they are presented as;

"Underpinning all other recommendations made in this report are two critical organizational prerequisites dealing with the establishment of the proper authority and governance structure necessary to ensure a genuinely Integrated Force Development System:

a. the establishment of a strategic level Central Force Development Authority reporting to the CDS; and

b. the creation of a Network Governance Structure for the Integrated Force Development System."

6.3.4 The recommendations for the establishment and operation of the Integrated Force Development System are shown as; *"Other recommendations related to the Integrated Force Development System include:*

a. the Central Force Development Authority (CFDA) be responsible for providing the following:

²⁵ CDS Action Team 2 Report, Part I – Executive Summary. <http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/00native/CAT%202%20Exec%20Sum%20Eng.doc>

a consolidated Military Assessment through an Operational Trends Analysis of the Future Security Environment;
the Canadian Forces Operating Concept;
all Military Mission Specific or Operational Concepts;
all integrated Force Employment Scenarios; a comprehensive required capability list for each Force Employment Scenario;
a consolidated and prioritized list of capability gaps for delivery option development; and
a Recommended Military Capability Investment List;
b.the CDS provide and continually update the Vision for the Canadian Forces; and
c.SOF and Joint Enabling/Op Support capability development responsibilities become the purview of the CFDA."

6.3.5 The requirement for an Integrated Concept Development, Experimentation and Doctrine Unit is considered to be best served by its inclusion in a previously planned organization that would be the primary source of data and core expertise. The statement in the report is; *"The central recommendation of the proposal for an integrated concept development, experimentation and doctrine unit is:*

– the stand up of the Canadian Forces Warfare Centre (CFWC).

Providing operational focus and critical military concepts and experimentation support to facilitate the processes of capability based planning, the CFWC will enable the Central Force Development Authority to provide the necessary top down direction for an effective system of integrated force development. The initial concept for the CFWC includes the following:

- *Integrated Lessons Learned Cell*
- *Integrated Operational Trends Analysis Cell*
- *Integrated Concept and Force Employment Scenario Development Cell*
- *Integrated Doctrine Development Cell*
- *Pol-Mil War Gaming Cell*
- *Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre*

6.3.6 Additional recommendations are provided for the operation and governance of recommended operational and operational support formations. They are; *"Key recommendations are that:*

a. a strategic-level authority be created as the "owner" of the IMRS with responsibilities as described in this report;

- b. *an Operations Support Command be created with specific responsibility for FG of NSEs, and with other responsibilities as described in this report;*
- c. *an IMRS Working Group be established to energize the IMRS process as soon as practicable; and*
- d. *a Command-Centric IMRS be adopted as the IMRS model, which includes FG of NCEs well in advance of missions."*

6.3.7 Establishment of, or designation of an existing authority to develop, oversee and monitor the validity and quality of training and the setting and enforcement of stringent, personnel, unit and formation evaluations is addressed as; *"Specific recommendations to establish an integrated Exercise system are to:*

- a. ***appoint a CF Collective Training Authority to plan and execute the training and accreditation of fighting formations;***
- b. *assemble the dedicated personnel and establish the "first call" status on material resources, training areas and ranges to both conduct the operational-level training and execute the validation and certification functions; and*
- c. *design a new Collective Training plan that directs all strategic and integrated operational training and influences all environmental operational and individual training. This will likely require significant additional resources."*

6.3.8 The team ensured that possible problems that could develop as a result of their major restructure plans are avoided with; *"As a result, it is recommended that the following be implemented within the next 12 to 18 months:*

- a. ***a Director of Coalition Advocacy be appointed and that he become responsible for the duties currently assigned to the Director Protocol and Foreign Liaison as well as management of the Exchange and Liaison Programme;***
- b. *the Director of Coalition Advocacy establish a Coalition Advocacy Steering Committee that will assume all the roles and responsibilities of the Military Assistance Steering Committee and the Canadian Defence Attaché Programme Management Committee;*
- c. *the Director Air Contracted Force Generation be re-roled as the Director of Contracted Force Generation and his mandate*

expanded to include all Canadian Forces training and educational opportunities. This would include responsibility for all aspects of Foreign Military Training, including the requirements of the Military Assistance Training Programme; and

- d. the Chief of Defence Intelligence develop a "Conflict Outlook" report to help guide the Coalition Advocacy programme based on the current inter-departmental threat assessments."*

Additional weight is placed on the need to ensure that all new and existing authorities are very clear on their responsibility and authority range with; "Critical for the success of the implementation is that the recommended concepts be aligned with the resulting CF Command and Control relationships as well as the realignment of the strategic-level staffs at National Defence Headquarters.

