

**Institutionalizing Leadership in Contemporary Police Services:  
The Catalyst to Becoming Learning Organizations**

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## ABSTRACT

This qualitative study examines the absence of a coherent leadership model in contemporary police services, recent recommendations to fill this vacancy and the concept of institutionalized leadership as the solution to this missing element. These themes are applied at the organizational level to the current practices and business plan of the Ottawa Police Service with the intent of exploring possible real life applications in the form of a real time case study. Research was conducted through content analysis of a wide range of leadership studies and practices in the two general categories of a) the contemporary police profession, and b) the non police world (e.g. military, business, sociology, psychology). Results showed that there is a very pronounced, recent awareness in the police profession of leadership deficiencies and multiple recommendations are made about increased leadership training, selection, development and measuring as part of a global leadership model. Despite these recommendations there are few examples of them actually being put into meaningful practice in Canada, the United States, or the United Kingdom. Also, the police profession is found to be in a state of identity crisis, where its traditionally strong service-oriented subculture is being eroded by the dilution of its core functions through corporate practices and various interpretations of the community based policing model. This erosion has led to concerns of corruption, self-entitlement and individualism, all to the detriment of police professionalism. Contrary to the absence of a cogent leadership doctrine and concerns about the waning police culture is the notion of institutionalized leadership. Other reference sources reveal that there is a consistent set of leadership principles, values and practices that form the basis of leadership-centric cultures that are strongest in the military, but are also consistent with the practices of the most successful private sector business leaders. These guiding principles and values found in older leadership organizations, specifically the military, are highly consistent with the recommendations being made by the various police sources and with the desired leader values being identified by actual police professionals in survey based research material. They were also found to be highly consistent with the definition of the learning organization. The salient characteristics (e.g. flexibility, adaptability, openness to change) of the learning organization were consistent with other prominent recommendations for contemporary police leadership strategy. Furthermore, the military leadership material (Canadian Armed Forces, United States Army and United States Marine Corps) exemplifies in its content what this study defines as institutionalized leadership and forms the basis of a model that could fill the police leadership gap. Some findings suggest that despite the existence of this leadership model there is resistance to adopting these leadership practices due to their military origins. This study concludes that institutionalized leadership, and specifically the military model meets all of the recommendations being made about the need for increased, positive leadership in policing and that there is no reason that it cannot be adopted, along with other

non military material as a working model for the police profession. The principle recommendations of this study are that, a) there be a dedicated police leadership section, comprised of sworn police officers directly accountable to the Chief of Police in every police service, b) a coherent leadership doctrine be written for police by these sections, c) appropriate leadership training be provided at every rank level in policing, d) leadership selection be made by the organization (i.e. specifically by the police leadership section) based on operational performance and tested through rank specific course performance and e) sustained institutionalized leadership be adopted as a perpetual strategy of all police organizations.

## **Acknowledgements**

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### **Table of Acronyms**

CACP: Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police  
CF: Canadian Armed Forces  
CFLI: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute  
CPC: Canadian Police College  
DND: Department of National Defence  
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation  
ISIS: Institute for Strategic International Studies  
LAPD: Los Angeles Police Department  
NCO: Non Commissioned Officer  
OPC: Ontario Police College  
OPS: Ottawa Police Service  
RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
USAR: United States Army  
USMC: United States Marine Corps

## **Institutionalizing Leadership in Contemporary Police Services: The Catalyst to Becoming Learning Organizations**

“Institutionalizing a leadership-centered culture is the highest act of leadership”

-John Kotter

### INTRODUCTION

John Kotter’s quote is also featured in the opening page of Anderson’s (2000) book, *Every Officer is a Leader*. Anderson’s book title combined with the Kotter quote form a concise synopsis of the core issue of this study; policing is a leadership profession at all ranks, but leadership is not instilled in its professionals in any systematic way. This study analyzed the current state of the leadership culture (e.g. training, awareness, selection, measures, etc), or absence thereof in what Industry Canada refers to as the public police services with the purpose of a) identifying the current situation and shortcomings, b) examining recommendations from sources that consistently identify leadership as a key strategic factor for modern organizations and c) defining the concept of “institutionalized leadership” as the conceptual model that meets these recommendations and corrects current shortcomings. This study will be presented against the backdrop of the OPS, a contemporary, mid-size<sup>1</sup> Canadian municipal police service. This study is being written from the perspective of someone who has spent twenty-three years of combined service as both a police officer and as a member of the CF, the two principal professions examined in this study. It is from this perspective that the concept for this study was conceived.

### Background

Policing is still a relatively young government service, with a collective history (in the West) dating back to the nineteenth century<sup>2</sup>. Unlike national armed forces, police services developed without an embedded professional officer, or senior leader corps. Leaders were largely selected through combinations of position and experience from other government services. Candidates were not necessarily provided with any meaningful leadership development or training. Rowe (2006) described just how prevalent this practice of out sourced senior leaders in policing was, “As Wall illustrated for much of the period since Metropolitan Police was established in 1829 the service has relied upon ‘gifted amateurs’ to provide senior leadership and this tradition did not finally die out until the 1950s” (p. 760). While the core services of the profession remained largely the same for its first hundred years or so, the late Twentieth Century saw the infusion of the community based policing philosophy and the corporate model to varying degrees and combinations. These changes did not significantly alter the reality of the front line police officer, however they did change the character of individual police services and further diluted the *raison d’être* of police leaders.



The potential operational effects of this type of move away from traditional professional values towards a more corporate orientation was explored by Gabriel (1981), himself an Army officer, in a comparative analysis of USMC versus USAR performance in the Vietnam conflict. The key difference between the two entities during this conflict was that, "The Marines consistently refused to change traditional leadership practices and imitate the modern managerialism of the Army" (p. 77). Gabriel examined desertion, absenteeism, homicides of leaders by subordinates, mutinies, drug use and various aspects of combat ability in the two organizations. His conclusion was that:

"...although Marine units were pulled by forces towards disintegration - as all armies have from time immemorial - the Marines, unlike the Army, were able to prevent these forces from damaging unit cohesion and discipline...through the judicious application of traditional leadership models. By contrast the Army had gradually abandoned many of its traditional leadership modes and disciplinary habits in conformity with the new bureaucratic order, which placed premiums on the ability to handle managerial skills" (p. 83).

Gabriel was examining two organizations with similar histories and evolutions that were grounded in very strong leadership cultures. Despite the failures of the Vietnam conflict both organizations have survived and evolved beyond the failures of that war. Both operate from current leadership doctrines that are replete with traditional leadership values and practices (i.e. Department of the Army, 2006; Department of the Navy 2002), upgraded with more modernized concepts (e.g. inclusiveness, consensus building, civilian-military linkage, etc). In the case of policing the introduction of corporate practices and managerialism in the latter half of the Twentieth Century further complicated the definition of the police leader in a profession that had never really established its own leadership culture.

### *The Issue*

Looking back at the evolution of police services since the nineteenth century, there have been many positive developments (e.g. technology, training, education, fiscal responsibility), however some of the evolutionary steps have had mixed results. Contemporary police services lack a unifying leadership culture and competing ideas of what police leaders should be continue to plague the profession (Danyluk, 2009). In an increasingly fast paced business world, private and public sector organizations need to be highly flexible, open to new ideas and to share characteristics of what has been termed the "learning organization". There is widespread agreement that to attain this status, the key element is exceptional, sustained leadership. While many other industries have leadership selection, training and development programs to help produce leaders for the learning organization, policing is lagging behind with a distinct lack of

systematic leadership development practices and weak, or more often, absent leadership doctrine. It is time for the profession to fill this vacuum.

### Purpose

The immediate purpose of this study is to substantiate the aforementioned claims about the state of police leadership with current information and to propose a model to fill the existing gap. A more far reaching purpose is to provide policing with a strategic leadership vision that can be sustained over the long term with favourable impacts on leadership selection, training, ethics, professionalism and the achievement of strategic aims. To these ends the paper seeks to answer several questions.

### Research Questions

There are two levels to the research questions in this study. One level pertains to the public police profession as a whole and the second level applies specifically to the OPS.

#### *In the Police Profession*

This study will answer the following questions in relation to the broader domain of public policing:

- What is the current state of the police leadership model?
- What are the current themes in relation to police leadership?
- What is institutionalized leadership?

#### *At the OPS*

The following research questions are asked in the specific case of the OPS:

- How might adopting an institutionalized approach to leadership support the achievement of strategic aims at the OPS?
- How can institutionalized leadership be achieved at the OPS?

### Scope

Leadership is a strategic issue. Grant (2005) contends that prominent successful “change masters” are leaders who, “...have been, first and foremost, strategic decision makers, charting the direction and redirection of their companies, and making key decisions...” (p. 524). If the role of these leaders was primarily making strategic decisions, then it is very fair to say that leadership itself is a strategic issue. Middleton-Hope (2007) makes this link specifically in relation to the policing profession because he concludes that, “Leadership as an

activity asks us to take a strategic look at how we as leaders provide leadership, how we identify and develop people in our organizations..." (p. 15). This study is about the need to make institutionalized leadership a core police business strategy. In the context of this paper, achieving that institutionalized status is the proverbial "big hairy audacious goal" (Collins, 1999, pp. 71-72). It is intended as a strategy to fill the vacuum described earlier.

While strategy is the primary management domain concerned here, there are elements that intersect organizational design (e.g. meeting contemporary challenges, the learning organization), human resources (e.g. selection, measures, records keeping) and information technologies (e.g. training tool, leverage for knowledge sharing). Two key processes that will certainly be examined as part of the institutionalized leadership concept will be a) Change Theory and its role in instilling the new model in a functioning police service, and b) how the success of the model can be measured in the short and long term. It is apparent from the Dobby, Anscombe, and Tuffin (2004) and Schafer (2009) studies that at the national level (i.e. UK Home Office and US FBI) contemporary police services are only at the nascent stage of defining their leadership models. Therefore, measures of the success of any model chosen will be a work in progress that can actually start with the current system and progress through the implementation of the new model (i.e. institutionalized leadership).

## METHODOLOGY

### Research Design

This is a conceptual study of leadership as a business strategy. It relies largely on the content analysis of secondary sources of data (e.g. peer reviewed articles, management texts, professional articles, etc) to identify the existing problem with police leadership (i.e. absent culture), recent recommendations regarding the importance of leadership in the modern organization and the existing model that fits these recommendations. Several of the sources also provide this study with second hand primary data. These sources of primary data all provide feedback from police practitioners on the question of leadership within the profession. There are also some contributions from informal data sources (e.g. workplace conversations, professional anecdotes) that supplement both the references and concepts. The three conceptual areas of this study that the sources contribute to are:

1. Problem: Multiple sources defining the absence of a coherent leadership strategy in police services, that contributes to corruption, ethical breaches, abuse of power, and/or other negative pressure on performance.
2. Recommendations: Sources that make strong recommendations about the crucial role of police leaders and the need for significant attention to leadership selection, development, training and promotion.
3. Solution: The definition of institutionalized leadership and its compatibility with the recommendations being made.

These three areas will be addressed sequentially in the study, with the first half of each dedicated to the business world and police services in general. The second half of each area will relate the material to the OPS specifically. The end goal is to provide the reader with an understanding of leadership in the police profession and how and why institutionalized leadership should be introduced into police services.

### *Sources of Data*

The references used to examine this issue are drawn from a variety of sources. Some of these sources are peer reviewed articles, professional articles, government papers and full size books collected over the past several years related to leadership issues. In the early stages (i.e. mid 2009) of planning for this specific project more deliberate searches were conducted, starting with the Internet using the “Scholarly Articles” function of a popular search engine. The most common search words used were:

- Leadership
- Police leadership
- Police leadership selection/training
- Military leadership
- Institutionalized leadership

Full versions of peer reviewed journal articles that were selected were accessed using the Athabasca University Library, or in one case by obtaining the book from commercial sources. Another significant source of references was provided by the course list from the now discontinued Athabasca University Center for Innovative Management (CIM), Strategic Leadership for Policing (ESLS 670) course. The great majority of the references have been published since the year 2000. A very small percentage of the references date further back spanning the past three decades.

### *Categorization of Data*

The subject of leadership is both highly subjective and open to endless speculation (both current and historical). It is the intent of this study is to identify those themes that are consistent across a variety of sources that fit either under the problem, recommendations, or solution portions of this study. Under each of the segments the following themes helped focus the value, or category of the source for the researcher.

Table 1

<b>Problem:</b>	<b>Recommendations:</b>	<b>Solution:</b>
Definitions	Leadership	Definitions
Situation and Challenges	Training	Institutionalization
Trends	Development	Principles
Absence of Leadership	Learning Organization	Values
Good/Bad Leadership	Leadership Organization	Theories
Civilianization	Transformational-	Models
Managerialism	Leadership	Feedback
Ethics	Ethics	360 Degree Assessment
Organizational Culture	Moral Development	Authentic Leadership

These categories did not in most cases mean that specific sources contributed exclusively to one of the three sections of the study. Indeed most of the references corresponded to more than one section dependant on their own structure and conclusions.

### Limitations

There is no “smoking gun” in the form of an experimental design, or quantitative analysis in the data collected for this study that says institutionalized leadership is the solution to all of the problems of modern policing. Nor is there even a single point of reference for what institutionalized leadership is using that term. The entire pursuit of knowledge in the field of leadership remains highly subjective. Kingshott (2006) articulated this intangible quality when defining leadership in research about the role of police leadership in service delivery by writing, “So, what is leadership? An examination of leadership literature would suggest that although it has been researched, discussed, and analyzed there is no universally accepted theory of leadership...” (p. 128). Using the system of categorization described in Table 1 this study seeks to provide those recurring themes that are most replicated across the sources in their data, or conclusions and provide answers to the research questions.

### PROBLEM: TRAINED TO POLICE, EXPECTED TO LEAD

Given that the key concepts of this study are leadership and institutionalization, one of those needs to be defined at this point. The Webster’s dictionary defines leadership as:

Leadership:... (2) The quality of character and personality giving a person the ability to gain the confidence of and lead others... (3) The people who serve as leaders of a group (Webster’s Dictionary, 2009).


This is consistent with the CF definition in the DND *Leadership in the Canadian Armed Forces Doctrine* publication, which describes it as, “directly, or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority, or personal attributes, to act in

accordance with one's intent or a shared purpose" (DND, Doctrine, 2005, p. 3). The CF policy makers provide an extremely important caveat that should be mentioned as it is inter-related to many other facets of this study (i.e. ethics, values, behaviour). This definition is, "...generic, and value neutral....It makes no statements about what might be good or bad, effective or ineffective, leadership" (p. 3). This broad, simple definition of leadership is reflected in recent police material, where the definition reads, "Any behaviour of a manager which impacts either negatively or positively on the work of staff would be regarded as a leadership behaviour" (Dobby, Anscombe, & Tuffin, 2004, p. 2). For the purposes of his study leadership is defined simply as a person influencing someone else to accomplish a goal.

Based on this definition, the police officer starting their career after basic training is immediately being thrust into a very real leadership role in society. They may also be called on to lead fellow officers<sup>3</sup> from their service, dependent on situational factors. The patrol officer in their early twenties, alone<sup>4</sup>, autonomous and performing full police functions is a common reality in the police services of North America, Western Europe and other services of similar origins (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa). Even in the most mundane of situations they occupy a leadership role in relation to members of the public. Bearing in mind the aforementioned definition, even a simple traffic stop places them in this role. In this type of situation they will be dealing with one to five members of the public, from a position of authority and they will be striving to bring those people to an end (e.g. issuing a ticket, giving a warning, etc) determined by the officer without provoking an escalation of force, public complaint, or other loss of faith in the police service. Anderson (2000) was obviously acknowledging this daily reality in his book's title *Every Officer is a Leader*.


Despite this leadership role every officer is tacitly expected to assume, they receive no formal leadership training at the entry level and formal leadership training for higher levels is in its infancy, or still non-existent. In short, the modern police recruit in most countries receives a plethora of training to perform their various and diverse tasks (e.g. traffic enforcement, report writing, interviewing, statement taking, use of force options, tactical judgment, etc), but they receive none in leadership. In the CF Infantry Officers Phase Training of the late 1980s, the leadership company commander's opening speech to candidates painted the picture of the infantry officer's job as being comprised of three distinct disciplines, all resting on the foundation of leadership. This was a very simplified model conceived by an individual, but it illustrated very effectively the importance of leadership in professional performance. In the CF a very consistent, reinforced, defined leadership doctrine forms the foundation upon which rest the "pillars"<sup>5</sup> of performance. For the purposes of this study the original model has been modified slightly by adding "performance" to the top of the structure.

Figure 1



In contrast, the Ontario police officer candidate receives their professional pillars<sup>6</sup>, but the foundation is assumed even though leadership is also the binding behaviour. This leaves the pillars resting on nothing, or a foundation of varying strengths and materials formed by the individual officer through their own experiences, learning and other inputs.

Figure 2



Schafer (2009) supports this contention about the missing foundation by concluding that, “The absence of quality leaders in policing is, in part, due to a common failure to develop officers to become more effective leaders” (p. 239). This glaring gap between preparation for policing and performing actual functions was identified in the study conducted by Dobby, Anscombe and Tuffin (2004) for the British Home Office where they concluded that:

“Whenever police performance has been criticised and police leadership has fallen under scrutiny as a result, there has been no generally accepted leadership theory against which practice could be tested, and no clarity about how police leadership might need to change. A further consequence of the lack of evidence has been that forces have not felt able to specify what kind of leadership their officers should provide and styles have differed leader to leader” (p. v).

As Anderson (2000) states, “Policing is lagging behind in the development of leaders: As one police Chief recently said, ‘We have our recruit and mentoring programs, but where are our leadership training and mentoring programs?’...” (pp. xvi-xvii).

### Environmental Scan

Where are the police leadership training programs? A junior police officer is clearly expected to act in a leadership role yet there is no specific leadership training to prepare them for this. This would not be a critical issue if leadership could be learned by socialization in the police environment, or from on the job training, but even if this was the case it is doubtful that it would meet the demands of the modern organization.

It is generally accepted that in all sectors (i.e. private, public, non profit, etc) that contemporary challenges have become more complex, the pace of change has greatly accelerated and the general turbulence of this environment requires great flexibility (Anderson, 2000; Daft, 2007; Grant, 2005). A consistent theme in how organizations should respond to this need for enhanced flexibility is strong, effective leadership (Anderson, 2000; Dobby, Anscombe, & Tuffin, 2004; Grant, 2005; DND, Doctrine, 2005; Hammond, 1998; Middleton-Hope, 2007). In the policing context it is clearly stated in the Dobby, Anscombe and Tuffin (2004) study that, “The National Policing Plan for 2003-6 (Home Office 2002) stated that ‘strong police leadership [was] central to delivering improvements in police performance...’” (p. 1). Yet, here is where a significant problem exists in policing. While policing, like many other sectors, has produced its share of good, bad and mediocre leaders there is no real consensus on leadership strategy. Indeed there is an apparent under-emphasis on leadership development (Anderson, 2000; CACP, 2008; Murphy, 2005).

An issue related to this missing leadership philosophy is that the policing culture of the past few decades has become diluted. Policing, as practiced in the



West has always been a profession based on public service. In Canada this has come to be enshrined as the preservation of life, property and the peace. In contemporary North American society this is most often expressed in both the police sub-culture and by the general population as “To Protect and to Serve”. Ironically, the simplicity of this role, or mission has been lost in many modern police services. Gottschalk, Sommerseth and Gudmundsen (2009) indicate how, “There seems to be no such thing as one single police culture” (p. 171). This in itself represents a distinct challenge to police leaders as the same authors conclude their study by stating, “As suggested in this conceptual research paper, police culture might be a determinant of the extent of strategy implementation” (p. 181). If police culture is a “determinant” to strategy implementation and that culture is esoteric, then it does not bode well for the effective introduction of sustainable strategy. Without a unifying culture, it is virtually impossible to create a homogenous and coherent leadership program. In the absence of the traditional service oriented culture and police specific leadership training Kingshott, Bailey and Wolfe (2004) posit that “...officers bring their own in-place working models regarding entitlement to the police culture. These may be altered or strengthened by their experiences in training and on the job” (p. 195). This description resembles the unstable foundation illustrated in Figure 2. The aforementioned authors examined the issue of police culture and ethics in relation to Entitlement Theory from the perspective that there are basically two types of entitlement, where one is healthy and the other is not. It is their conclusion that the unstable, or weak present police culture, is contributing to a negative sense of self-entitlement and consequently breaches of ethics.

In the background section of this study, a similar historic precedent for the dilution of traditional values was described in relation to the USAR experience in the Vietnam War. In that study, Gabriel (1981) grouped “professionalism” and “traditional modes of leadership” together as positive attributes of the USMC that permitted that organization to outperform the USAR who had moved towards a “new bureaucratic order” and putting “premiums on the ability to handle managerial skills” (p. 83). This also seems to be the similar finding of Kingshott (2006), who concludes in relation to leadership in police service delivery that, “It is argued that the implied hypothesis is correct; there is a difference between management and leadership” (p. 134). Kingshott does acknowledge though that the division between managing and leading is not always clear and that, “The dual roles of management and leadership must necessarily interact and complement each other at both the personal and organizational levels to achieve an efficient and effective police service...”. Most police services lack any sort of meaningful leadership training, however they do provide extensive process based management training (e.g. computer applications, organizing teams, distributing tasks, rosters, time management, etc), therefore it would appear that these organizations have taken the Vietnam era USAR direction towards managerialism. Rowe (2006) highlights a very concerning breach between the frontline operator and senior police leaders when he recounts that, “A frequently recurring feature of PCs<sup>7</sup> views was that senior officers had, in various ways lost touch with the harsh realities of life faced by their subordinates” (p. 763). Gabriel

noted this type of rift between subordinates and leaders as a key failure of the USAR approach in Vietnam where (p. 80):

“There is perhaps no element of leadership that cements men together more than the perception that their officers are bearing their fair share of risk and death. In Army units the troops quickly discerned that with their officers having to serve only half as long as they did<sup>8</sup> under the enemy’s guns the officers were not bearing their share of the burden. In marine units the opposite perception was obtained...”

In relation to the British police example cited by Rowe (2006), he summarized the consensus of frontline police officers about senior leaders as, “Those, such as senior managers, who were regarded as desk-bound bureaucrats, were apart from ‘real’ police work by definition” (p. 763). In the absence of a leadership model, and/or a strong professional sub-culture that is a constant from recruitment to the senior police ranks, the risk of the aforementioned type of alienation is increased as there is no unifying doctrine, or sense of shared experience.

The problem (i.e. lack of a leadership model) is clear, however review of the literature has revealed it is tri-dimensional. The three facets of the problem are:

1. There is no clear, unified police leadership model in place to identify, develop, train and select leaders.
2. Private business and police literature agree that the modern environment is chaotic so organizations need to be more flexible than ever and that the key element in achieving this is good leadership strategy, but police services have none, or it is in its infancy.
3. The current lack of a strong service-oriented police leadership culture, leaves a vacuum that can potentially be filled with a negative culture of self entitlement and the potential for unethical behaviour.

Is this statement of the problem supported by the current situation in a contemporary police service?

### Leadership at the OPS

The word “leadership” appeared (until recently) only in two places at the OPS. It is one of the competencies within the OPS competency based model (OPS, 2007) and it appears in the new evaluation framework (i.e. Performance Review Program). A third more recent addition, which is highly opportune for the timing of this study, is its inclusion as a strategic goal for the 2010 to 2012 OPS business plan (OPS, 2009, p. 12). Part of the short OPS statement of the

internal problem is consistent with statements made earlier in this study, specifically “There is little consistency to the decision regarding participation and support in current leadership programs, courses, or other developmental opportunities”. Recognition of this gap in organizational practice is followed by the goal statement, “Establish a leadership development strategy”, of which one objective is to, “...create an internal leadership framework”.

Aside from these few contexts, the word leadership, or leader is rarely emphasized in OPS organizational language, and in many cases it is eclipsed by much more recurring words like “manager”, or “supervisor”. In many training venues even the title “police officer” or “officer” is forsaken in favour of “employee”. Even the term “business plan” is somewhat misleading given that a police service is most definitely not a business. Recent efforts have been made by the Chief of the OPS to refer to the business plan exclusively as an operational plan. While these distinctions may be argued by some to be simply semantic, this is the type of erosion of traditional values that Gabriel (1981) was referring to. Major-General Lewis McKenzie (retired), Major-General (retired) Dan Loomis, Lieutenant-Colonel (retired) Bland all former CF officers and the narrators of *A Question of Honour*, a documentary on the decline of the CF cite the “civilianization” of the Forces as one of the great negative influences that started with integration in 1964 and culminated in the reduced Army of the nineteen nineties (Stornoway Productions, 2003). Major-General McKenzie is very specific in dissecting this problem, indicating that what was supposed to be a “co-equal” relationship between military leaders and senior civil servants quickly became imbalanced with the civil bureaucracy gaining unequal power in the daily leadership of the CF. He ascribes much of this to the fact that while military members all have three to four years in a position before being “posted” to another role, the civil servants are in their positions for close to a decade, or more in many cases.

In studying the changing character of the police culture Jones and Newburn (2002) selected “managerialism/quasi markets” and “civilianization” to examine as two of the “...three particular elements that have been linked with the changing character of public policing” (p. 136). Civilianization in Canadian policing in recent years saw the selection of a non police officer as the Commissioner of the RCMP. Ironically it was discussed earlier that this type of practice of selecting a non professional as a senior leader in policing was a discontinued nineteenth and early twentieth century practice. Rowe (2006) traced the discontinuation of the practice to the British Police Act in 1919 whereby, “In the aftermath of the First World War it seems that ‘followership’ within the police service demanded leaders with credible experience in operational policing” (p. 761). One of his conclusions from this contemporary study found that, “...direct experience of the realities of policing ‘on the ground’ continues to be a central theme in police narratives about the legitimacy of leaders”. One critical difference between the impact of civilianization in the military and in police services is that the former retained control of its leadership doctrine, measures of leadership performance and selection of new leaders. In policing the average career path has a far greater managerial, or corporate

content and selection is based on a variety of private sector practices (e.g. the competency based model at the OPS) designed by civilian staff.

A potential police officer candidate arrives in the OPS application process after having participated in an out sourced<sup>9</sup>, provincially mandated basic selection process where there is no reference to leadership, or for that matter professional values. This is simply a screening process where physical fitness is tested along with aptitude and some basic writing skills. With a pass in these tests the candidate may then enter the actual OPS application process. The first stage of the process is the interview phase and this is the first exposure of the police candidate to the competency based interview system.

This competency based system is not only used at the recruit phase, but becomes the primary tool of selection for promotion. Originally adapted from the private sector, its validity is being questioned in recent business literature (Martin & Pope, 2008). Martin and Pope, who are both senior British business leaders put into question the lack of subjective input afforded by the competency based system. Martin offers an observation that has particular pertinence with recent OPS experience. He recalls how:

“I have even worked in organizations where whole bureaucracies are employed to ensure that line managers understand and apply the competency models carefully sculpted by the HR Department in cahoots with highly paid external consultants” (p. 82).

In the OPS promotional processes conducted in the past year, the program was overseen and validated by an outside consultant with no police leadership qualifications, or operational police experience. In specific relation to the first time applicant Martin recommends that, “When recruiting, make sure that there is not a sole or substantial reliance on competency based interviewing” (p. 83). Neither Martin, or Pope advocate the total rejection of the competency based models, however they do recommend strongly that these models be treated as a less prominent tool used in conjunction with a more subjective, holistic evaluation of the individual as a whole (e.g. history, values, measured performance). Furthermore, reliance by the OPS on the competency based system fails to enact a major recommendation of a Doctoral study (McDonald, 2006) conducted at the OPS. In relation to recruiting McDonald recommended very specific subjective questions “customized” to the police profession (pp. 177-79). One of the words used directly in her examples was “leadership” (p. 179). These recommendations will be explored in greater detail in the next section.