6.4 CAT 3 RECOMENDATIONS²⁶

6.4.1 As stated in their report: *"CAT-3's assigned mandate was to identify existing and emerging operational capabilities that would enable the CF to realize the CF Vision, as well as to articulate an operational capability investment/divestment strategy."* However, as several, absolutely, necessary systems and conditions required to provide reliable data and support to the analysis and discussion of the subject were not present and could not be expected to be present in the short term, the decision was made to change team focus; *"With AFC endorsement, the team therefore refocused its efforts on two deliverables: (i) an initial conceptual framework for operations, or CONOPS, consistent with the CF Vision's focus on 3-Block War in the complex and densely populated urban-areas of the world's failed and failing states and across the integrated air, land, sea and special operations interface of the Operations "Bubble" as articulated by the CDS; and (ii) a Capability-Based Planning (CBP) process prototype to form the foundation of future CF integrated force development."*

6.4.2 Team 3 not only presented recommendations on their adjusted mandate, but also offered the advise required to address their original mandate questions in the not to distant future with; *"CAT3 submits the following recommendations for consideration:*

- a. In addition to a Defence Capability Plan, and building on the CAT3 conceptual framework for operations, a CF Operating Concept (Domestic/International) should be developed to further clarify the operational implications of the CF Vision;*

²⁶ CDS Action Team 3 Report, Part I – Executive Summary. <http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/00native/CAT%203%20Exec%20Sum%20Eng.doc>

- b. *On the basis of CAT3 preliminary findings, CBP planning should be institutionalized within CF/DND;*
- c. *To facilitate CBP, a series of real-world (SECRET AUSCANUKUS)" (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States) "scenarios should be developed to guide integrated FD within CF/DND. These scenarios must be clearly linked to Government objectives, prioritized according to Government policy, and approved by the CDS for planning purposes;*
- d. *To ensure the incorporation of best-practice methodologies, CF CBP staff should conduct regular visits with their US, UK and AUS counterparts to remain abreast of innovations; and*

To ensure the authority and transparency of a top down force development process within an integrated national command structure, consideration should be given to establishing a Chief of Force Development at the 3-star level."

6.5 CAT 4 RECOMENDATIONS²⁷

6.5.1 The mandate of CAT 4 is stated as; *"To fully support CF transformation, the CDS Action Team (CAT) 4 was formed with a view to setting the conditions that would enable a "whole of defence" (i.e. the department including the CF) approach to meeting the CF vision. To this end, the CAT 4 worked together to bring to the forefront a new level of strategic coherence that would directly support the interests and values of the Government and people of Canada."* The team quickly found that several ongoing CF initiatives were already addressing some of their mandated areas of study and they included annexes to their report to show their situation. They are; Public Affairs, Human Resources Military, Human Resources Civilian, Material Acquisition and Support, Information Management, Knowledge Management, Finance, Infrastructure and the Environment and Science and Technology.

6.5.2 As their mandated task covers a wide range of authorities and subjects, CAT 4 has divided their recommendations into four categories. The categories are; Near Term, Long Term, External Engagement and Future Institutional Alignment Work, however only near and long term apply to this report. CAT 4 near term recommendations are; *"The review of functional area initiatives for efficiency improvements identified a number of recommendations. The recommendations that would have a significant impact in the short term include the following:*

1. *Adopt a single Individual Training and Education framework such as that recommended by the Human Resources System Transformation.*

²⁷ CDS Action Team 4 Report, Part I – Executive Summary. <http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/00native/CAT%204%20Exec%20Sum%20Eng.doc>

2. *Allow the deployment of civilians on operations through approval of the draft Defence Administrative Order and Directive and the accelerated completion of the DCDS Direction on International Operations.*
3. *Mitigate the delays in the currently lengthy security clearance by allowing the enrolment of recruits with a security clearance while reviewing the security process including the organization structure of DPM to increase efficiency.*
4. *Contribute to an interagency security "community" with increased outreach and, in the longer term, the development of an interagency professional development security programmes and curriculum.*
5. *Investigate the extent to which integrated military-civilian work force planning can both support transformation and increase the deployment capacity of the CF. This would include identifying roles, such as administrative ones, currently conducted by CF members that could be filled by civilians; and integrated recruitment drives to maximize synergies and efficiencies in attracting recruits or civilian employees that share common requirements with distressed military trades.*
6. *Vigorously pursue the pilot project for contracting authority with Public Works and Government Services Canada. This will include the designation of a senior focal point for all major projects and Departmental contracting authority on military specific procurement.*
7. *Identify and support a "fast-track" all major capital projects that are critical for the success of CF transformation."*

6.5.3 Continuing on, they state that; *"In the longer term, the following recommendations would have a material effect on the efficiencies of the horizontal functional areas:*

8. *Accelerate the development of a fully integrated (PRICIE) Strategic Capability Investment Plan that would include the full cost of ownership.*
9. *Develop an integrated Enterprise Resource Planning system to support capability production and support.*
10. *Develop a Defence Industry Policy to clearly reflect the current security environment and not one based upon a mobilization and attrition view such as in the "Cold War". Within this policy the Department should seek exemption from the Agreement for Internal Trade for defence procurements in line with agreements such as NAFTA, GATT and the WTO."*

6.6 CDS DIRECTION and DRIVE

6.6.1 As he is, with the Minister of National Defence, ultimately responsible for all Canadian Forces activity, it should be expected that the aims and objectives of the Canadian Forces transformation project are best summarized by General Hillier in his "CDS PLANNING GUIDANCE - CF TRANSFORMATION"²⁸ When he stated:

"CDS Intent; The CF will become more effective, relevant, and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased. The CF will become more effective by better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces. It will become more relevant, both at home and abroad, by adapting its capabilities and force structure to deal with threats that arise from international instability, especially in fragile states. It will become more responsive by enhancing its ability to act quickly in the event of crises, whether in Canada or around the world. The transformation of the CF will focus on the establishment of new integrated (beyond joint) organizations and structures, including a unified national command and control system. These goals demand that the CF move beyond traditional thinking to adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations."