Until recently there was absolutely no leadership oriented content at any level of training in the OPS. In recent years some leadership oriented courses have been introduced both in the OPS and from some external sources. While these courses are leader oriented (i.e. given to junior and senior leaders) they are for the most part short (i.e. one to two weeks) and are more focused on leadership tools (e.g. briefing formats, evaluation report writing, labour relations) processes as opposed to actual leadership (e.g. how to motivate, leading by

example, principles, practical scenarios, etc). Again, the actual words “leader” and “leadership” are still used sparingly. The course titles normally use vernacular such as “Manager”, “Supervisor”, or “Administrator”. These courses are offered both before and after promotion, but do not play a direct role in evaluation of the individual (i.e. course performance, scoring).

To be selected for the first major promotion of an officer’s career from Constable to Sergeant, the officer simply writes a general knowledge exam, submits a resume, and participates in a competency based interview and a brief sit down scenario. The entire process is initiated by the officer submitting their own candidature. This is possibly one of the most perplexing aspects of the police leadership selection process for anyone with a military background. Even with the recent increase of live operations (e.g. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Somalia, Afghanistan) in the military, the average CF member still spends the majority of their career in peacetime operations (e.g. training, maintenance, administration). In contrast the average police officer is engaged in operations for the vast majority of their careers.

In the military the evaluation system is based uniquely on daily observation and measuring of professional performance by the immediate next level leader and reviewed by the immediate commander of the writer (i.e. two levels up from the person being evaluated). These evaluation reports are then used as the primary tool for identifying leadership potential and selecting candidates for leadership training. While the member can communicate their desire to be a leader at the next rank and receive mentoring towards that goal, selection for leadership training is made by the CF exclusively based on their overall scores in relation to their peers. Live operations are obviously the preferred venue for these observations given that they are the most demanding and stressful on the individuals and give the truest indication of dynamic leadership. While similar evaluation reports have recently been re-introduced to the OPS, they are not scored and they are not used to quantify the individual’s leadership potential within the promotional process in any way. The major score for performance comes from the few anecdotes the individual is asked to provide in relation to competencies and one or two questions on organizational issues. Their ability to articulate these anecdotes and the answers to the organizational questions is the basis for the measure of their leadership potential.

Put simply, the military selects its leader candidates based on daily observation and objective evaluation by front line leaders, while the OPS (and presumably most other police services) rely on the individual to provide a few of their own examples. The irony is that the policing environment provides a constant operational theatre to objectively measure performance in, however this sustained performance is ignored in favour of the examples presented by the self-interested party. This appears to be similar to what Schafer (2009) hints at when he wrote, “McCall and Hollenbeck (2007) contend the prevailing problem with leadership development is a tendency to focus on competencies, not competence” (p. 242). The emphasis from application to actual performance in the interview on the self seems to contradict the very nature of the policing profession as a self-less, or self-sacrificing, service to others profession.

While there is no proven link to this current emphasis on self-promotion by the OPS Human Resources promotional process and the following conclusion by McDonald (2006), the effect is of critical concern if the OPS is seeking to promote its best potential leaders. McDonald found a high incidence of “promotional complacency” in the “top performers” (p. 171) selected for her study. She found that, “...only 10% believe that through effort and confidence (6%) that they could succeed in the promotional process”. Only one in four showed aspirations to be promoted. McDonald noted that, “For this group of high achievers to lack motivation in terms of advancement is of serious concern for future succession planning”. While the current OPS situation is evolving, with growing interest being given to leadership issues, the organization has not as yet countered the three facets of the leadership problem. Furthermore, there are some practices such as recruiting, leadership selection and the competency based model that contradict recommendations made specific to the organization (i.e. McDonald) and/or may fail to recognize current warnings (i.e. Martin & Pope). There is a recent and voluminous body of knowledge proposing many different recommendations that could help the OPS and police services in resolving the leadership problem in the profession’s way ahead.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS: LEADERSHIP AT ALL LEVELS

The CACP ISIS (2008) report was succinct, declaring that, “Not to put too simple a point on this, but our collective findings in this area can be plainly stated: leadership matters” (p. 12). Dobby, Anscombe and Tuffin (2004) were equally categorical in the opening line of their report which read, “Professional consensus in both the public and private sectors, is that leadership is key to performance” (p. 1). At this point it has already been demonstrated that in the police profession there is an expectation of leadership from the earliest stage in an officer’s career, yet there is no early leadership training and it is not a significant focal point in recruiting. Furthermore, as the officer’s career progresses selection criteria are largely weighed on the ability of the candidate to sell themselves at the specific moment of the promotional process, as opposed to relying on sustained performance of the individual measured by other police leaders. This model, or absence thereof, literally obliges the individual to create their own leadership model from their own experiences and intuition. If an organization is going to allow this type of self-development then there should be at least some examination of the age old question about whether or not leadership is innate, learned, or a combination of the two. To put this question into perspective an examination of the two extremes may be helpful.

Jeanne d’Arc could arguably be the most exceptional historical example of a transformational leader whose abilities were innate. As an adolescent girl, from the peasant class (O’Leary, 2004, p. 74) in medieval France she would have had absolutely no leadership training. Furthermore, as a young woman in a highly chauvinistic period of history she would have been excluded from any form of early military training, let alone the opportunity for a military leadership position. Despite these barriers, a young<sup>10</sup> Jeanne d’Arc petitioned her king for such a

role, was granted a command and in one short year reversed over one hundred years of battlefield defeats. While she was killed within a year of her debut, the momentum she gained through several major victories brought the Hundred Years war to an end with eventual victory for France. O'Leary summarizes Jeanne d'Arc's resources at the outset of her battlefield command:

“If you would raise the bar of your leadership, Joan's example is immensely useful, as she had no position, experience, champion, or friend in high places. Are you lacking resources? She had none. Are you lacking skills and expertise? She had none. She did have one thing you may lack...She had an uncompromising faith that she was being called to accomplish something greater than she had the means to achieve” (p. 94).

On the other end of the spectrum, there is the example of Alexander the Great. Alexander is a particularly apt comparison to Jeanne d'Arc, having stepped into the highest rank of his nation when he was only twenty (O'Leary, 2004, p. 51), three years older than Jeanne at the time of her prominence. Aside from the similarity in age, Alexander's career path was drastically different than Jeanne d'Arc's. Alexander was heir to a King in an era of imperial military expansion. He inherited one of the Western world's first professional armies and an army that had already developed a revolutionary style of tactics that gave great advantage over their contemporaries. From childhood Alexander was schooled by the best academic, political and military minds of the region. Amongst his teachers was Aristotle. He also led his first military engagements as an adolescent and was already leading his nation as regent in his father's absence by the age of sixteen. This was a person who was given every resource possible to prepare him for leadership and his legacy is one of the most known in history.

If there is any question as to the relevance of the two aforementioned historical anecdotes to the current issue of police leadership it is this: the average police applicant is not a modern day Jeanne d'Arc, or an Alexander. Furthermore, if Jeanne d'Arc is an example of innate leadership ability it can be stated with confidence that most of the rest of us could use some degree of training to help us develop as leaders. Popper and Mayselless (2007) place this outside training, or development in the context of the elements needed to become a leader. Their position was, “Thus, the formula for ‘becoming a leader’ consists of the potential to lead, motivation to lead, and certain developmental contextual processes and conditions” (p. 666). While police services need not prepare everyone as a future Alexander, it has already been argued that they do need all officers to demonstrate some leadership. In *An Integrative Approach to Leader Development Day*, Harrison and Halpin (2009) emphasize the developmental requirements of leadership. They contend that, “Being an effective leader means drawing from a repertoire of skills and higher order competencies that require nearly a lifetime of experience, intense practice, and learning to master” (p. 172). Even with this type of preparation there is the

possibility of failure, however the authors are categorical about the risks of not following a framework for leadership development where, "...failure is more likely if leaders are developed in an ad hoc and atheoretical manner. Comprehensive and systematic leader development cannot guarantee success but it can certainly raise the odds dramatically". In the context of our two historical examples Jeanne was clearly the "ad hoc" and "atheoretical" product (Figure 2, minus the three pillars), while Alexander was the product of "systematic leader development" (Figure 1). If the police profession is going to follow the recommendations of Day, Harrison and Halpin at what level should this development begin?

### Micro Environment

At the micro level (i.e. the individual and team) leadership is being displayed on a daily basis, peer to peer, senior ranking person to junior ranking person, from junior ranking person to senior ranking person and to people outside of the organization. Simply acknowledging this multi-dimensional relationship would counter some long standing misconceptions about leadership in general. The "top down" bias that traditional leadership study entailed was a clear problem identified by House and Aditya (1997) who found in relation to leadership research, "...it continues to focus excessively on superior-subordinate relationships to the exclusion of several functions leaders perform and to the exclusion of organizational and environmental variables..." (p. 465). The more contemporary sources in this study seem to have moved beyond this perspective. Schafer's (2009) survey research indicated that contemporary police agree with the notion in the preceding section favouring some form of leadership training as opposed to relying on the innate. He observed that:

"Though a small portion felt leaders were born, the vast majority felt effective leaders were made or had innate skills that could be enhanced by education, training, and experience. Some respondents felt such processes should begin very early in an officer's career, perhaps even as a component of pre-service (academy) training" (p. 245).

This view by a sample of police officers is a clear response to the missing leadership training facet identified as part of the problem. Schafer acknowledges Anderson's "every officer is a leader" concept and in relation to his sample, he observed, "Though some respondents felt leadership education and training should only focus on those most likely to rise through the ranks, others felt initial efforts were better focused in a broad manner". Pagonis (2001), a former General officer in the USAR, supports the Schafer survey with his own belief that, "The good news is that leaders are made not born. I'm convinced that anyone who wants to work hard enough and develop these traits can lead" (p. 108). In Figure 2 where there is an absence of a deliberately constructed leadership model, people will develop their own with unending combinations of variables. If



the organization is not providing the model, yet expecting its members to lead then there is a distinct risk that the individual's model will be inconsistent with the values, vision, or even the basic mission of the organization. This potential dysfunction can manifest itself in some significant manners.

Leadership is directly associated with ethical behaviour (Day, Harrison & Halpin, 2009; Department of the Army, 2006; DND, Doctrine, 2005; Department of the Navy, 2002; Johnson & Cox, 2005; Kingshott, Bailey, & Wolfe, 2004; May, Chan, Hodges, & Avolio, 2003; Middleton-Hope, 2007; Owens & Pfeifer, 2003), positive role modeling (Dobby, Anscombe & Tuffin, 2004; Harvard Business School Press, 2007; Johnson, 2007; O'Leary, 2004) and improved service delivery (CACP, 2008; Independent Commission on the LAPD, 1991; Kingshott, 2006) at all levels in the organization. Owens and Pfeifer (2003) made the direct relationship between leadership and ethics/role modeling the subject of their study. One of their specific recommendations includes the recognition of the role of leaders in ethical behaviour (p. 132). They consider this role when they recommend testing for leadership candidate selection (p. 133). This position regarding the critical role of junior leaders (e.g. Sergeants, front line leaders) in positively influencing ethical behaviour is a recurring theme (Dobby, Anscombe & Tuffin, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Kingshott, 2006; Schafer, 2008; Wood, & Winston, 2005). Johnson measured specific behaviour (i.e. conducting personal business on duty) and found that:

“Field supervisors who model appropriate behaviour by refraining from conducting personal business themselves and who engage in frequent face-to-face contacts with their subordinates in the field tend to supervise officers who engage in less personal business while on duty” (p. 347).

Johnson has identified a key link in the police leadership continuum, the junior leader (e.g. Sergeant, lead Constable in an operation, etc) and another of the inadequacies of the current police model. Emphasis on the role of junior leaders was also identified by Dobby, Anscombe and Tuffin (2004), who believe, “A focus on sergeants is appropriate as they are the main supporters for the officers at the front line and it is vital that they support and add value to the work of those officers” (p. 15).

It was observed in the discussion of the problem that some police services (i.e. the OPS) have identified leadership as a strategic issue/goal and some courses are now being offered to develop leaders. However this is a strategy without a plan and the emerging courses are concentrated at the senior ranks of policing. In other words, this appears to be a case of the very “top down” bias identified by House and Aditya and it ignores the critical role of junior leaders described by Johnson. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that there are other recommendations similar to the survey results obtained by Schafer that call for leadership training and/or awareness at all levels of the police chain of command, including at the recruit stage:

- From the Independent Commission on the LAPD (1991) in the aftermath of the Rodney King incident, “Command accountability and effective supervisory techniques should be the primary focus of the training of sergeants, lieutenant, and captains” (p. 136).
- From the Home Office report (2004) on police leadership, “All recruitment and selection processes for the service from constable to chief officer and from CID to community beat, need to be able to distinguish those candidates who are able to have a positive impact on subordinates through the kind of leadership they provide” (Dobby, Anscombe & Tuffin, p. vi).
- From the CACP, ISIS (2008) report, “Canadian policing should promote a new concept: the Canadian Police Leader. Canadian policing should create a deliberate and managed talent pipeline culminating in a formal accreditation process for police leaders with emphasis on validated performance standards” (p. 15).

These are only a few samples of recommendations regarding the profound importance of having a leadership model that starts with the junior ranks and sustains development to the highest leader echelons. They make intuitive sense because they emphasize the need for the selection of competent leadership at the tactical, or micro level if you desire to produce top performing strategic leaders.

### Macro Environment

From the top leader of an individual service to the national policing scene, leadership is a growing area of interest. On the macro level, it is recommended that the modern business, firm, non profit, or public service become learning organizations, and that they develop transformational leadership to do so. The hallmark of the learning organization is its responsiveness to change and this meets the need for flexibility identified earlier. Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) define the term as, “Learning organization refers to the ability of an organization’s employees to learn to cope with environmental changes on an ongoing basis” (p. 471). This definition is consistent with the five from different academic sources provided by the Canadian Public Service Agency (2007) in their report *A Primer on the Learning Organization*.

Transformational leadership is often credited with being the style that is best suited for implementing and reacting to change (Anderson, 2000; Canadian Public Service Agency, 2007; Daft, 2007; DND, Doctrine, 2005; Livingstone, Nadjiwon-Foster, & Smithers, 2002). Anderson (2000) proposed that the way forward for the modern organization is to become a “learning organization”, but he lays the foundation for this study’s concept of institutionalized leadership by claiming that a pre-requisite is to first become a “leadership organization” (p. 5). Dobby, Anscombe and Tuffin (2004) cite a specific recommendation from the Police Reform White Paper (Home Office 2001) that required, “Improved training, leadership and professionalism [were] required at every level of the police

service...” (pp. 1-2) as a necessity to respond to future challenges. They also identified the importance of pursuing transformational leadership in modern organizations (p. 27). Echoing the aforementioned Police Reform White Paper’s call for leadership training at all levels, the Canada Public Service Agency (2007) identifies the first level of transformation to becoming a learning organization as the “individuals” (p. 12). This focus on the individual at all levels is a recurring theme across much of the literature for the metamorphosis to a learning organization. Anderson sees this as the future of successful organizations where, “Self-leadership will become a common word, and effective leaders will become culture change leaders” (p. 11).