6.6.2 There can be no doubt that DPS 2005 is the most important document in the transformation process from a legal standpoint, however, from the execution perspective the CDS Planning Guidance is the enabling force. It is a particularly brief, concise and detailed instruction that should leave no question for anyone charged with "transformation responsibilities". The inclusion of appendixes is not a preferred option however as this document is very important to the CF execution of directed transformation initiatives it is therefore, a primary source for the development of evaluation standards so the web link is included with the reference.

7 ANALYSIS

7.1 MEASUREMENT

7.1.1 The question that must be answered by research and analysis is: Have the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces complied with the attributes and the objectives (table 1 and table 2) of Strategy 2020 and met criteria set in the "CDS Intent" and "CF Mission" statements? Secondary to this is: Do the projects executed for modernization, upgrading and reorganization (transformation) of the CF, serve the best interests of Canada and its military establishment with sufficient flexibility for today's requirements and our swiftly changing and unpredictable world?

²⁸ CDS PLANNING GUIDANCE - CF TRANSFORMATION, 1950-9(CT), Oct 2005 (3)
http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/00native/cds-planning-guidance_e.doc

7.1.2 The measuring sticks that will be used to judge the CF transformation project and its initiatives are, as stated in the original research question, however, some suitable, general business best practices will be applied to the discussion of the overall merit of the transformation processes. It has become evident, through the research for this project, that the DND and CF are seriously working to apply more general business principles and practices to administrative and economic management procedures. The separation of tactical, strategic and infrastructure functions and the rules controlling their interaction, has considerable potential for savings on many planes.

7.2 THE PRIMARY QUESTION

7.2.1 First; **Have the DND and the CF complied with the attributes and the objectives (table 1 and table 2) of Strategy 2020.** There are eleven "attributes" listed in Table 1 and it is most appropriate and easier to follow if they are addressed in turn. The CF has a web site²⁹ dedicated to transformation, however there is very little information posted there and several of the links do not open. Therefore, all of the supporting material for this paragraph is taken from; Department of National Defence: 2006–2007, Departmental Performance Report, for the period ending March 31, 2007³⁰.

1. Modernization. *There are several "cutting edge" technology projects well under way in the Maritime (Frigate command and control system) and Air (CF- 18 Hornet, fighter, satellite-guided precision munitions) Environment and all are working towards the implementation of systems compatible with the "Land Force Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (LF ISTAR) Omnibus Project" described as; " The LF ISTAR project will move into the implementation phase by end 2006. It will update Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities by allowing the rapid acquisition and sharing of information. This project will also help the Land Force achieve its Leading with Sensors employment concept. The first aspect to be delivered will be data link communications capability, which will provide the digital backbone for moving sensor data and situational awareness information around the Land Area of Operations. This system will link the current and future Land Force Sensors, integrating information from joint and coalition assets into a network environment where information and knowledge are shared at all levels of command. This approach will increase the quality and quantity of information and intelligence so that the commanders can make the timely decisions essential for success.*

²⁹ CF TRANSFORMATION - FROM VISION TO MISSION, http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-ffc/pubs/documents_e.asp

³⁰ Department of National Defence: 2006–2007, Departmental Performance Report, for the period ending March 31, 2007. http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp06-07/RPP06-07_e.pdf

2. Deployability The CF have highly capable, well trained and equipped members and formations in all three environments that are continually screened and prepared for deployment. With the governments procurement of strategic air lift capability and enhanced tactical air lift assets, this will be exceptionally improved. The basic direction is; *" As part of the transformation strategy, the CF will better integrate maritime, air, land and special operations forces to allow units to work as one unified team. On July 1, 2005, Canada Command (Canada COM) was created as a cornerstone of transformation. As an integrated national operational command headquarters, Canada COM allows the CF to deploy the best military assets to meet any emergency, anywhere in Canada. When a domestic crisis occurs—whether it is a natural disaster or a terrorist attack—the combined response will be immediate, co-ordinated and sustained. The defence of Canada is the CF's first priority. In addition, Canada COM is also responsible for North American operations. Working in cooperation with the US, Canada COM's responsibilities include the protection and security of North America."* It is also worthy to note that as Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) has a similar responsibility they have; *" Since April 2005, over 4,700 CF personnel have been deployed on various missions. Currently, Canada has over 2,900 personnel deployed across the globe to defend Canadian values and interests while contributing to international peace and security."*