Current business literature also, cites the need for transformational leadership in the fluid modern environment. Daft (2007) indicates that, “One style of leadership, referred to as *transformational leadership*, is particularly suited for bringing about change” (p. 425). Middleton-Hope’s working paper (2007) from the International Police Executive Symposium identifies leadership development as the “number one challenge” (p. 17) in the future of policing. Part of his elaboration on this resonates with Anderson’s idea of a “Leadership Organization”, where Middleton-Hope endorses a clear organizational leadership philosophy, “By communicating the vision of leadership broadly within the organization, emerging leaders are able to more effectively participate in the process of leadership...” (p. 17). Needless to say this pursuit is not expedient, nor easy. Rooke and Torbert (2005) warn that, “The leader’s voyage of development is not an easy one...Those who are willing to work at developing themselves and becoming more self-aware can almost certainly evolve over time into truly transformational leaders” (p. 76).

Middleton-Hope’s work suggested that creating the vision for leadership development starts and ends with the Chief of Police. He goes on to further recommend that the Chief’s office; not a junior leader, nor a Human Resources Section, nor outside talent consultants, needs to:

- Identify people within the organization who have high performance track records.
- Attend to developing talent through growth learning opportunities.
- Foster creativity and innovation by developing a culture of risk taking and decentralized decision making...chief’s tenures are all too often cut short before they are able to execute a plan to leave a sustainable legacy (p. 18).

Middleton-Hope is saying that police leadership development is the sole preserve of the Chief’s office. He does not say that a Chief cannot draw on the expertise of those other entities, but it is clear from his study and recommendations that the primary mover in the leadership process in an individual service is the Chief and no one else. This is only fitting given that the Chief in large municipal services is the person most likely to be able to demonstrate sustained “strategic leadership” (Rowe, 2001), which is, “...defined as the ability to influence others to voluntarily make day-to-day decisions that enhance the long-term viability of the

organization...” (p. 83). While Rowe was not restricting his definition to the Chief Executive Officer, it is the senior leader by virtue of their positional power that can most easily take action that promotes, or hinders the aforementioned definition. The Canada Public Service Agency (2007) identifies three levels of transformation necessary to become a learning organization as, the individuals, the groups and the organization (pp. 12-13). Rowe identifies the strategic leaders as the coordinators of the aforementioned triumvirate because, “They guide the organizational knowledge creation process by encouraging the organization’s capability to combine individual, group and organizational tacit and explicit knowledge...required for enhanced future performance” (p. 87).

It has been suggested that the Chief is ultimately accountable for leadership development, and by extension the ethical conduct of his or her organization. Furthermore, they occupy the position with the most prominent role in the pursuit of becoming a learning organization through their strategic leadership. Therefore, if the recommendations about adopting a leadership model are going to be acted on and a cultural change initiated within the police services it is going to start in the Chief’s office.

### Recommendations in Relation to the OPS

Following the same thematic approach as in the previous section, leadership recommendations at the OPS can be divided into the micro and macro. At the micro, or tactical level (i.e. the individual), McDonald (2006) conducted research at the OPS, studying performance excellence. Several of McDonald’s conclusions were interwoven with the leadership material referred to in this study, or are very similar to specific recommendations made in other literature. Specifically McDonald made recommendations to customize recruiting for the profession, use multi-level self assessment tools, target career and succession planning, develop a web based learning program, promote front line recognition, establish a corporate curriculum and enrich the internal role-model function (pp. 177-188). In terms of recruiting Schafer and the Home Office study (Dobby, Anscombe & Tuffin) identified the recruit and training stage of an officer’s career as the starting point for leadership awareness.

In terms of assessment both McDonald (2006) and Anderson (2000) make recommendations favouring continuous self assessment of both performance and leadership respectively. In terms of assessment of the individual McDonald described a much more detailed and objective system to measure sustained tangibles as opposed to the shortcomings (i.e. limited to a few examples, self-described) of the current competency based model. Succession planning was the subject of another recent internal MBA research project at the OPS and Middleton-Hope was quoted on this subject earlier. Learning (web based) and curriculum is the foundation of what this study is exploring in terms of a sustained, comprehensive knowledge based approach to leadership. It is also one of the consistent messages in the works by Day, Harrison and Halpin (2009); Dobby, Anscombe and Tuffin (2004); and Schafer (2009). Finally, identification of internal role models is again a core part of the leadership model. The Johnson

study specifically identified the effect of junior leaders as role models. For a more detailed comparison of the intersection between McDonald's recommendations, other related theories and the current situation at the OPS please refer to Appendix A. To date these recommendations have not been implemented in any focused way at the OPS, however they do provide concrete, actionable recommendations that could be enacted as part of an organizational leadership model.

A modest beginning to forming such a model has already been initiated by the OPS senior leadership. The exact wording of the strategic goal and objectives as it appears in the OPS Operational Plan (2009, p. 12) is provided below.

Figure 3

**Goal:**  
**3.0 Establish a leadership development strategy.**  
**Objectives**  
 3.1 Review current leadership content accessed by Ottawa Police Service members, identify any gaps and create an internal leadership framework.  
 3.2 Establish a strategy to financially support external academic development and create guidelines for access to outside education.  
 3.3 Formalize a mentoring program to include criteria, goals and deliverables.

The two key parts of this goal that put the OPS in alignment with the recommendations enumerated in this study are the goal of establishing a leadership strategy (recognizing it as a strategic issue) and creating an internal framework (the missing model). This is the perfect set up for the question that now remains to be answered; what should that framework look like?

**SOLUTION: INSTITUTIONALIZE LEADERSHIP**

A Working Model

This study proposes that the answer to the previous question is for police organizations to pursue the notion of institutionalized leadership. The term as this study refers to it is defined as follows:

Institutionalized: The term institutionalization is widely used in social theory to denote the process of making something (for example a concept, a social role, particular values and norms, or modes of behaviour) become embedded within an organization, social system, or society as an established custom or norm within that system... (Wikipedia, 2009).

A key consideration in relation to the definition of institutionalization is that it is "embedded" and becomes an "established custom or norm within that system". These qualities respond to the concerns raised by Middleton-Hope about the

failure to sustain leadership programs of individual Chiefs and through its “customary” quality takes on the attributes of a culture. Daft (2007) describes the path to institutionalization as part of three stages, namely, preparation, acceptance and commitment (p. 425). Institutionalization is the final step in the entire process, found in the commitment portion and is when, “...employees view the change not as something new, but as a normal and integral part of organizational operations”.

Pursuing institutionalized leadership, is not the same as implementing the change and immediately arriving at the institutionalization stage. Using Change Theory (ExperiencePoint, 2009) as a continuum for organizational change this study is only a part of the first step known as “understanding the need for change” (p. 4-5). A hypothetical model of how institutionalized leadership could be introduced and accepted in a police service following the seven steps of Change Theory is included at Appendix B. As with any other significant change a key step would be the creation of buy in, consensus and/or motivation for change (Daft, 2007; ExperiencePoint, 2000; Jick & Peiperl, 2003) in this domain. Daft refers to author Jeanie Duck’s work that likens organizational change to a “Change Monster” (p. 424) that goes through several stages starting with “stagnation” and ending with “fruition”. The key point that Daft makes is that there can be successful change, “But Duck cautions that a new period of stagnation is just around the corner”. This point applies equally to the implementation of institutional leadership.

Based on the definitions of “leadership” and “institutionalized” adopted by this study there is only one profession that can claim to be a long standing practitioner of institutionalized leadership, and that is the profession of arms. Schafer (2008) indicates, “The importance of leadership as a social concern can be traced back some 7000 years, yet the exact definition and nature of this concept remains elusive” (p. 239). There is only one institution that was participating in organizational leadership that far back and still relies on lessons learned from that timeframe, the military. This corporate knowledge about leadership spanning millennia that militaries reference is the core of the idea of institutionalized leadership. The military model of leadership is not a reference to the actual practice of arms, or militarism, it is in reference to the constant, pervasive and sustained dedication to the study, discussion, measuring and development of leadership. Pagonis (2001) describes this prominence given to leadership in the military:

“Fortunately for me and for thousands of other officers like me, the army goes to great lengths - greater, I would argue, than any other organization – to groom and develop its leaders. Like all my peers in the general officer ranks, I have been formally educated, informally mentored, and systematically rotated through a wide variety of postings, all designed to challenge me in appropriate ways... and to broaden my skills and knowledge base” (pp. 107-08).

It would appear that these skills are transferable as Korn/Ferry International, a business leadership consultant firm conducted a study in 2005 that concluded amongst other things that:

- Military officers are over-represented among the ranks of CEOs
- CEOs with military background are more likely to deliver strong performance
- The leadership skills learned in military training enhance success in corporate life (Wardell, & Griesedieck, 2006, p. 1).

The same study also states that, “For all of its advantages though, military experience offers no guarantee of success in the corporate world” (p. 8). This warning highlights an important caveat to the proposition that the military model of institutionalized leadership is desirable; it is not infallible. Military defeats, scandals and failures are equally numerous as successes in history<sup>11</sup>. However in the military, even the failures are seen as a learning opportunity and are added to the corporate knowledge of the profession. Despite the military’s long standing obsession with leadership and a constantly evolving model, it is often discounted, or ignored as a source of expertise on the subject.

One source examined the question of policing and the military leadership model specifically. Cowper (2000) summarized his study’s intent by stating that, “What it will attempt to do is dispel the notion of a single military leadership model that needs to be rejected – a stereotypical model based on authoritarian, centralized control of mindless subordinates...” (p. 229). Whether or not it is this generalization that causes people to reject the military leadership model is secondary to the important notion that there is no single military leadership model. Rather there is a singular devotion to leadership matters that can be emulated in any industry. And, aside from its roots as the “military model”, it can be completely customized under any name (i.e. the police leadership model). However, if the values of that system are viewed with bias, or prejudice without rational study then police leaders run the risk described by Cowper:

“This fallacious notion is causing many progressive police decision makers to ignore or reject a vast body of knowledge and experience – organizational structures, training and development philosophies, methods of operation, and practical leadership - that could radically improve the way law enforcement agencies conduct the business of policing” (p. 229).

The corporate knowledge that this study refers to and the “vast body of knowledge” alluded to by Cowper is captured in such works as Jeff O’Leary’s (2004) book *The Centurion Principles*. O’Leary draws on historical examples spanning from Hannibal to Lincoln to demonstrate ten principles of leadership. This type of dedication to the study of leadership is the essence of what is meant by institutionalized leadership and O’Leary describes why leaders in

industries other than the military can learn from them. He stated, “Timeless leadership principles carried these brave warriors through the most desperate circumstances...If they were useful then, they will surely serve those in ministry, military, or corporate leadership today” (p. 4). A compilation of several lists of these “principles” from various sources is provided at Appendix C with the intent of showing just how universal they are. A key consideration of the Dobby, Anscombe and Tuffin (2004) research was that, “Although police leadership has often been criticised in recent years, there had been no generally accepted model of police leadership against which current practice could be tested, and towards which it could be advised to move” (p. 3). While this study agrees there is still no police leadership model, like Cowper it asks why a solution cannot be drawn from a working model in a similar profession.


The proposed solution for contemporary police services is to stop flailing about, looking for a Holy Grail of leadership practices and return to a simple formula that has worked for a much older institution for centuries. Collins and Porras (1996) wrote that, “Truly great companies understand the difference between what should never change and should be open for change, between what is generally sacred and what is not” (p. 66). Military institutions have long understood that core principles, positive leader behaviour, constant leadership scanning (i.e. identification), training, and metrics based on results are those things “sacred”, while techniques, theories, leader’s tools (e.g. planning methods, briefing formats, etc) and support services (i.e. HR processes, technology, organizational structure) are constantly changing. Policing has not cemented those core issues that should be sacrosanct to the profession. Instead of looking to an organization that has mastered what is and is not “sacred”, policing seeks to reinvent the proverbial wheel. Cowper wrote about this failure stating, “Yet, it is the leadership, the kind of leadership that creates the esprit and morale and professionalism found in today’s armed forces, that today’s police forces should be most emulating” (p. 242). Cowper produced a table listing the conceptual similarities between the two professions (Appendix D) that would suggest the compatibility of leadership practices.

While there is no doubt that the core missions of the two professions are different, they share compatible roles (i.e. service to others, state security, state sanctioned use of force, protection of civil society, tactical problem solving, etc). In the case of the military, they have been building their leadership models since the outset of military history (several thousand years), while policing is still experimenting with a variety of practices that date back less than two hundred years. In the military, there is still a recognition that practices will change and can be improved. The current CF leadership doctrine was only published in the last five years. Hammond (1998) called for this type of update, even though the CF already had very lengthy leadership manuals. He was writing from the perspective of a professional practitioner who had lived through the CF crises examined in *A Question of Honour* (Stornoway Productions, 2003). Hammond concluded that, “Improving leadership starts with improving doctrine...Correcting our leadership doctrine should be one of the highest priority tasks within the department” (p. 10). Figure 1 begged the question, what supports the leadership



foundation? In his article, Hammond introduced the notion of the “four walls” of personal characteristics, leadership concepts, leadership techniques and leader development, all resting on the foundation of the core values of the organization. Combined with Figures 1 and 2 the new model could be illustrated as follows:

Figure 4



It is recognized in CF doctrine that situational factors, team capabilities, experience, learning and other dynamics greatly affect the individual leader and their Figure 4 components. The CF produced the “Simplified Leadership Model” (Appendix E) to capture these interactions. Figure 4 of this study, only accounts for the “Leadership Characteristics” of that CF model.

In the case of policing, Figure 4 could become the starting point for a hypothetical police leadership model. Figure 2 was an illustration of what presently exists in the profession. Without casting away all of the advancements in the professional skills, police services have to start filling up those lower level

supports. First and foremost the foundation has to be set in meaningful values that resonate with the frontline police officers. Lencioni (2002) believes that these, “Core values are the deeply ingrained principles that guide all of a company’s actions; they serve as the cultural cornerstones” (p. 114). This is also described in other sources as the “core ideology” (Collins & Porras, 1996) of the organization. In the case of the USMC, this ideology is described in part as, “Self-image is at the heart of the Marine Corps – a complex set of ideals, beliefs, and standards that define our Corps. Our selfless dedication to and the elevation of the institution over self is uncommon elsewhere” (USMC, 2002, p. 22). If as Gottschalk, Sommerseth and Gudmundsen (2009) suggest there is no identifiable police culture, or as Kingshott, Bailey and Wolfe (2004) conclude, the current police sub-culture is unhealthy then selection and defining of these values is all the more important. For example, a succinct, memorable set could be:

- Honour: Ethical, moral, legal, honest and impartial behaviour at all times.
- Courage: Courage in the face of physical danger, the courage to be accountable for decisions and mistakes, as well as the courage to address respectfully errors made by peers, subordinates and superiors.
- Service: Embodiment of the protect life and property function of the profession, equal service to all others irrespective of gender, culture, race, religion, or other differences and service to others always before oneself.

For the remainder of the four walls police organizations can draw on existing practices from any number of sources.

The CF, USMC and USAR have all published updated leadership doctrine in the past eight years and all of them share some fundamental similarities. Firstly all of them are substantial documents. The CF material is presented in four volumes that cover Conceptual Foundations (2005), Doctrine (2005), Leading People (2007) and Leading the Institution (2007). Second, they all define leadership and list the principles the respective organizations adhere to. Thirdly they discuss values, concepts, traits and/or theories associated to leadership. Fourth, they are liberally filled with anecdotal stories demonstrating the values, they wish reinforced, even when those stories are built on failures within the same organization and these are powerful messages. Appendix F is a particularly poignant example of one such teaching point, that sets an example for ethical leadership. These anecdotes follow the principles of vicarious learning (Popper & Mayseless, 2007) and are intended as a deliberate strategy given that the final fundamental similarity of these publications is that they are all instructional guides. All leadership training within the organizations is given in accordance with this doctrine. These documents are the tools by which, in Anderson’s (2000) words, “The leadership organization creates and sustains leadership-centered culture where leaders are equipped to develop other leaders at all levels of the organization...” (p. 5). The introductory sentence of the USAR (2006) *Army Leadership* manual defines the document’s goal as, “All Army team members Soldiers and civilians alike, must have a basis of understanding for

what leadership is and does” (p. 1-1). Not only do these documents serve to teach consistently, but they also serve as the basis for identifying and objectively measuring leadership potential in one’s subordinates. The scored performance evaluation report (Canadian and United States models) most weighed in career movement and/or advancement in the organizations is a critical part of the leadership model.

In the case of the contemporary CF leadership framework the measures of leadership were also the subject of modernization. Oversight of both the doctrine and the leadership measures are the responsibility of the CFLI, a section dedicated to leadership matters. For example, in the case of leader potential measurement the section’s research, “...included a thorough analysis of the suite of 2020 CF documents, other military sources, and generic leadership literature” (Edwards, Bentley, & Walker, 2006, p. 10). The resulting framework is used to assist in leader development across all four sub-divisions they have used to classify leaders: junior, intermediate, advanced and senior (p. 11). This framework is applied to the members throughout their careers, starting with induction. This assessment component cannot be overemphasized. Another common theme from both the military and non military sources of leadership demand increased leadership assessment with meaningful measures. This does not only mean top down assessment, but self-assessment (Anderson, 2000), subordinate feedback (DND Doctrine, 2005, Department of the Army, 2006, Dobby, Anscombe, & Tuffin, 2004) and even peer evaluation (Anderson, 2000, Dobby, Anscombe, & Tuffin, 2004). Dobby, Anscombe and Tuffin, clearly recommend this type of comprehensive leadership evaluation in policing where, “It may be that 360 degree appraisal, in which all officers are assessed by officers above and below the in the chain, will provide a promising way forward” (p. 26).

None of the traditional military leadership practices have precluded those organizations from evolving with modern leadership trends from within and without the military environment. The most recent trends being explored in civil business literature is the language of the contemporary USMC, USAR and CF leadership doctrine. Transformational leadership is recognized in the military literature and is actively promoted as the target behaviour of leaders. In the CF doctrine they have isolated it along a continuum of leadership styles (Appendix G), excluding the laissez faire and authoritarian styles at the two opposite poles (DND Doctrine, 2005, p. 21). One might assume that organizations such as the military which operate under a strong vertical hierarchy may have trouble fostering the environment for transformational leadership given that certain sources indicate that hierarchies tend to curb the ability to display transformational qualities at the junior leader level (Bruch & Walter, 2007). However, while discussing the feasibility of the CF’s pursuit of transformational leadership development at all levels, Mau and Wooley (2006) identify the very characteristic of the military (and policing) that makes this a necessary strategy. They observe that, “...in combat situations, it is still possible to envision ‘life and death’ circumstances, whereby even the non-supervisory ranks might be required to react spontaneously with innovation and creativity – and without

direct orders – in the face of a completely unexpected contingency” (p. 55). This comment by Mau and Wooley is all the more pertinent to policing where the individual police officer is engaged in daily, live operations in a context where they are far more isolated and independent (Johnson & Cox, 2005) than their military counterparts. This assertion is corroborated by Steinheider and Wuestewald (2008) who see modern police initiatives (i.e. community policing and intelligence-led policing) as causes for a shift where, “The focus has shifted from leadership at the top to leadership at the bottom, where the discretionary activities of front line officers can make a real difference in terms of community engagement, prevention, and interdiction” (p. 145). It remains to be seen if all of these practices of institutionalized leadership can be applied to the modern police service to move its members towards transformational leadership practices.

### Applicability of the Solution at the OPS

Adapting a comprehensive military model of institutionalized leadership to a police service would certainly be *avant garde*, but not completely without precedent. With the repeated recommendations in numerous articles calling for increased leadership training and development it is not surprising that at least one organization has looked to the military for inspiration in providing leadership training. In the aftermath of the Independent Commission of the LAPD, that organization created the West Point Leadership Program in 1996, named after the United States military academy of the same name and created in consultation with the military academy. Jenks, Carter, Jenks and Correia (2006) sought to measure user satisfaction towards the program. Their conclusions, amongst others, were that, “It was remarkable to find that all respondents agreed that the training met their expectations and that it inspired them to continue a study of leadership... Respondents generally feel that the WDLP training has helped them improve their skills and helped them become better leaders” (p. 69). Feedback on this program is still limited and the authors also point out that actual leadership was not measured, but from a user standpoint the program is rated as a success.

Currently the OPS has no dedicated leadership section, nor any formal leadership program. Most leadership related matters (i.e. promotion) are run by the Human Resources Section and training for leaders (e.g. NCO Orientation Course) is conducted by the service’s Professional Development Center. At this point it would be beneficial to examine the differences in leadership and leadership related matters between the OPS and one of the military models that is being considered an example of institutionalized leadership. Appendix H is a comparison of the current situation at the OPS in contrast to the practices of the CF. From the table in Appendix H it can be observed how far apart the two models currently are. If police services elect to follow the recommendations being made here, the police model will need to shift in some dramatic ways.

Embarking on the road to institutionalized leadership and becoming a learning organization starts first and foremost with a comprehensive plan (Day, Harrison, & Halpin, 2009). From the US and Canadian military examples it was

observed that very detailed doctrine is a pre-requisite for the model. In the military preparing and maintaining these plans and doctrines is a full time task of dedicated sections. The first step for the OPS would be to create such a section in its own organization. At its tactical level the OPS is organized in a platoon structure, therefore a potential name for this hypothetical section could be the OPS Leadership Platoon. The Broken Arrow Police Department practices a similar concept in their “Leadership Team” that comprises roughly twelve members (Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008, p. 149). This team is comprised of a wide variety of the service’s ranks and includes police union representation. This team’s “...power and responsibilities constitute a ‘high involvement’ (Lawler, 1988) structure within the organization, meaning it possesses policymaking authority and the ability to direct the activities of various other components of the organization”.

In order to avoid the organizational “power struggle” (Stornoway Productions, 2003) described between civil servants and military leadership in the CF in the 1990s, the OPS Leadership Platoon leader should be co-equal in positional power to the Human Resources section head. Both should report directly to the Chief of Police. This would be an enormous change to the traditional OPS “functional structure” (Daft, 2007, pp. 102-104) where all of the lower level sections report up the branches to a collection of two Deputy Chiefs and a civilian Director General, who in turn report to the Chief. In the case of this reformed twin sub-section (OPS Leadership Platoon and Human Resources) their unique role in transmitting the Chief’s intent for ethical and leadership behaviour to all members of the organization calls for an end to reporting to the Chief through another layer of the chain of command. It was recognized earlier that the Chief (or CEO) occupies the pre-eminent position of power in setting the direction of these domains (Dobby, Anscombe, & Tuffin, 2004, Heifetz & Laurie, 2001, Johnson & Cox, 2005, Middleton-Hope, 2007, Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008). It makes no sense to put someone in that great a position of power and the associated liability when things go wrong, but then oblige them to communicate their intent through an intermediary.

Once a leadership section is formed to implement that intent, selection of the junior and senior police leaders who will ensure its delivery has to undergo change. Using Figure 4 as the illustration of the dynamics involved in developing each member as a leader, there is some key construction from the ground up that has to take place. Currently the OPS mission and values portion of the foundation is tenuous for the average front line operator. When asked through informal conversation between 2008 and 2009 what the OPS mission is only three of approximately thirty officers, including several Sergeants and a Staff Sergeant, knew it. Those who knew it were only able to give it in its abridged version (i.e. “Working together for a safer community”). More than twice that number, including one Sergeant answered with variations of “To protect and to serve”. When asked to name the OPS values, answers were so sporadic as to be meaningless with only a few being able to name one or two in one word derivatives. This does not mean that the current mission statement and values<sup>12</sup> are poor choices for the organization, but they are obviously failing to resonate

with the front line professionals. They do represent the collective (i.e. front line and administrative) character of the organization and its place in the community, but a much more focused set is needed that inspires the average front line patrol officer, or investigator. Lencioni (2002) described what usually happens and what should happen in relation to defining core values:

“What’s the first thing that many executives do after they decide to embark on a values initiative? They hand off the effort to the HR department, which uses the initiative as an excuse for an inclusive feel-good effort. To engage employees, HR rolls out employee surveys and holds lots of town meetings to gather input and build consensus. That’s precisely the wrong approach...they’re about imposing a set of fundamental, strategically sound beliefs on a broad group of people” (p. 116).

If the same exercise described above was conducted in a CF front line infantry battalion there would be few soldiers at any rank who would not be able to articulate the infantry’s mission. In fact, this question and other fundamental knowledge questions are asked on a weekly basis in operational units to reinforce the basics. If you asked the same soldiers what the CF, or Land Forces (i.e. organizational) mission was, the answers would likely be just as varied and uncertain as those given at the OPS in the last year. There is no reason why having two sets of missions and/or values for the tactical and strategic levels should be detrimental if they are meaningful to the professional sub-culture and help form that critical foundation in Figure 4. This is perhaps why the CF has even divided its two basic leadership manuals into the categories of “Leading the People” (i.e. tactical) and “Leading the Institution” (i.e. strategic).

Currently the OPS places all of the onus on the individual to volunteer, or put themselves forward for promotion, much like an ambitious private sector employee would apply for a specific managerial position. It is then a highly individualistic effort where almost all of the performance measured is the performance in the actual promotional process, which is held in the corporate environment of the classroom and/or interview room. This environment is completely the opposite of where most officers spend the vast majority of their career actually displaying the qualities being sought under operational conditions. How then can one claim that such a process is “results oriented”, when the actual meaningful results are being displayed over the course of several years in live operations? CF soldiers and officers are evaluated on an ongoing basis from the moment they join the forces. Their performance on courses, in their daily functions, in garrison, on exercise and in operations is constantly being monitored and recorded. Course reports, including all of their results on tests and practical evaluations are kept as part of their Human Resources file for the rest of their careers to assist the centralized career managers in accurately guiding each individual’s long term career. Furthermore, the CF member does not simply decide they are ready for promotion. While they are encouraged (and obliged) to communicate their career ambitions on an annual basis, nomination

for leadership courses is based on a complex scoring system, including the member's annual performance evaluation report (PER), education, language skills and other details. The rank specific course itself is also part of the selection process and many candidates are unsuccessful at passing. Policing has an advantage in this regard, because there is already an assessment component in live operations for first year officers returning from basic training, but this practice is not continued in the case of potential leadership candidates.

Both the CF and the OPS are organizations that are fundamentally dedicated to the service to others, provided in a strong team or small unit context. The CF reinforces this message not only in its leadership philosophy, but by making leadership selection based on objective and sustained observations of these values and attributes in the working environment. On course, candidates are tested in realistic simulations, where the majority act as followers, when the assessed candidate(s) perform in leadership roles. In the case of the OPS, the individual is encouraged to nominate themselves for participation in the promotional process and then are removed completely from performing in a team environment to describe how they as individuals have demonstrated a few of the organizational competencies on a handful of occasions. Practical scenarios are conducted in a classroom, or in a computer exercise where the officer has to describe what they would do in the real situation, again with a total absence of real world stimuli. By continually reinforcing the performance of the individual in isolation from the team and realistic conditions one has to speculate that the long term message is one of self-promotion and egoism, which are the polar opposites of the fundamental calling of the profession.

By shifting the emphasis from the individual to the organization in career advancement the organization will be encouraging the "humility" element of Collins' (2005) Level 5 Leadership in its members from the outset. This will also contribute to developing authentic leaders (Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2001; May, Chan, Hodges, & Avolio, 2003), who try to do the right thing all of the time because it is the right thing to do, as opposed to doing it once in a while with the intent of producing it as one of a few examples in a future promotional process. If the OPS adopts this type of approach the organization is conforming to two of the three major recommendations by May, Chan, Hodges and Avolio (2003) regarding authentic leadership development, specifically:

"1. Organizations should select leaders who are personally motivated to be authentic in their actions. 3. Performance metric systems for leaders must reflect the attributes of authentic leadership. For example, leaders must be rewarded for developing a longer-term orientation and for taking authentic moral actions..." (p. 257).