3. Inter-operability The ability to operate with other government departments at all levels and with other nations and international organizations in intense situations, both tactically, emotionally or strategically is an ever increasing requirement in both business and the military, in today's fast dangerous world. Therefore, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) must satisfy; *" One of the CF's roles is to contribute to international peace and security. CEFCOM's contribution to this role is the conduct of fully integrated global operations, across the spectrum from humanitarian assistance to combat, in concert with national and international partners to achieve timely and decisive effects in support of Canada's national interests."*

4. Force Structure The department and CF have been transitioning to a new activity based structure for some time and are now working to; *" adopt a fully integrated and unified approach aligning force structure to ensure operational effectiveness. Key initiatives include the further development of Canada Command (Canada COM), six Area Joint Task Forces, the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), a Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), a Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM), a Military Personnel Command (MILPERSCOM), a Strategic Joint Staff, a Rapid Reaction Force, Mission Specific Task Forces and a managed readiness system to enhance CF ability to generate and deploy integrated forces."* Table 1 is National Defence Organization – Before formation of new commands, while Table 2 depicts National Defence Organization – After formation of new commands.

FIGURE 1 NATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANIZATION – Before formation of new commands.





FIGURE 2 NATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANIZATION – After formation of new commands.



5. Domestic Capability The CF mission statement priority list is simple and clear. Defence of Canada, Defence of North America and then international tasks, so it would follow that; *"The capability to conduct operations effectively at home and abroad is provided by efficient, professional maritime, land, air and special operations forces, supported by many partners and agencies. It comprises a variety of activities, including international operations in conjunction with NATO and the UN, continental NORAD operations, and domestic operations, such as surveillance and control of Canadian territory."*

"Domestically, Canada COM will establish and maintain operational-level liaisons with other federal government departments. Regional Joint Task Force Commanders, responsible for executing the Canada COM mission within their assigned Areas of Operational Responsibility (AORs), will establish and maintain liaisons with local federal agencies, provincial departments and provincial police forces."

6. Jointness The ability to operate in unison and with safety with other organizations that would normally have completely different doctrine and procedures, requires a very well trained and flexible force at all levels, in all branches, so; *"National Defence will continue to work closely with other departments, particularly the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), to enhance day-to-day links at the staff and executive levels and to craft strategic-level recommendations to government on responses to domestic and international crises. Co-operation at the strategic level will help to ensure greater policy and operational cohesion and effectiveness."* The CF will therefore; *'Generate and Sustain Joint, National, Unified and Special Operations Forces.'*

7. Capitol Program The government has initiated many capitol procurement and equipment and system upgrade projects over the past three years and are now entering into several large projects to solve very long standing mobility problems within the CF. Most notable are; *"The government has already demonstrated its intent to rebuild the Canadian Forces. Budget 2006, combined with the commitments of Budget 2005 is expected to provide National Defence with approximately \$20 billion in additional expenditure authority for the five-year period ending 2010/11. Moreover, in its first 120 days in office, the government has taken tangible action to address critical sea, land and air capability requirements, and announced plans to acquire:*

- *Joint Support Ships*
- *Strategic airlift*
- *Tactical airlift*
- *Medium/heavy lift helicopters*
- *Medium Logistics Truck"*

8. Command and Control Canada is a very large country with very diverse terrain and ethnic concerns in a rapidly changing world that can severely effect the quality of life and the ability to sustain the Canadian, democratic, way of life. That makes it imperative that the CF establish a command and control structure that will enable a high level of expertise to be applied to every possible theatre of operations, domestic and foreign. It also follows that all environmental commanders and staffs must develop more limited scopes of focus and concentration. The direction provided for all is; *"Build the Force - Present and future policy decisions will guide the CF through this period of transformation. Paramount to this transformation is the requirement to improve Defence's domestic Command and Control (C2) presence and to better meet its international obligations. To achieve this, the CF established a new national command structure. In doing this Defence made a clear delineation between the strategic and operational levels of command by creating a dedicated Strategic Joint Staff and four operational - level command structures. The result will be a more efficient and responsive Canadian Forces C2 structure. The new command structures are described below."*

"Canada Command (Canada COM). Located in Ottawa, but separate from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), Canada COM is the sole authority for the conduct of all routine and contingency domestic operations in Canada, except those operations that, by law, must be executed under the direct command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Canada COM views the country as a single operational area with the national headquarters exercising command and control via six asymmetric, subordinate commands, which reflect the regional nature of the country."

"In addition, Canada COM is responsible for any operations the CF undertake jointly with the US military in North America either directly or through the Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) who will continue to function as the Canadian North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) region commander. It also serves as the point of contact and liaison with NORAD and US Northern Command (US NORTHCOM)."

"Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) is a key element of the new vision of the CF. Understanding that security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad, CEFCOM will ensure the CF are able to address threats to Canadian security beyond Canada's borders."