Instilling this sense of humble authenticity in leaders at all levels is the difference between producing true transformational leadership, as opposed to the "Pseudo-transformational leaders [who] pursue egotistical self-aggrandization ends and do not hesitate in manipulating their followers..." (Charbonneau, 2004, p. 130). It is

at the individual's level where the battle is going to be fought in the road to police services becoming learning organizations. Either we will succeed in conveying the message that "every officer is a leader" and provide those officers with the leadership foundations and walls necessary to sustain top performance; or we will continue to flounder from one theory, practice and trend to the next, encouraging the officers that it is every man and woman for themselves.

## CONCLUSION

In the "Abilene Paradox", Harvey (1988) described the process by which organizations arrive at places that no one really wants to be, yet everyone helps in getting there. In military history, the era where combat leaders were often chosen because of social status or political power instead of proven merit within the profession of arms is treated with scorn in modernized armies. However in policing, where all of the contemporary research is recommending an emphasis on meaningful leadership training and professional credibility as pre-requisites for leadership selection there is still an absence of leadership training at the junior ranks, only sporadic training at more senior levels and the infusion of a civilian corporate approach to human resource practices. Where it is recognized in the military that several hundred years ago it bordered on the preposterous to select people with no military training, or experience to lead people in battle, the current Commissioner of the RCMP, Canada's national police service has no prior police service, or training; a type of police appointment that was discontinued in the United Kingdom in the early Twentieth Century. None of this means that military history does not have its examples of exceptional leaders (Jeanne d'Arc is one such) who humbled this modern scorn, nor does it mean that the current Commissioner of the RCMP is a bad leader, or does not possess other impressive qualifications, but it does call into question where police leadership is in its evolution. The absence of a coherent leadership culture, unanimous calls for an enhanced leadership model and the confusion of civilian corporate practices that come and go in rapid succession indicate the profession is at its figurative "Abilene". No police officer from the most junior Constable to the Chief of police wants an ad hoc leadership model, but presently that is what the profession has. Schafer (2008) summarizes this state of the police leadership model as, "Historically, leadership development has been a limited process. Leaders were expected to either bring requisite skills to the job or acquire those skills (presumably through osmosis) in the course of performing their duties" (p. 252).

There is no doubt from the literature reviewed in this study that there is a continuum between developing transformational leadership and becoming a learning organization. There is also total consensus on the fact that this is not an overnight process, nor is it done in the absence of continuous development. There are few organizations that have working models, let alone long standing working models that commence leadership development from the applicant's first day to their retirement, but the military is one such profession. Cowper (2000) has no doubt as to the applicability of this model to policing. He concludes that:



“The military, philosophically accomplishing the same types of missions with the same types of resources, has developed and has been developing the theories and methods to do its job for centuries. The doctrines are sound, and the methodologies are effective, albeit ever changing and improving. The philosophical concepts are directly applicable to law enforcement, with only minor modification. Many of the operational and structural techniques are largely appropriate to our profession” (p. 242).

Cowper suggests that resistance comes from two polarized and inaccurate views of the military model that either; a) glorify the militarist stereotype and use it as an excuse for authoritarian leadership, or b) cling to a violently anti-military bias that sees the profession simply as monolithic and violent. Needless to say both of these views are extremely biased and fail to objectively assess the merits of the military model. One source that considered the military model as part of a scientific approach to leadership development was the work of Day, Harrison and Halpin (2009). They used military leadership as a starting point for their leadership theory. They see this theory as being widely applicable because, “Your organization may not have the same demographics or mission as the Army, but we believe the central focus points from this integrative theory apply to leader development across a wide spectrum of organizations” (p. 2).

It is this ability to be able to weigh an external system objectively, while maintaining focus on internal needs and marrying the two that is central to the “both/and” component of Wright and MacKinnon’s (2003) Leader-Coach theory. The central recommendation being proposed by this study is for police services to both adopt the military’s institutionalized approach to leadership and maintain their own police identity and role.

### Recommendations

Based on the themes, recommendations and initiatives observed across the sources analyzed in this study the following recommendations for the institutionalization of leadership in the police profession are made. It is recommended that:

1. A dedicated leadership section (along the lines of the CFLI) be formed in police services.
  - a) This section be led by a senior police officer (e.g. Superintendent, or Inspector level in the OPS rank structure) who is co-equal to the civilian director, or highest ranking civil servant of the Human Resources Section
  - b) Both these sections (Police leadership and Civilian HR) report directly to the Chief with no intermediary level of the chain of command

- c) These two entities work cooperatively in the exchange of information, practices, theories and knowledge. However, they be exclusively responsible for leadership development, selection, testing and training of sworn officers and civilians respectively, from hiring until the member reaches a rank level (i.e. Chief, Director General) that requires special selection processes
  - d) All rank levels be represented by at least one member in the new police leadership section (up to the senior officer of the section)
  - e) This police leadership section be responsible for producing the police service's written leadership doctrine
  - f) The doctrine include the creation, or return to succinct, traditional mission and values for front line police officers and investigators
  - g) This police leadership section be responsible for the sustained maintenance of the police service's leadership doctrine and knowledge, to include forming communities of practice (Wenger & Snyder, 2000) with other leadership partners like the CFLI, LAPD West Point Leadership Program, British Home Office and the CPC
2. Leadership training for all rank levels be instituted as quickly as possible.
- a) The police leadership section, initiate appropriate leadership training at all rank levels in the service
  - b) Ethics, moral development, a service to others culture and meaningful, succinct operational mission and values be incorporated as the foundation (Figure 4) throughout all training
  - c) Coach Officers receive a specific leadership training component to their course with scoring and the possibility of unsatisfactory results (i.e. re-course, or further development required)
  - d) Police leadership training for Sergeants and above be incorporated into the promotional process (i.e. scored) with the possibility of unsatisfactory results
  - e) Training incorporate assessed practical scenarios and operational components
  - f) Course assessments be retained as part of the officers' Human Resource files for developmental and long term performance measure value
3. Leadership selection be based on objective, observed, sustained performance measures and results throughout the individual's career.
- a) Promotion selection be initiated by the organization based on a quantifiable score
  - b) The leadership potential score be based on a combination of performance review, pertinent qualifications (e.g. education, other leadership training), professional qualifications (e.g. police courses, operational experience) and 360 degree assessment
  - c) Promotion be contingent on passing rank specific training and operational assessment

- d) Leadership development (e.g. individual career intent, measures, mentoring) be incorporated as a daily leadership behaviour with a formal interview as part of the annual performance review process
  - e) The police leadership section be responsible for formulating a leadership scoring formula, objective selection of annual candidates for promotion and for running rank specific leadership courses up to the rank of Inspector (OPS rank structure), or equivalent rank
4. The aforementioned recommendations be used to establish and sustain institutionalized leadership in the police profession as a perpetual organizational strategy.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> The current complement of the OPS is approximately 1300 police officers and 575 civilian staff, retrieved the 15<sup>th</sup> of March 2010 from: <http://www.ottawapolice.ca/en/AboutOPS/abouttheops.aspx>

<sup>2</sup> Created in Great Britain by Sir Robert Peel who enacted the Metropolitan Police Act in 1829, starting with approximately 1000 police officers for the London area, retrieved the 10<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010 from: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert\\_Peel](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Peel)

<sup>3</sup> In some police services an officer will immediately assume full duties, while in others there is some sort of assessment, or coach officer period, however in this latter case they may still conceivably be separated from their partner due to the dynamics of a situation and be obliged to become the “lead” on a call.

<sup>4</sup> Johnson and Cox (2005) elaborate on the responsibility of the lone officer in contrast to the military. They write, “However in one very important way, police departments are not military organizations. The basic operational unit of the military is the squad, or a group of eight to ten persons who operate together...The basic operational unit in policing, in contrast, is the individual officer. The lone “patrolman” must simultaneously act as intelligence officer, tactical officer, commander, and foot soldier. There is no one else to help make decisions...” (p. 76).

<sup>5</sup> “Battlecraft” refers to mastery of the many tactics, basic skills (e.g. navigation) and practices needed to actually command an infantry unit. “Musketry” was a rather traditional way of referring to mastery and understanding of the many weapons systems (i.e. personal, unit and support arms) an infantry officer would use, or call on in combat. “Physical Fitness” meant both physical conditioning, but also endurance, mental acuity and the mastery of self necessary to not only survive in combat, but be able to care for the officer’s many charges.

<sup>6</sup> “Legislative Authorities” refers to the powers invested in the police officer through Federal, Provincial and Municipal laws. “Tactical Skills” are the skills and procedures learned in how to deploy use of force options, conduct vehicle operations, respond to various calls for service, judgment decisions in high stress situations and other operational procedures. “Wellbeing” is the combination of physical fitness, mental wellbeing, healthy lifestyle, sense of time management and other skills that permit an officer to remain sound in the practice of the other two pillars, despite shift work, job stress and the other pressures both personal and professional.

<sup>7</sup> PC is a commonly accepted acronym, or abbreviation in many Western hemisphere police services for Patrol Constable, or Police Constable.

<sup>8</sup> Considered in military leadership discussions to be one of the most critical errors in combat leadership by the USAR during the Vietnam War, Army officers only served six months as their combat tour, while their non-commissioned subordinates did twelve months under at least two different commissioned officers. The USMC did not follow this practice and their officers did their full twelve months with their troops unless killed, or wounded out of action.

<sup>9</sup> Applicant Testing Services Inc, <http://www.applicanttesting.com/>

<sup>10</sup> Jeanne d’Arc was seventeen years old when she petitioned Charles, the King of a much reduced France to allow her to lead French soldiers in the war against England.

<sup>11</sup> For every winner of every skirmish, battle, or war ever fought, there was always a loser.

<sup>12</sup> Shortly after the commencement of this study, they were updated at the OPS with the introduction of the 2010-2012 operational plan (OPS, 2009, p. 6) and are similar, but not the same as those referred to from the informal conversations in this study.

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**Appendix A**

<b>McDonald</b>	<b>Related Theories</b>	<b>OPS Applicability</b>
<p>Customize Recruitment, Selection and Retention Guidelines</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anderson (2000) Transformation Through Personnel Systems (pp. 327-346): Specifically, screen more thoroughly, build a database, create relevant behaviourally based interviews (p. 331)</li> <li>• CACP (2008) Human Resource Strategies: Specifically, nationalized standards with emphasis on professionalization (p. 22)</li> <li>• Middleton-Hope (2007) in examining recruitment contends that “ethical decision making is still and issue of character” (p. 8), which suggests this can be screened for in recruits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic goal in 2010-2012 Operational Plan supporting recruitment (OPS, 2009, p. 13)</li> <li>• Opportunity for “Employer of Choice Advisory Council” (p. 13) to address recommendations from McDonald and other sources</li> <li>• Opportunity to incorporate leadership training and doctrine into this early stage</li> </ul>
<p>Create Multilevel Self-Assessment Tools</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dobby, Anscombe, &amp; Tuffin (2004) Full Constructs of Positive and Negative Leadership Behaviours by Rank (pp. 33-60) and suggestion of 360 degree assessment (p. 26)</li> <li>• Martin &amp; Pope (2008) Competency Based Interviewing – Has it one too Far?: Specifically, criticism of singular, or over-reliance on competency based system</li> <li>• Mau &amp; Wooley (2006) An Integrative Model for Assessing Military Leadership</li> <li>• Pagonis (2001) Leadership Practices: Specifically, self assessment, “Regularly scheduled self-examinations are a must for building and sustaining leadership” (p. 112)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Related to the strategic goal of “Performance Management Strategies” in the 2010-2012 Operational Plan (OPS, 2009, p, 11)</li> <li>• Aforementioned goal includes the creation of a “mobile employee record” and members are trained in “giving and receiving feedback to manage performance”</li> <li>• A formal performance review program (PRP) already exists, but it is not scored as part of the promotional process</li> <li>• The existing PRP provides the opportunity to refine the process and make it more meaningful as an assessment tool</li> <li>• Can add to the current list of competencies with separate leader competencies (e.g. Department of the Army, 2006, pp. 2-7)</li> </ul>

<p>Target Career and Succession Planning</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Middleton-Hope (2007) Challenges to Contemporary Police Leadership: Specifically, “number one challenge, developing new leaders” (pp. 17-18)</li> <li>• Murphy (2005) Qualitative Assessment of Executive Development Process in a Large Canadian Police Service: Specifically, seen as not picking the best officers, no faith in the selection process, poor leadership training/ mentoring and lack of meaningful feedback in promotional process (pp. 256-259)</li> <li>• Popper &amp; Mayselless (2007) Building Blocks of Leader Development: Specifically, “the ability to assess and measure pro-social orientation and motivation to lead” (p. 676)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic goals in 2010-2012 Operational Plan for leadership development strategies (OPS, 2009, p. 12) and as part of general development, to “create a succession planning strategy that includes all levels...” (p. 13)</li> <li>• Opportunity presented by one member recently pursuing master’s level study in this specific subject area</li> <li>• Current climate (i.e. growing interest in leadership, emerging leader courses) supports further development of a succession planning strategy as part of global leadership issues</li> </ul>
<p>Develop a Web-Base Learning Program</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CACP (2008) Technology: Specifically, “police leaders in Canada must develop and/or leverage existing agency-specific centres of excellence to create a community of knowledge...” (p. 24)</li> <li>• Wenger &amp; Snyder (2000) Communities of Practice: Specifically, that the communities of practice are corroborative in the sharing of knowledge, which is particularly pertinent to the policing profession where it is not a competitive business environment</li> <li>• Wright &amp; MacKinnon (2003) The Leader Coach: Specifically, one of the four leadership competencies of the modern leader as “learning and change” (pp. 41-44)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The OPS already has a very detailed e-learning site with many of the recommendations from McDonald</li> <li>• Existing site could be expanded to include a very focused, leadership specific area</li> <li>• Several related strategic goals in the 2010-2012 Operational Plan (OPS, 2009) including, “use technology to improve effective efficiencies in solving crime” (p. 10), “enhanced information and intelligence sharing” (p. 13), and “develop and internal and external communications network” (p. 14)</li> </ul>

<p>Promote a Front-Line Recognition Plan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DND Leading People (2007) Recognizing and rewarding success (pp. 64-65): Specifically, with the purpose of increasing or sustaining success and demonstrating to team what successful performance looks like (p. 65)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Part of actions in 2010-2012 Operational Plan, to “Review and expand the rewards and recognition system to members” (OPS, 2009, p. 25)</li> <li>• Recently announced via OPS Intranet, formalized recognition system from NCO, Senior Officer and Chief levels</li> <li>• Opportunity to incorporate this into the PRP system and make it a measurable in identifying leadership potential</li> </ul>
<p>Establish a Corporate Curriculum</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DND, Conceptual Foundations (2005); DND, Doctrine (2005); DND Leading People (2007); DND Leading the Institution (2007); Department of the Army (2006); Department of the Navy (2006): Specifically case studies and anecdotal role modeling of values/ideals</li> <li>• Owens &amp; Pfeifer (2003) Police Leadership and Ethics: Specifically, ethics need to be incorporated into training and practical scenarios as well classroom (p. 132)</li> <li>• Popper &amp; Mayseless (2007) Building Blocks of Leader Development: Specifically, vicarious learning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic goal in 2010-2012 Operational Plan to “Establish training and development standards and expectations for organizational programs and individual education” (OPS, 2009, p. 12)</li> <li>• A very clear and detailed commitment in the current Operational Plan to address this from the individual to the organizational levels, both internally and externally</li> <li>• This strategic goal is completely synchronized with McDonald, but also represents the opportunity to introduce OPS leadership doctrine (if pursued) across that full spectrum</li> </ul>
<p>Create a High-Performance Mental-Training Program</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Day, Harrison, &amp; Halpin (2009) Mental Models (pp. 105-17): Specifically, “... environments in which leaders lead...highly developed mental models allows for quick and generally accurate sensemaking” (p. 117).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No current indication of this type of initiative at the OPS</li> <li>• May be compatible with the training and development goal of the 2010-2012 Operational Plan alluded to in the previous section</li> <li>• Bears further examination and could be incorporated into any potential OPS leadership model</li> </ul>

<p>Enrich the Internal Role Model Function</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Department of the Army (2006), <i>Leading by Example</i> (pp. 7-13 to 7-16): Specifically, “It means putting the organization and subordinates above personal self-interest” (p. 7-13)</li> <li>• Harvard Business Press (2007) <i>Leading by Example: Specifically, “...leader’s responsibility to set the right tone, live the values the company espouses, and truly lead by example”</i> (p. 13)</li> <li>• Johnson (2007) <i>Role Modelling: Specifically, leader behaviours do have an effect on behaviours of subordinates</i> (positive and negative)</li> <li>• Popper &amp; Mayselless (2007) <i>Building Blocks of Leader Development: Specifically, if using vicarious learning, “serious consideration should be given to selection of role models, as well as to the modelling process itself”</i> (pp. 676-77)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Objectives of related strategic goals in 2010-2012 Operational Plan for leadership development, to “formalize a mentoring program” (OPS, 2009, p. 12) and as part of training and development standards to “deliver an employee coaching framework”</li> <li>• The OPS, like many other Canadian police services already participates in a strong coaching culture as the first operational experience of any new members is time with a coach officer. For a junior member this is a very crucial first exposure to leadership by example where they learn by observing their “coach”</li> <li>• There is an opportunity in both the current OPS operational plan and in the existing coach officer culture to enhance the importance of leadership by example in both selection of leaders and continuous emphasis of the point in training</li> </ul>
<p>Pursue Publication Opportunities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anderson (2000) <i>Research: Specifically, “Every policing agency needs to have research on its agenda...”</i> (p. 197). Anderson links the degree of research capabilities and access to data to the success or failure of change initiatives</li> <li>• Wenger &amp; Snyder (2000) <i>Communities of Practice</i>. In general terms, the need for the sharing and access to professional knowledge is an essential element for the modern organization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There are a growing number of officers at all rank levels gravitating towards continued education, particularly post-secondary</li> <li>• The OPS has committed to a strategic goal of supporting external academic development (OPS, 2009)</li> <li>• The geographic location in Ottawa places the OPS in close proximity to two major universities and the CPC.</li> </ul>
<p>Promote Further Related Research</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• See previous section</li> </ul>	

## Appendix B

### Step 1 Understand: Understanding the Need for Change (ExperiencePoint, 2009, pp. 4-5)

- Review of current material regarding police culture, specifically targeting leadership culture, or lack thereof
- Review of material recommending organizational change towards learning organizations
- Review of compatibility between transformational leadership, leadership in general and the learning organization
- Assessment of internal organizational culture in contrast to aforementioned reviews
- Consult with internal (e.g. Experienced police leaders, Academic leadership qualifications, Leadership qualifications from other professions), and external (e.g. CFLI, CPC, CACP) subject matter experts about the issue

### Step 2 Enlist: Enlist a Core Change Team (ExperiencePoint, 2009, pp. 6-7)

- Consistent with the findings of this study the key driver of internal strategy is the Chief, therefore this would be the logical person/position to act as the “change agent” (p. 6)
- In “mapping stakeholders” (p. 7) particular attention should be paid to those “champions” who will not only assist in the change process, but who will then become the new “Leadership Platoon” (or equivalent)
- There should also be at least one member of the civilian membership and a representative of the police association (or union) involved in the core change team

### Step 3 Envisage: Develop Vision and Strategy (ExperiencePoint, 2009, pp. 8-9)

- This stage should include the creation of the actual police leadership doctrine and accompanying curriculum
- Adhering to the principle of keeping the change vision simple and focused (p. 8) a possible vision for this endeavour could simply be, X Police Service will become a learning organization through the institutionalization of leadership
- The strategy for accomplishing this vision will undoubtedly be somewhat more detailed, however here is a series of suggestions that would contribute to aligning police leadership practices with the military model:

#### Personnel:

- Screen for prior leadership experience, training and qualifications in recruitment; and add this to the member’s HR file and factor into future scores for leadership potential

- Add a basic leadership training component to pre-basic training curriculum, including definition, ethics, values, principles, etc
- Have service liaison personnel at basic training academy/college monitor recruits for leadership potential and provide written feedback on leadership for HR file
- Leadership to be scored as part of performance review process from moment of return from basic training, including career counselling, feedback from officer and career development strategy
- Incorporate leadership reinforcement (e.g. revisit definition, principles, ethics, etc) training as part of regular training days and routine operations (e.g. pre-deployment parades, debriefs of operations)
- Leadership platoon/section to make selections for Coach Officer candidates based on leadership potential score calculated from HR files. Coach Officer candidates to attend selection course with advanced leadership training and assessment component (i.e. approximately 4 weeks, 2 weeks of academic and 2 weeks of assessed scenarios)
- Sergeants' promotional process to follow same path as Coach Officers, but with increased leadership material, more complex (i.e. more subordinates, larger calls) assessed scenarios and field assessments similar to those of new police recruits after basic training (i.e. approximately 6 weeks, 2 weeks of academic, 2 weeks of assessed practical scenarios with other candidates filling roles of patrol officers and 2 weeks of field assessment with qualified police Sergeants on regular platoons)
- From this point on promotion until the rank of Inspector (or equivalent) to follow the same basic path with differences based on rank specific tasks

#### Organizational Practices:

- Leadership Platoon/Section should create and maintain a leadership knowledge repository on the service Intranet with current literature, reading lists and anecdotal accounts of positive leadership for role modeling (e.g. similar to Appendix F)
- Leadership Platoon/Section should foster partnerships from within and outside the profession to form communities of practice dedicated to leadership matters
- Core operational mission (e.g. To Protect and to Serve) and values (e.g. Honour, Courage, Service) should be incorporated into all operational broadcasts, orders and correspondence. Organizational, or corporate mission and values could be maintained for all administrative orders, inter-division correspondence and outside correspondence.
- Senior ranks should be present as often as practical in the front line operations environment and engage front line operators when appropriate



Step 4 Motivate: Create a Sense of Urgency (ExperiencePoint, 2009, p. 10)

- From the majority of the literature it would appear that police are unhappy with the current state of leadership and/or leadership training therefore this could be the focal point of creating a sense of urgency
- Without creating, or exacerbating a power struggle with civilian partners, the recent extraordinary action of naming a civilian as the Commissioner of the RCMP can serve as a suitable “external threat” (p. 10) in creating buy-in within the profession for the change
- Particular emphasis should be placed on the NCO level as these members will have the greatest impact on furthering buy-in, or creating resistance

Step 5 Communicate: Communicate the Vision (ExperiencePoint, 2009, p. 11)

- Police services enjoy an advantage in this step of the change process, given their vertical hierarchies and strong internal communications (e.g. briefings, e-mail systems, regular collective training).
- Communicating the vision can be performed by all members of the core change team, but also by the regular chain of command and through the Association/Union.

Step 6 Act: Take Action (ExperiencePoint, 2009, pp. 12-13)

- Implement the strategies proposed at Step 3.
- While this is an ambitious change from existing structures, it should enjoy some advantages over a change process targeting a specific process because it encompasses all levels of the profession. New recruits will be indoctrinated into this new model and over the course of years it will become self-sustaining.
- Close monitoring, particularly user feedback should be exercised from the outset and continue indefinitely.

Step 7 Consolidate: Consolidate Gains (ExperiencePoint, 2009, p. 13)

- “Quick wins” (p. 13) in the police profession may include enhanced service delivery and a reduction of negative ethical cases with new officers.
- “New targets” in the case of institutionalized leadership in policing will be the constant updating and evolution of doctrine to reflect best leadership practices.


**Appendix C**

<b>CF Principles of Leadership</b>	<b>USAR Leadership Requirements Model</b>	<b>USMC Principles of Leadership</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Achieve professional competence and pursue self-improvement</li> <li>• Clarify objectives and intent</li> <li>• Solve problems: make timely decisions</li> <li>• Direct; motivate by persuasion and example and by sharing risks and hardships</li> <li>• Train individuals and teams under demanding and realistic conditions</li> <li>• Build teamwork and cohesion</li> <li>• Keep subordinates informed; explain events and decisions</li> <li>• Mentor, educate, and develop subordinates</li> <li>• Treat subordinates fairly; respond to their concerns; represent their interests</li> <li>• Maintain situational awareness; seek information; keep current</li> <li>• Learn from experience and those who have experience</li> <li>• Exemplify and reinforce the military ethos; maintain order and discipline; uphold professional norms</li> </ul> <p>(DND Doctrine, 2005, pp. 32-33)</p>	<p>Attributes:</p> <p>A Leader of Character</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Army values</li> <li>• Empathy</li> <li>• Warrior ethos</li> </ul> <p>A Leader with Presence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military bearing</li> <li>• Physically fit</li> <li>• Composed, confident</li> <li>• Resilient</li> </ul> <p>A Leader with Intellectual Capacity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mental agility</li> <li>• Sound judgment</li> <li>• Innovation</li> <li>• Interpersonal tact</li> <li>• Domain knowledge</li> </ul> <p>Core Leader Competencies:</p> <p>Leads</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leads others</li> <li>• Extends influence beyond the chain of command</li> <li>• Leads by example</li> <li>• Communicates</li> </ul> <p>Develops</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creates a positive environment</li> <li>• Prepares self</li> <li>• Develops others</li> </ul> <p>Achieves</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gets Results</li> </ul> <p>(Department of the Army, 2006, p. 2-4)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Be technically and tactically proficient</li> <li>• Know yourself and seek self-improvement</li> <li>• Know your Marines and look to their welfare</li> <li>• Keep your Marines informed</li> <li>• Set the example</li> <li>• Ensure the task is understood, supervised and accomplished</li> <li>• Train your Marines as a team</li> <li>• Make sound and timely decisions</li> <li>• Develop a sense of responsibility among your subordinates</li> <li>• Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities</li> <li>• Seek responsibility, and take responsibility for your actions</li> </ul> <p>(Department of the Navy, 2002, p. 105)</p>

O’Leary’s Centurion Principles (paraphrased)	Leading by Example – Lessons from Leaders	Anderson’s Ten Leadership Practices
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrate constant creativity</li> <li>• Learn from failures</li> <li>• Create unity within your organization</li> <li>• Be an integrity-based leader</li> <li>• Always serve the higher cause</li> <li>• Lead with persistence</li> <li>• Accept that decision making requires risk</li> <li>• Be bold and encourage this behaviour with your subordinates</li> <li>• Be a servant leader to your subordinates, always placing their needs before your own</li> <li>• Be a charismatic, visible leader who seeks feedback</li> <li>• Know and care for your subordinates</li> </ul> <p>(O’Leary, 2004)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The importance of a visible leader – Be visible in the work place</li> <li>• Setting the right tone at the top – exemplify the values of the organization and do not tolerate breaches values/ethics</li> <li>• Leadership 24/7 – Communicate with subordinates and be consistent in leadership</li> <li>• The front line is the bottom line – Be visible to the front line and encourage junior leaders to be present with their teams</li> <li>• Be a servant leader – Remain in touch with the front line reality</li> <li>• The head gardener – Develop subordinates carefully</li> <li>• Listening at all levels – Be genuine and encourage open communication</li> <li>• Leadership is not a popularity contest – Make the hard decisions, but explain them</li> <li>• Use emotion sparingly – Be aware of own emotions and use them wisely</li> <li>• The humble boss – Humility in command</li> <li>• The leader is shaped by the team – Recognize and encourage bottom-up leadership</li> <li>• The CEO sets the tone – Entrench mission/values through junior leaders and with front line presence</li> <li>• Trust your judgment – Be steadfast in the face of uncertainty</li> <li>• Having the courage of your convictions – Do not waver under pressure, but be open to valid concerns</li> </ul> <p>(Harvard Business Press, 2007)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Search out challenging opportunities to change, grow, innovate, and improve</li> <li>• Experiment, take risks, and learn from the accompanying mistakes</li> <li>• Envision an uplifting and ennobling future</li> <li>• Enlist others in a common vision by appealing to their values, interests, hopes and dreams</li> <li>• Foster collaboration by promoting cooperative goals and building trust</li> <li>• Strengthen people by sharing information and power and increasing their discretion and visibility</li> <li>• Set the example for others to by behaving in ways that are consistent with one’s stated values</li> <li>• Plan small wins that promote consistent progress and build commitment</li> <li>• Recognize individual contributions to the success of every project</li> <li>• Celebrate team accomplishments regularly</li> </ul> <p>(Anderson, 2000, pp. 49-50)</p>