"Co-located with Canada COM in Ottawa, CEFCOM is the sole operational authority for the conduct of all international operations, with the exception of operations conducted solely by elements of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and for those continental operations under the command of Canada COM. CEFCOM establishes national and operational-level command and support structures, in theatre, for CF units deployed overseas, while ensuring that the maritime, land and air assets needed

to conduct humanitarian, peace support or combat operations remain under national command."

"Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) is composed of Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), the Canadian Forces' special operations and counter-terrorism unit, the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Company, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, and 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron. CANSOFCOM provides the CDS and operational commanders with agile, high readiness Special Operations Forces capable of conducting special operations across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad and of responding to terrorism and threats to Canadians and Canadian interests around the world."

"Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) provides an operational-level command capable of supporting all CF operations, domestic and international. With selected core resources assigned on a full time basis and authority to force generate additional resources as necessary, CANOSCOM provides the CF with a full range of command support, communications and information systems, and services such as health care, military engineering, logistics, land equipment maintenance, and military police."

"Completing this command structure is the Strategic Joint Staff, located in NDHQ. Maintaining an around the clock capability, the Strategic Joint Staff provides timely advice to the Chief of the Defence Staff in his role as the Government's principal military advisor, enabling him to exercise effective command at the highest level."

"From a more force structure perspective, the CF will place a premium on lighter, more mobile forces, capable of deploying rapidly and sustaining operations for extended periods. These forces will include the Canadian Special Operations Forces Regiment, the Rapid Reaction Battalions and other mission-specific task forces."

"Canadian Special Operations Regiment (Cdn Spec Ops Regt) will be a high-readiness, agile and robust special operations force capable of supporting and conducting a broad range of special operations missions. Defence will enlarge Joint Task Force 2 to enhance its ability to carry out missions at home and abroad, either alone or with other elements of CANSOFCOM."

*"Four new **Rapid Reaction Battalions** will also be created. The military will locate these units strategically across the country, in Comox, Trenton, Bagotville and Goose Bay to provide a Regular Force presence and to help ensure an effective response to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. The Forces will organize these units around key capacities that can be used locally, or transported rapidly to support Canadian Forces operations. Implementation will begin in 2006."*

"To better respond to domestic emergencies, the Land Force will also create a territorial response capability in centers such as Vancouver, Calgary, Regina, Winnipeg, Niagara-Windsor, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Saint John, Halifax and St John's. In addition, the Land Force, in conjunction with Canada COM, will identify other key capabilities in each region that could be used in a domestic emergency."

"The territorial response capability that will eventually be formed will include full-time and part-time personnel in each location. To achieve this capability in an efficient and effective view to grouping and/or amalgamating units, as necessary. Where circumstances allow, the territorial battalions may also be supported by other Reserve components, as directed by Canada COM."

Mission-Specific Task Forces (MSTFs) will be deployed as required. These task forces, which will be drawn from forces maintained at different states of readiness and structured for longer deployments, will carry out combat and peace support operations. They will be made up of maritime, land, air and special operations elements. They could be deployed as follow-on forces to CANSOFCOM or the Rapid Reaction Force, or as stand-alone contributors to other operations. The MSTF will also be capable of lead-nation status in multinational peace support operations for limited periods.

9. Engage Canadians There has been a long standing situation that could probably be considered as "uniquely Canadian", in that Canadians had very little interest in the military, and the military/political establishment wanted to keep it so. Those days are gone, and it is in every Canadian's (military and civilian) best interest to have all possible information about CF activities in the public eye. This generates better understanding leading to better respect and support and more diligent commanders and managers. Therefore, the instruction and resulting action within the department is; *"National Defence will continue to connect with Canadians through a broad range of coordinated, community-based activities to attract and enrol quality recruits. The aim is to make Canadians aware of the unique opportunities, benefits, challenges and rewards of CF careers. To effectively compete for the best people during a period of force expansion, the CF have adopted a robust and cohesive recruiting strategy. A comprehensive National Recruiting Campaign, supported by a National Recruiting Attraction Plan, new advertisements, and appropriate advertising funding is aimed at increasing the number of applicants from which to select suitable candidates. Performance measures are being developed, and results against these measures are expected by 2007."*

10. Human Resources The more modern and technical the military, the more expensive it is to train and maintain personnel. This is the case throughout industry, but the very intense and dangerous world of combat makes people the

very most important asset. Extremely narrow margins for error and very final consequences with a wide knowledge requirement compound the problems.

"Military Under transformation, the CF Personnel System and the organization leading personnel management will need to attain greater operational focus and, in particular, functional realignment and cohesion with respect to Human Resources (HR) issues. Over the past couple of years, much effort has been placed in re-defining and re-aligning the CF Personnel System through the Human Resource System Transformation (HRST) initiative to support CF transformation. Measures to address a growing backlog in HR policy development, a new Individual Training and Education (IT&E) management framework and better management and administration of non-environmental military occupations training will be put in place."