14 Dimensions of Transformational Leadership	6 Competencies and Selection of Associated Behaviours (paraphrased)	Rowe's Strategic Leader Characteristics
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Genuine concern for others' wellbeing</li> <li>• Empowers, delegates, develops potential</li> <li>• Transparency, honesty, consistency</li> <li>• Integrity and openness to ideas and advice</li> <li>• Accessible, approachable</li> <li>• Inspirational communicator, networker and achiever</li> <li>• Unites through joint vision</li> <li>• Clarifies individual and team direction, priorities and purposes</li> <li>• Creates a supportive learning and self-development environment</li> <li>• Manages change sensitively and skilfully</li> <li>• Charismatic, in-touch</li> <li>• Encourages questioning and critical and strategic thinking</li> <li>• Analytical and creative thinker</li> <li>• Decisive/risk-taking (Dobby, Anscombe, &amp; Tuffin, 2004, pp. 19-20)</li> </ul>	<p>Communication:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accessible and available</li> <li>• Shows sensitivity</li> <li>• Active listener</li> <li>• Empathy</li> <li>• Seeks and offers feedback</li> </ul> <p>Team Building:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encourages teamwork</li> <li>• Places team goals first</li> <li>• Values diversity and uses it to enhance team</li> </ul> <p>Win-Win Negotiation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Builds consensus</li> <li>• Prepares and understands mandates, issues</li> <li>• Open minded</li> <li>• Keeps promises and commitments</li> <li>• Builds on common ground</li> </ul> <p>Flexibility and Innovation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Challenges the status quo</li> <li>• Creative ways to get results, but adheres to organizations values/goals</li> <li>• Accepts change and readjusts to accommodate</li> <li>• Solves problems with openness to new ideas, innovations, partnerships</li> </ul> <p>Risk Taking:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Takes reasoned risks</li> <li>• Is aware of risk parameters</li> <li>• Uses good judgment</li> <li>• Accountable for risks and encourages learning from failures</li> </ul> <p>Seeing the Big Picture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seeks external sources of knowledge</li> <li>• Works to reduce duplication</li> <li>• Anticipates future directions</li> <li>• Adapts to situational factors</li> </ul> <p>(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1998)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synergistic combination of managerial and visionary leadership</li> <li>• Emphasis on ethical behaviour and value-based decisions</li> <li>• Oversee operating (day to day) and strategic (long term) responsibilities</li> <li>• Formulate and implement strategies for immediate impact and preservation of long-term goals to enhance organizational survival, growth and long-term viability</li> <li>• Have strong, positive expectations of the performance they expect from their superiors, peers, subordinates, and themselves</li> <li>• Use strategic controls and financial controls, with emphasis on strategic controls</li> <li>• Use, and interchange, tacit and explicit knowledge on individual and organizational levels</li> <li>• Use linear and nonlinear thinking patterns</li> <li>• Believe in strategic choice, that is, their choices make a difference in their organizations and environment</li> </ul> <p>(Rowe, 2001, p. 82)</p>

Appendix D



## Appendix E

Figure 3 | Simplified CF leadership model.



How personal and situational characteristics make leader influence possible:

- **Relationship a.** Whether they are employed in solving a tactical-level problem or a strategic one, technical, cognitive, social, and other competencies are the basis of a leader's personal power and affect the quality of a leader's analyses, decisions, and plans.
- **Relationship b.** Analysis and intent formation are also influenced by various situational factors. For example, a leader's consciousness of his or her responsibilities, channels attention, thinking, imagination, and decision making. Situational constraints and opportunities also guide and mould

behaviour. Constraints operate at all levels and may apply to time, resources, or behaviour. For example, constraints on behaviour can take the form of the rules of engagement applicable to a specific mission, or Government policies that pertain to the CF as a whole. Similarly, for the prepared and situationally aware leader, opportunities that get noticed can result in dramatic changes in plans or direction at the tactical, operational, or strategic level.

- **Relationships c and d.** The influence processes depicted in the central portion of Figure 3 are the essence of leadership. As an expression of intent, leader influence

may be either enhanced or diminished by the leader's personal characteristics and situational factors. A leader's technical and tactical competence, for example, will earn the confidence of subordinates and enhance the leader's ability to obtain their willing support. Similarly with respect to situational factors, a unit climate characterized by pride and professionalism makes it easier for a commanding officer to communicate intent and implement plans.

**How leader influence affects the capabilities, behaviour, and performance of individuals and groups:**

- **Relationship e.** Outcomes are achieved through others, which means that influence is typically applied in a face-to-face way to modify the capabilities, behaviour, or performance of individuals and groups. In addition to influencing subordinates, leaders may also influence the decisions and actions of peers, superiors, and people external to the organization.
- **Relationship f.** Conversely, any of these people may equally attempt to pro-actively influence or reactively counter-influence whoever is doing the leading. These observations should make it clear that leadership is a dynamic interactive process, involving both hierarchical and mutual influence.

**How leader influence affects the capabilities and performance of CF systems, the institution as a whole, and other aspects of the situation:**

- **Relationship g.** Leader influence is also exercised indirectly, to shape task, group, system, institutional, or environmental characteristics. According to their level of responsibility and authority, CF leaders may change or influence an operational procedure (e.g., a tactical innovation),

organizational structure (e.g., to process-based rather than functional), system capabilities (e.g., new technology or doctrine), institutional characteristics (e.g., unit climate, organizational norms and culture), or conditions in the external environment (e.g., through public relations activities, advice on national security policy). In this way, leaders attempt to improve situational favourability and create the conditions necessary for effective performance and mission success.

- **Relationship h.** Through indirect influence of this kind, leaders enhance individual and group capabilities and performance. When group, system, or institutional improvements become stabilized (e.g., tactical drills, integrated technologies, standard operating procedures, professionalism, cultural norms), they make the process of leading easier and may even substitute, in some cases, for weak leadership.

**How people and situational factors generate essential outcomes and other indicators of effectiveness:**

- **Relationships i and j.** As indicated by Figure 3, the key determinants of CF effectiveness are its people and its systems. The performance of CF members and the performance of various CF systems contribute jointly and independently to the essential outcomes of mission success, internal integration, member well-being and commitment, and external adaptability. The performance of people and systems also affects such secondary outcomes as the CF's image and reputation and public attitudes toward the military. However, events are not entirely subject to human control, and therefore outcomes are not predetermined even in the best-equipped,

best-trained, and best-led military forces. Desired outcomes may be thwarted by human error, natural phenomena, the behaviour of independent actors, equipment failure, chance, and other uncontrollable factors. Even tactical-level decisions and actions can have a strategic impact. Consequently, leaders must constantly be alert to the possibility of plans and actions miscarrying and strive to contain or offset identifiable risks.

■ *Relationship k.* Naturally, outcomes achieved reflect back on leaders, affecting their subsequent behaviour. Outcomes also influence how a leader's capability and effectiveness are perceived by subordinates, peers, and superiors, and thus may either enhance or diminish a leader's legitimacy and capacity to lead.




## **Appendix F**

### **Warrant Officer Thompson at My Lai, Vietnam**

On 16 March 1968, WO1 Hugh C. Thompson, Jr. and his two-man helicopter crew were on a reconnaissance mission over the village of My Lai, Republic of Vietnam. WO1 Thompson watched in horror as he saw an American Soldier shoot an injured Vietnamese child. Minutes later, he observed more Soldiers advancing on a number of civilians in a ditch. Suspecting possible reprisal shootings, WO1 Thompson landed his helicopter and questioned a young officer about what was happening. Told that the ground combat action was none of his business, WO1 Thompson took off and continued to circle the embattled area. When it became apparent to Thompson that the American troops had now begun firing on more unarmed civilians, he landed his helicopter between the Soldiers and a group of ten villagers headed towards a homemade bomb shelter. Thompson ordered his gunner to train his weapon on the approaching Soldiers and to fire if necessary. Then he personally coaxed the civilians out of the shelter and airlifted them to safety. WO1 Thompson's immediate radio reports about what was happening triggered a cease-fire order that ultimately saved the lives of many more villagers. Thompson's willingness to place himself in physical danger to do the ethically and morally right thing was a sterling example of personal and moral courage.

## Appendix G

Figure 4 | Spectrum of leader influence behaviours.



**Appendix H**

In the table located below the leadership practices of the CF are represented by a single column, however there are slight differences between the career paths of non-commissioned members and commissioned officers. Some of the salient differences are distinguished on a case by case basis.

<b>CF Leadership Practices</b>	<b>OPS Leadership Practices</b>
<b>Recruiting</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• On line, or mail in application process</li> <li>• On material provided about Canadian Armed Forces “Leadership and Recruit School”</li> <li>• Immediate exposure to leadership choices (i.e. NCO or commissioned officer path) through career orientation interview</li> <li>• Career orientation performed with serving military members of various ranks who will explore leadership matters with candidate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• On line application process</li> <li>• No specific mention of leadership in publicity</li> <li>• Leadership treated generically as part of competency based model (not mentioned in recruiting portion of web site)</li> <li>• No mention, or allusion to leadership role of police officers in application process</li> </ul>
<b>Basic Training</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Immediate emphasis on leadership reality (i.e. anyone can be called on to lead due to operational losses)</li> <li>• Very prolonged (i.e. approximately 40 weeks) basic training with meaningful assessment in leadership roles (Commissioned officers)</li> <li>• Early practice in simple leadership roles (e.g. group “leader” for tasks, day, etc)</li> <li>• Leadership assessed and recorded in course reports if observed (non-commissioned), maintained throughout career</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No leadership training for recruits within the service</li> <li>• No leadership training at the OPC</li> <li>• Minimal leadership roles as group leader, leadership acts recorded at discretion of individual instructors</li> </ul>
<b>Operations</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Daily awareness for leadership issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Little or no reference to leadership in daily vernacular</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Daily reinforcement of positive leadership, or challenging of negative leadership</li> <li>• Constant recording by next level leader of acts reflective of leadership potential</li> <li>• Informal, but constant reflection on leadership case studies</li> <li>• Daily potential for filling leadership roles</li> <li>• Practical experience for junior members to lead at higher levels in exercise scenarios</li> <li>• Growing recognition in modernized doctrine for bottom-up feedback on leadership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some recognition of leadership in Performance Review Process, but predominantly reserved for members who hold positional authority (i.e. rank) and is one dimensional (i.e. does not measure elements of leadership, rather treats it as a single competency)</li> <li>• No feedback from subordinates on leadership efficacy</li> </ul>
<p>Leader Selection</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leadership potential measured by centralized career manager section comprised of senior NCOs and senior officers for respective career paths</li> <li>• Score based on annual assessments, course reports and related outside qualifications (e.g. language skills, education, etc)</li> <li>• Member signals interest for increased responsibility through annual performance evaluation report interview and receives feedback</li> <li>• Selected by centralized career managers for spots on upcoming trade specific leadership courses which are also part of selection process (i.e. usually there is a certain attrition due to failure)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Self-initiated by application after minimum of seven years of service (at the Sergeants level)</li> <li>• Pass or fail process based on scoring of self-prepared resume, an interview with a limited number of self-articulated competency based examples and self-described response to a sit down scenario</li> <li>• Performance Review not scored in process</li> <li>• Successful candidates ranked by score in process and promoted sequentially as positions become available</li> </ul>
<p>Leadership Courses</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Part of leadership selection process</li> <li>• Significant length of time (e.g. Infantry Section Commander's</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited, short courses offered in service, or through OPC and CPC</li> <li>• No meaningful assessment</li> </ul>

<p>course approximately twelve weeks)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formal leadership training (e.g. theories, practices, principles)</li> <li>• Extensive academic and practical assessment</li> <li>• Practical filling of daily leadership roles by candidates</li> <li>• Each successful candidate ranked on course with impact on time of promotion (i.e. when spots become available)</li> <li>• Course results (i.e. written course report) maintained as part of member's central file for duration of career</li> <li>• Senior commissioned officers' courses linked to civilian academic qualifications and interchangeable between many NATO allies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Very little actual leadership theory or training, mainly managerial based (i.e. processes)</li> <li>• No practical scenarios</li> <li>• No leadership roles to fill</li> <li>• Not scored and not retained in Human Resources records other than as an additional qualification</li> </ul>
<p><b>Leadership Doctrine and Knowledge</b></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extensive written doctrine, maintained and updated over time</li> <li>• Dedicated section for oversight of this knowledge and material (i.e. CFLI)</li> <li>• Practical use of doctrine by leaders at all levels for instruction on courses, or in garrison</li> <li>• Material readily accessible on-line and in central libraries within all types of CF units</li> <li>• Consistent content and readily shared between international NATO allies and some non NATO allies (e.g. Australia, New Zealand)</li> <li>• Enormous collection of case studies, anecdotes and examples of real life failures and successes from both within and outside of the CF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No leadership doctrine</li> <li>• No dedicated leadership section, or expertise</li> <li>• No formal collection point for leadership material, or content</li> <li>• Limited, or no collection of leadership anecdotes, or case studies</li> <li>• Limited sharing of leadership knowledge with other police organizations</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No historical time limit, or borders on sources/examples</li> </ul>	
<p>General Leadership Practices</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Constant referencing of word “leadership” in daily activities, organizational literature and publications</li> <li>• Constant discussion of leadership topics and case studies in formal and informal settings</li> <li>• Encouragement to make leadership a career long area of extra-curricular study</li> <li>• Leadership irrevocably intertwined within the traditions, daily operations and culture of the organization</li> <li>• Military members’ leadership development, measurement, selection and promotion controlled by military professionals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under-emphasis of “leadership” and “leader” in daily operations and training in favour of “manage”, “supervise” and “administrate”</li> <li>• Little to no reflection on leadership matters as a part of individual or team routine</li> <li>• Little to no (but growing) motivation given to study leadership outside of the profession</li> <li>• Leadership is not embedded in the culture</li> <li>• Leadership development, measurement and selection processes controlled by civilian Human Resource professionals</li> </ul>