"Civilian DND must attract the right number and mix of motivated, qualified civilian personnel, in a timely fashion, to meet Defence's growing needs. The Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Civilian) has identified the following challenges and priorities for fiscal year 2006–2007:

- implementation of the Public Service Employment Act (P SEA);
- civilian impacts of CF transformation and potential restructuring;
- recruitment and staffing;
- retention strategies; and
- technology."

11. Proactivity "The CF will develop and institutionalize a coherent, centrally driven, long-range Capability-Based Planning (CBP) methodology to identify future CF capabilities within the government's policy and financial framework. CBP is the CF's core capability planning methodology and helps Defence prioritize and manage evolving CF operational capabilities. With this approach, the CF joined their key allies in supporting a more holistic approach to developing force structure".

"CBP itself is an alternative to threat-based planning and represents an attempt to break down traditional stovepipes while providing for transparency and coherence in defence decision-making. This planning method also provides a more rational basis for making decisions regarding future acquisitions and makes planning more responsive to uncertainty, economic constraints and risk. CBP focuses on goals and end-states and encourages innovation. It starts by asking "What do we need to do?" rather than "What equipment are we replacing?" CBP also uses the PRICIE construct (Personnel; Research and development; Infrastructure and organization; Concepts, doctrine and collective training; Information management; Equipment, supplies and services) to break down capabilities into areas of functional responsibility. This process allows the Department to better identify, prioritize and manage evolving operational capabilities within DND and the CF".

"Developing defence capabilities is a complex, multi-dimensional task. When planning for and eventually acquiring capabilities, Defence needs to identify the strategic circumstances in which Canada is likely to find itself in the next several decades. Then it must determine the potential and plausible military situations, or scenarios, for which Canada might need to mount a military response. In a departure from past practice, the centrally controlled force-planning scenarios used for capability-based planning in the CF will be based on real-world threats. Defence will use them to assess risk; describe operational considerations, resource requirements and other influencing factors; and rationalize capability requirements."

"CBP will also allow for resource prioritization, better business planning, in-year corporate management, performance measurement and transparent reports to the Government. The Joint Capability Requirement Board, which the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) chairs, will be responsible for overall long-term capability planning and top-down guidance to shape the CF. To control the planning and programming activities, Defence created the position of Chief of Programme in June 2006."

7.2.2 As there are some additional qualifiers included with the objectives covered in Table 2, it is important to expand on the material presented to answer the research question. Therefore the following information has been compiled to clarify those considerations:

1. Objective 1: Innovative Path The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) has a considerable list of responsibilities and the expert personnel required to ensure their execution. However, two of the VCDS sub-chiefs are in the forefront of the work to keep the CF and its agencies at least abreast of world developments, while striving to stay ahead of the development flexibility curve. Under the Defence Planning and Management (DP&M)³¹ umbrella are the Chief Force Development and the Chief of Programme (CFD). Together, they fulfil the DP&M purpose to the DND/CF of;


- **Plan** its long, mid and short term strategic direction;
- **Manage** the Sustaining and Change Agendas;
- **Monitor** performance and risk management; and,
- **Report** to government through the Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) and the Departmental Performance Report (DPR).

Figure 3 is included to demonstrate the high level of structure and attention with which the DND and the CF approach the subjects of strategy and planning and the extent to which they are seen as co-dependant functions. It is also worthy to note that each is headed by a Major General.

³¹ Defence Planning & Management, http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp_m/intro_e.asp

FIGURE 3

Diagram depiction of the flow of decisions and the return flow of results.



This is the mechanism that ensures those involved at all levels have the latest "Lessons Learned" information possible at every stage of planning and conduct of tasks.

2. Objective 2: Decisive Leaders The establishment of the Canadian Defence Academy must be seen as an exceptionally progressive step in military and civil service leadership, policy development and education sharing, in at least 50 years. It is explained as; *"The **Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)**³² is a Canadian Forces formation, organizationally situated within the Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources-Military) Group. It is part of a Canadian Forces-wide strategy to prepare its members intellectually and professionally to meet the challenges of future operations. Specifically, the CDA champions lifelong learning through the implementation of coherent, integrated, academically rigorous and*

³² CANADIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY, http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/index/engraph/about/about_e.asp

accredited education and professional development programs. This approach helps ensure members of the CF can develop their full intellectual potential.

Canadian Defence Academy Headquarters - CDA HQ

- *Canadian Defence Academy Command Cell*
- *Chief of Staff Cell - COS Cell*
- *Directorate of Professional Development - DPD*
- *Directorate of Learning Management - DLM*
- *Directorate of Operational Training and Education Needs*
- *Canadian Forces Leadership Institute - CFLI*
- *Canadian Military Journal*
- *CDA HQ Detachment Ottawa - CDAHQ Det Ott*

Royal Military College - RMC Kingston

Canadian Forces College - CFC Toronto

Canadian Forces Language School

Canadian Forces Learning and Development Center (CFLDC)

Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School CFLRS

Canadian Forces Support Training Group (CFSTG)

Canadian Military in the 21st Century

3. Objective 3: Modernize Going over the research material, it is obvious that the department and the forces are being modernized in every possible way. From policy and tactics through equipment, vehicles, aircraft and ships and the technology applied to their operation, command and control there is a concentrated policy of renewal. Everything from the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) through to the C-17 Globemaster III, will add to the technology surge within the CF and support organizations all over Canada.

4. Objective 4: Globally Deployable For many years, the CF has had to rely on contracted ships, the United States Air Force or rented air resources to deploy or return personnel and equipment around the world. When deployments were confined to a few personnel and light vehicles or 20 to 30 UN missions, this was not a serious short fall. However Iran/Iraq and Operation Apollo (first mission to Afghanistan) showed the considerable weakness of CF logistic movement capability, particularly when international agreements required that air resources be hired from specific nations. The C-17s and new "supply ships" will go a long way to solving these dilemmas.

5. Objective 5: Interoperable The most noticeable sign that interoperability with your allies is improving is that your soldiers are not being killed by those allies and your soldiers are not killing theirs. When they are not dropping bombs or throwing bullets even close without prior arrangement, there is some cause for optimism!

6. Objective 6: Career of Choice This objective is satisfied by the work of the CDA, the ongoing programme to reorganize and justify the trade and pay structures and the HR initiatives to;

- *"develop fair and effective performance evaluation procedures that motivate, provide performance feedback, recognize exceptional performance and provide developmental opportunities, and that apply at both the individual and team level;*
- *restructure military occupations to group occupations and common/generic jobs into career fields to broaden individual career development and meet operational requirements;*
- *explore distance-learning initiatives to increase student enrolment while decreasing the amount of time a member has to be away from the home unit and their family; and*
- *introduce a personnel-tracking policy in 2006 to collect and monitor a single, complete, national record of a member's or unit's time away."*

7. Objective 7: Strategic Partnerships Canada has always maintained mutual defence treaties, agreements and partnerships starting with specific native groups through the "Commonwealth", UN, NATO and NORAD just to name a few. Supply chain and equipment maintenance partnerships are being added to the list, as few countries, today, can keep a lot of very expensive spares in very expensive storage facilities for the occasional emergency requirement. Therefore, a group of countries and companies make mutually beneficial joint investment/operation agreements. This makes it possible for several operators of limited numbers of high tech items to purchase an interest in at times one set of contingency spares. This makes it possible to operate required equipment that would otherwise be out of reach, particularly when spares and maintenance costs can often outstrip purchase and operation.

8. Objective 8: Resource Stewardship The department and the forces have long understood the concept of identifying minimal requirements, identifying the best mix of purchase and services contracts to satisfy those requirements and getting the most for the least. However there have been several conditions of various origin in the way of full realization of economical operation. Large strides are being taken to; "**Optimize Resource Utilization**" Through;

- **Strategic Costing Model.** *captures all aspects of the existing force structure as well as the planned capability development.*
- **Strategic Asset Management Model (SAMM).** *The SAMM has been developed by Defence to calculate the current value of its existing asset base and to estimate replacement and sustainability gaps.*
- **Strengthen financial management within Defence by improving existing financial reports.**

- **Performance Measures.** *Within the framework of the Balanced Scorecard, Defence is developing financial indicators to measure the performance of the allocation and utilization of financial resources*
- **International Financial Linkages.** *Defence has pursued contacts with Senior Financial Officer (SFO) counterparts in the UK, the US, Australia and New Zealand concentrating on lessons learned in the accrual accounting environment, comptrollership, shared services and risk management.*
- *Defence will continue to optimize its resource utilization by: monitoring financial spending results against planned spending;*
 1. *ensuring that resources are allocated and re-allocated based on strategic priorities,*
 2. *transformation initiatives and capability requirements; and ensuring that capital programs (equipment, infrastructure, and IM/IT)*
 3. *are linked to strategic priorities, transformation initiatives, and capability requirements identified in a long-term capital plan, and*
 4. *ensure they include divestiture strategies, life-cycle management, and risk management.*

7.2.3 There are many more programmes, projects and initiatives that could be listed, however, the material presented is sufficient to support the statement that the DND/CF Transformation has **complied with the attributes and the objectives (table 1 and table 2) of Strategy 2020**. The plans formulated and the policies for future study and ongoing flexibility are true to the stated principles on which that document was based.

7.2.4 The CDS mission and intent statements are included below to save search time and for ease of reference and the second condition of the research question; "Have they (DND and CF) met the criteria set in the CDS Intent and CF Mission statements?"

"Mission. *Building on the foundation of institutional credibility and guided by the principles of sustainability, strategic relevance, operational responsiveness and tactical decisiveness, we will produce a Canadian integrated force supported by an effective, efficient and adaptable defence institution in which all Canadians can take pride, upon which our allies can depend, and upon which the government of Canada can rely for the defence of Canadian sovereignty and the protection of Canadian interests."*

"CDS Intent. *The CF will become more effective, relevant, and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased. The CF will become more effective by better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces. It will become more relevant, both at home and abroad, by adapting its capabilities and force structure to deal with threats that arise from international instability, especially in fragile states. It will become more responsive by enhancing its ability to act quickly in the event of crises, whether in*

Canada or around the world. The transformation of the CF will focus on the establishment of new integrated (beyond joint) organizations and structures, including a unified national command and control system. These goals demand that the CF move beyond traditional thinking to adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations".

7.2.5 All of the material produced by extensive research indicates that the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence are well on track with "transformation" in keeping with mission statement and CDS intent presented in his document, "CDS Planning Guidance - CF Transformation, October, 2005". There are several reasons to expect that the process will not continue with complete compliance to all guiding principles. The establishment of the "Transformation Steering Group" and appointment of a "Chief of Transformation" (originally at the MGen rank, he is now Lieutenant-General, W.J. Natynczyk, VCDS) will keep the many agencies, commands and personnel involved in the myriad activities required to execute such a radical and extensive change on track and in tune.

7.2.6 "Secondary to this is: Do the projects executed for modernization, upgrading and reorganization (transformation) of the CF, serve the best interests of Canada and its military establishment with sufficient flexibility for today's requirements and our swiftly changing and unpredictable world?"

7.2.7 The people of Canada are getting a military institution tailored to serve the wishes of their elected representatives immediately and well into the future. It is far more open and visible than in the past and is being built on the values that made Canada great. The average citizen will now be able to see what the CF and its personnel are doing, how they are doing it and what it means to them. The Government of Canada will have a military that reflects the policies of parliament and its various departments, committees and boards and with the doctrine, structure, equipment, personnel and training to carry them through. Other significant additional benefits to all Canadians are;

- Well trained, experienced and tested, leaders, tradesmen, engineers and many professionals who will continue to contribute to the nation and all of its endeavours for many years to come;
- Increased technology opportunities and expertise throughout Canadian industry and educational institutions;
- A very good source of employment either in support or as a uniformed member, that will provide exceptional training and the opportunity to gain unparalleled experience in their profession and in life; and
- Added business opportunities at home and abroad.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 IMMEDIATE

8.1.1 The first recommendation is quite plain and simply that the transformation of the DND/CF should be executed with concentration and flexibility. There is an urgent need to evaluate constantly, and quickly address errors and omissions. This is an extremely radical change, not only effecting the physical make up of the forces, but a complete rebirth of military doctrine, policy, procedure and even the basic ethos on which uniformed groups depend for success.

8.1.2 The most immediate requirement for the success of "transformation" within the DND, in general, and across the CF in particular is that the confusion created by the establishment of new command chains that take responsibilities and authorities from old commands that remain in the mix. An example; Land Force Command was referred to as "The Army" and its Commander (Chief of Land Staff) was considered to be the commander of the army. The land staff and CLS still exist and have duties to perform while four new operational commands have taken several of their responsibilities and authorities. There is confusion. In December, 2006, the Chief, Review Services³³ conducted an audit on, "Support of CF Transformation"³⁴ at the request of, Chief Defence Institutional Alignment, *"to confirm that core functional areas and authorities to support the new Canadian Forces (CF) command and control structure are in place and appropriate."*

8.1.3 Many areas of this evaluation indicate that there is significant confusion as to "who does what to/for whom" at the L1 level (General Officers and civilian Directors, in command positions answering to the CDS or Minister). This indicates not only that there is considerable potential for disaster, but there are probably significant opportunities for economy. "Where there is duplication, there is waste."

Using Land Force Command (LFC) as an example to look at the proliferation of new Headquarters, the flaws are obvious. The resulting increase in non-operational (ie. Staff) is seen as a step backwards. LFC had four, subordinate, Area Headquarters (AHQ) prior to restructure and though six new Joint Task Force Headquarters have been created with four of them superimposed on the existing AHQs. This not only increases the load of higher ranks on an already strained establishment, but it also adds to the potential for confusion. A count of General List Officers (full Colonel and Generals and Navy equivalents in late 2005 indicated 89.Gens and 309 Cols. The same count in January 2007 produced 94 Gens and 327 Cols. This has been a long running complaint of the CF and was a major point of WPD94.

³³ Main Web Site, http://www.forces.gc.ca/crs/rpt/reports_e.htm

³⁴ 1258-157 (CRS), Evaluation of Functional Responsibilities in Support of CF Transformation, December, 2006, http://www.forces.gc.ca/crs/pdfs/cffr_e.pdf

8.2 INTERMEDIATE

8.2.1 There are several areas of resource investment that should be studied without an eye on "tradition" or the internal politics of the "associations".

- Why are pilots given very expensive degrees, often in fields such as music, nursing and philosophy;
- Should every level of "command" in air units be over ranked, For instance squadrons (squadron leaders are majors) are commanded by wing (LCol) commanders and wings are commanded by group Captains (Col).
- There needs to be a separation between rank and trade pay for the non-commissioned troops. A long standing problem, not fully addressed by present transformation projects, is the fact that all pay is tied to rank. There is no way to reward and recognize a great tradesman unless they are also a leader. A lot of good service members take their talents to industry earlier than necessary for that purpose.

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